FORDFOUNDATION

Kathleen Hartford

Review of the Ford Foundation's Grant-making in Education and Culture in China 2001-2016

Methods and Approaches

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Review of the Ford Foundation's Grant-making in Education and Culture in China

– Methods and Approaches

2001-2016

PREFACE

Dear friends and partners,

I am pleased to share with you the *Review of the Ford Foundation's Grant-making in Education and Culture in China — Methods and Approaches 2001-2016*.

As you may know, when the Ford Foundation closes a program or at the end of a program officer's tenure, the foundation often commissions a consultant's review of the program to assess its scope and impact and to provide suggestions for future directions. This report therefore might be seen as a normal undertaking, undertaken at the end of Dr. He Jin's tenure as program officer the then-senior program officer responsible for the Education portfolio in the Beijing office. However, two factors make this report more ambitious. First, the fifteen-year life span of the program coincides almost exactly with the program officer's time spent developing and implementing it. That is double or triple the time most program officers remain in the office, and creates a strong individual grant maker's stamp on the program. Second, Dr. He has worked closely with other donor organizations and has shared systematically with many new Chinese domestic foundations over the past decade. His approach has been examined with keen interest by those in the philanthropic sector. It is clear from their responses that an evaluation report on this program's strategy formation, grantmaking approaches, and results can and should serve also to inform the broader philanthropic sector.

Dr. He Jin joined the Ford Foundation in July 2001 and retired in September 2016. Over this fifteen-year period, Dr. He developed and funded work in the fields of culture, basic education, vocational education and higher education. Across all his work, Dr. He prioritized equality and respect for the actual conditions and needs of China's development. Dr. He also developed his own set of principles to guide his work and to guide grantees and stakeholders on their search for root causes and sustainable solutions to some of China's most important social issues. Many of you will find familiar

the fifteen-character grant making principle developed by Dr. He: **"Seeking truth from facts, Participation, Innovation, Sustainability, Replicability".**

In addition to his own grant making work, Dr. He made irreplaceable contributions to the development of China's philanthropic sector. Many foundation staff and those interested in philanthropy joined him on field trips and assessments, learning how to use a small amount of seed money to mobilize people and resources to gain greater impact. The Education Donors' Roundtable Forum initiated by him developed into a Donors' Roundtable led by Chinese foundations to serve the sector. After retirement, Dr. He continues to teach strategic grant-making, to organize and participate in philanthropic workshops, and to support the sector overall.

On behalf of the Ford Foundation, I would like to thank Dr. He Jin for fifteen years of dedication and to congratulate him on his outstanding achievements.

I would also like to thank Dr. Kathleen Hartford and Mr. Li Zhiyan and colleagues from the Donors' Roundtable for diligent efforts to research, write, and translate this report.

I hope this report will be useful to everyone. The views expressed in the report and the author's assessment and judgment of the current situation represent only the author's point of view. And as mentioned in the introduction to the report: "Donor organizations differ substantially in their circumstances, their resources, their mission and goals, and their organizational cultures. The range of variation among donors and the rapid pace of change in China make us reluctant to offer suggestions on specific issues or areas for funding by others. However, we hope that the examination, in the body of the report, of the portfolio's development and its impact will be of some help to other donors in education or other fields, by providing examples of approaches to strategy formation, strategic grantmaking, and mutual learning that can advance the philanthropic sector as a whole."

Enjoy reading!

Elizabeth Knup

Ford Foundation Beijing Office
Country Director and Representative

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I.

INTRODUCTION

With the impending conclusion of a program or of a program officer's tenure, the Ford Foundation often commissions a consultant's review of the program in order to assess its scope and impact and to provide suggestions for future directions. This report therefore might be seen as a normal undertaking, undertaken at the end of Dr. He Jin's tenure as program officer and then senior program officer responsible for the Education portfolio in the Beijing office. However, two factors make this report's task more challenging and its goals more ambitious. First, the fifteen-year life span of the program coincides almost exactly with the program officer's time spent developing and implementing it. That is double or triple the time most program officers remain in the office, and creates a strong individual grantmaker's stamp on the program. Second, He Jin has worked closely with other donor organizations and has shared systematically with many new Chinese domestic foundations over the past decade. His approach has been examined with keen interest by those in the philanthropic sector. It is clear from their responses that an evaluation report on this program's strategy formation, grantmaking approaches, and results can and should serve also to inform the broader philanthropic sector.

Therefore, the charge for the preparation of this report included three purposes: to assess the program's work, achievements, and lessons, and its place in the office's strategy and the foundation's mission; to provide domestic foundations with insights on good grantmaking based on the program's experiences; and to contribute to the rapidly growing philanthropic sector in China by sharing ideas on approaches to improve philanthropic effectiveness.

The body of the report consists of five chapters after this introduction.

Chapter 2, on *Context*, presents an overview of the situation in China that made the Education portfolio important and shaped its emphases. Here we identify the key aspects of social structure, economic growth, and demographic changes that made education a vital part of China's own strategies for social and economic development, and review the major government policies related to education. Much of this information will be familiar to Chinese readers but may be necessary for those new to the Chinese context.

Since we offer this report to support the growth of China's own domestic philanthropic sector, we also include within Context a general introduction to the Ford Foundation, in particular to its history, its nature, and its methods. Much of the work done under the Education portfolio in the Ford Foundation's Beijing office has been shaped by the unique circumstances of this foundation, so it is important that we explain those circumstances.

Next, Chapter 3, on *Strategy*, sketches the development of the foundation's work on education in China, from the earliest grantmaking dating back to 1979, through the Education and Culture portfolio created in 2001 and the transition to the Education program from 2008 onwards. Here we look at the interplay between strategic thinking within the foundation at both global and field office level on the one hand, and the specific needs and challenges within China's education sector on the other, and how the program officer designed his strategic priorities to fit with those.

Chapter 4, the *Program Overview*, reviews the major areas of work, with a brief recapitulation of the major emphases and key grantees in the earlier work on culture, and more detailed discussion of key arenas of work in basic education (access and quality), vocational education, and higher education. In that discussion, particular grants or series of grants are highlighted for illustrative purposes. Given the huge total number of grants made over fifteen years, we have regretfully had to omit discussion of many valuable, creative, and effective projects.

Because the program was consistently shaped by the program officer's approaches in grantmaking, monitoring and evaluation, and in coping with basic challenges, we devote Chapter 5 to a discussion of those approaches as *Contributions to the Philanthropic Field*, with some illustrative examples. And because as early as 2005, the program officer began engaging regularly with other donors who wanted to learn this grantmaking approach, we include in that chapter a discussion of the activities beyond grantmaking

that have played a part in the overall impact of the program and on the development of philanthropy in China more generally.

As most grantmakers are well aware, while specific grants are building blocks, they are not the whole structure. Therefore, we offer Chapter 6, with *Case Studies* that can deepen understanding of how impact may be achieved in a particular arena, over time and across a range of institutions and activities, with careful pursuit of a strategy, sometimes using a cluster of grants in phases, and sometimes in collaboration with other programs or donors. In this section we look more closely at the twelve years and three phases of the Pathways to Higher Education, begun as part of a foundation–wide initiative in 2001. This approach to supporting poor students' study at colleges and universities in poor provinces in western China spread well beyond the schools funded by Ford grants, and persisted well beyond the period of the grants in those that have received funding. By now it has benefited many thousands of students. In the second case, we examine the genesis and development of the Rural Education Action Program (REAP), a series of collaborative projects in action research that have involved scholars from several Northwest China colleges and universities, the China Center for Agricultural Policy at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Stanford University. Those projects that have introduced rigorous experimental research methods for evaluating policy options' effectiveness in improving educational opportunities for poor rural children from infancy through senior middle school; the case study goes in depth into a subset of the projects that help illustrate how the team built capacity among all stakeholders while it conducted research of great benefit for education policies for poor rural areas. Finally, we explore a duo of grants aimed at improving methods of evaluation of undergraduate student learning engagement as an example of a concrete, focused endeavor that has had far–reaching effects, due to meticulous attention to both survey methods and instruments and to providing flexibility to meet the needs of different types of institutions of higher education, their administrators, and their teachers.

Chapter 7, *Analysis and Conclusions*, summarizes the findings of the preceding sections and reflects upon the effectiveness and impact of the grantmaking strategy, grantmaking approach, and the cumulative body of work funded by the Education program.

In this chapter we also offer some basic reflections on strategic grantmaking that may be useful to other philanthropic organizations in China. Donor organizations differ substantially in their circumstances, their resources, their mission and goals, and their organizational cultures. The range of variation among donors, and the rapid pace of change in China make us reluctant to offer suggestions on specific issues or areas for

funding by others. However, we hope that the examination, in the body of the report, of the portfolio's development and its impact will be of some help to other donors in education or other fields, by providing examples of approaches to strategy formation, strategic grantmaking, and mutual learning that can advance the philanthropic sector as a whole.

Several *appendices* accompany the report to provide greater detail on some of the background for the report itself and for its subject matter. These will be referred to as relevant in the text.

Our review/evaluation team consisted of Dr. Li Zhiyan, Ms. Gao Rui and Ms. Zhang Fan of the Secretariat of the China Donors Roundtable (CDR), and Dr. Kate Hartford, an independent consultant and former program officer with the Ford Foundation's Beijing office. CDR is a peer-led and member-based learning, facilitation and support platform created by and for leading Chinese funding-type foundations to improve, strengthen and expand philanthropic giving and its supporting institutions in China. Its objective is to serve the domestic donor community in the exploration of effective funding to solve social issues.

For the evaluation we reviewed internal Ford Foundation strategy, planning and administrative documents and grant proposals, recommendations and reports for over three hundred grants; read published and draft interviews and articles about Dr. He Jin's work and approaches; and visited grantees for meetings and interviews in Shanghai, Suzhou, Nanjing, Changsha, Guangzhou, Xi'an, Chengdu, Kunming, Guiyang, and Beijing. He Jin participated in some but not all of these meetings, and we found the grantees in all cases forthcoming, open, and engaged. Grantee participants included not only the principals responsible for the grants, but also many of the team members: students, teachers, administrators, researchers, and local officials. All of them are very busy, and we are deeply grateful for the gift of their time, thoughtfulness, and patience in explaining their project work, reflecting on its significance, and responding to our questions.

We are also grateful to Ms. Li Xinfang, Program Assistant, and Ms. Li Yiqiong, Receptionist and Administrative Assistant in the Ford Foundation's Beijing office, for their unstinting assistance in obtaining documents and making travel arrangements. Others in the Beijing office have been very helpful in providing information and smoothing the path as we worked on this evaluation, most notably Ms. Elizabeth Knup, Country Director and Representative; Ms. Niu Caixia, Assistant to the Country Director and Representative; Ms. Zheng Hong and Ms. Wang Yan, Senior Grants Manager and Grants Manager, respectively; and Ms. Zhang Yingjie, Program Assistant.

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II.

CONTEXT

Any grantmaker or donor institution needs to map the environment in which grantmaking is planned. The mapping helps to identify the social needs to which the grantmaker can respond, and the circumstances that both constrain the possibilities and generate the opportunities for effective grantmaking. Two elements in the context are fundamental: first, the country context (or, for a locally focused donor, the local context), and the institutional context of the grantmaking institution itself.

For the Beijing office's Education portfolio during the entire fifteen years of its existence, both of those contexts have been dynamic, with continuous change seeming, at times, the only constant.

A. China

China has sustained a breathtaking pace of economic and social change since market–oriented reforms began in 1978. Reforms and rapid economic growth, in tandem, have reshaped and created new drivers of the economy, transformed the social structure and the role of the state, made China a moving force in the global economy, and sped the metamorphosis from rural to urban nation. The education system has supported these processes of change; it remains essential and possibly even more crucial for future development. Here we first sketch the major economic

and social developments over the past three decades, emphasizing changes since 2000, which created much of the demand for development of the education system while affecting the environment in which it could flourish. We then examine the rapid evolution of the education system, with brief consideration of its condition before 2000 and a survey of the progress since then. Since much of that progress relates to proactive policies introduced at the national level, we also provide a scan of the major policy.

1. An era of rapid social and economic change

China in recent decades has set new records not only for the speed of growth but also for growth's protraction. A few achievements warrant mention here:

a. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) grew, *after correction for inflation*, by an annual average of 7.8 percent from 1981 to 1990; 9.3 percent from 1991 to 2000; and 9.9 percent from 2001 to 2010 (World Bank, WDI).

b. All sectors grew: agriculture's value added rose by nearly 350 percent between 1981 and 2015; services grew by 3,230 percent, and industry by an even more astounding 3,660 percent. Increases in GDP sparked rapid increases in income as well; corrected for inflation, per capita GDP in 2015 was nearly eighteen times that of 1981(WDI).

c. Poverty declined rapidly. Ranked in the late 1970s among the poorest countries in the world, China has risen to stand within the World Bank's category of "upper middle income" countries. The bank estimates that over 500 million people were "lifted out of poverty" between 1981 and 2012 (World Bank, China Country Overview).

Growth, however, has been uneven. China's income inequality grew rapidly relatively early in the reform era, but the gaps have widened since 1990, whether reckoned by the Gini index or by population quintiles (Table 2.1). From 1990 to 2010, for example, the income share of the bottom 60 percent of the population fell from 36.7 percent to 29.7 percent.

Table 2.1. Measures of poverty and inequality, 1990 to 2010

	1990	*2005*	*2010*
Poverty headcount ratios (percent of total population with incomes under threshold)			
at $3.10/day (2011 PPP*)	89.2%	41.8%	27.2%
at $1.90/day (2011 PPP)	66.6%	18.8%	11.2%
Gini index of inequality**	.3243	NA	.4206
Shares of income by quintile			
top quintile (top 20%)	40.73	48.0	47.09
second quintile	22.56	22.23	23.20
third quintile	16.52	14.95	15.31
fourth quintile	12.15	9.81	9.74
bottom quintile	8.04	5.02	4.67

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, China data table. http://data.worldbank.org/country/china?view=chart

** PPP="purchasing power parity." See the Glossary appendix for detailed explanation.*

*** The Gini index or Gini coefficient is an international standard indicator of the degree of inequality of net income distribution among a population. Coefficients may range between 0 and 1, with 0 representing perfect equality of distribution, and 1 representing maximum inequality. Therefore, the lower the coefficient, the greater the degree of income equality.*

In part, unevenness is an inevitable part of the development process, for the pace of growth in agriculture cannot keep up with the pace in industry or services. While agriculture employed the majority of the labor force and held almost a one-third share of the value added in GDP in 1981, its share had declined to 9 percent by 2015 (See Fig. 2.1). Because of a lag in the movement of rural labor out of agriculture into faster growing sectors, rural incomes have also lagged. While in 1978 urban households' net income per person was approximately 2½ times as high as that of rural households, the gap steadily widened, and urban incomes were just short of triple those of rural households by 2014. Ironically, most of the gain in rural incomes in the past decade or more came from urban incomes—remittances from family members who migrated to the cities for work. Without those, rural incomes would be much further behind urban ones.

Rural-urban differences explain some but not all the stark disparities in regional incomes. In 2014, per capita disposable incomes in Shanghai and Beijing (municipalities ranked with provinces, and comprising some rural districts) both topped 44,000 *yuan*. Only Zhejiang province broke the 30,000 *yuan* threshold. Five provinces fell below the 15,000 *yuan* mark, and another six failed to reach 16,000 *yuan*.[1] Of the eleven poorest in terms

[1] Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Gansu, and Qinghai had less than 15,000 *yuan* in per capita income; Tibet's was lowest at 10,730 *yuan*. Xinjiang, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Guangxi, and Henan had per capita incomes between 15,096 and 15,749 *yuan*.



SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators, China data sheet. http://data.worldbank.org/country/china?view=chart

of per capita income, all but the central China grain–basket province of Henan lay in western China (*China Statistical Yearbook 2015*, Table 6–17).

The poorest all have economies still heavily dependent on agriculture; most also have ecologically fragile environments.[2]

Certain advances since early in this century are obvious. The pain of the transition from state and collective ownership of businesses to private ownership has largely (though not entirely) passed: tens of thousands of workers suddenly laid off have mostly either found other employment, started their own businesses, aged out into retirement, or found ways to survive while staying home. Minimum income guarantees for the poorest urban and, more recently, rural residents have helped preserve many from the direst poverty, and the government has assiduously expanded pension programs that are partly state–funded. The urban middle class has burgeoned in size; a *McKinsey Quarterly* article found that while only 4 percent of China's urban residents had broken through the middle–class purchasing power threshold in 2000, that proportion had risen to 68 percent (Barton et al. 2013). The picture, therefore, is mixed: undoubtedly, more people

[2] China's leadership by no means ignored the lagging development in western China. Since 2000, the government has emphasized an ambitious development strategy for the western region (西部大开发战略), setting special plans and policy treatments to encourage the region's progress. Education has been among the priorities. See Appendix 3, Chronology of Chinese Education, for details. The plan included ten provinces of western China and the western portions of Hunan and Hubei provinces.

are doing better economically than ever before; just as undoubtedly, too many are left behind or left out.

In recent decades, two demographic factors have accelerated socioeconomic development. The first factor, *migration*, began as a gradual and temporary transfer of labor from rural to urban areas, but has long since become a virtual juggernaut of irreversible *urbanization*. The second is the *demographic dividend*, the consequence of the one-child family policy, which sharply reduced birth rates. Over the first two decades of reform, the population share of each new age cohort shrank and the proportion of earner-producers to dependents grew rapidly, contributing mightily to economic growth. That factor *is* reversible. In fact, it has already reversed, and can be observed in a shrinking labor supply and a massive increase in the share of population over age 60.

Both of these factors are significant for China's longer-term educational needs, so we discuss them here in more detail.

From migration to urbanization

In 1958 China introduced a system of household registration, called *hukou*, classifying every Chinese citizen as either rural or urban. The system was intended to prevent rural residents from relocating to urban areas, and for twenty years constituted a largely impermeable barrier between the worlds of urban and rural Chinese.

On the urban side stood a largely state-owned industrial economy, guaranteed employment and incomes, access to the best education and health care the country offered and good social protection programs. On the rural side stood a collectively owned agricultural economy, employment and income provided only by the collective (for men, in their natal community or for women, the natal community of their husbands), second-rate or even worse health care and education, and very basic social protection arrangements that relied in the first instance on one's own family.[3] Even as the labor force in rural areas grew rapidly, it was virtually impossible for rural workers to move to cities (even buying a train ticket, for example, required formal permission from one's work unit) or to find employment in the state-owned sector. More prosperous rural collectives, usually in coastal regions, managed to set up small industrial enterprises to supply local needs and soak up some labor. They were, however, enjoined from venturing into the more lucrative industries monopolized by urban state enterprises.

[3] There were some state-owned farms, which offered better wage and social-protection treatment, but those farms held a tiny minority of the rural population, and were concentrated mostly in border areas. Many state farms originated in army placements along the border.

Table 2.2. Increasing size of China's "floating population"

Year	*Rural–urban migrants (millions)*
1982	6.6
1987	18.1
1990	21.4
1995	70.7
2000	102.3
2005	147.4
2010	221.4
2015	247

Source: 郑真真；杨舸, 中国人口流动现状及未来趋势, 人民论坛，总 400 期, reproduced by CASS IPLE, 2015–11–27. http://iple.cass.cn/rkxzt/yjyts/qyld/201304/t20130422_1948633.shtml. The numbers are based on successive national population surveys and by the national 1% sample survey data； 2015 figure from the National Bureau of Statistics report on 2015 economic and social development, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201602/t20160229_1323991.html.

The reform process, launched first in rural areas, initially contributed to a rapid increase in rural incomes. However, scholars in the early 1980s estimated the labor bottled up in disguised rural unemployment ran as high as two–thirds of the total rural labor force (then 300 million, and rising rapidly). As various planned–economy restrictions in the cities and between urban and rural areas relaxed, new employment opportunities in the cities appeared, the means of getting to them were more readily available, and

despite legal prohibitions, rural people began moving temporarily to the cities to take on jobs that urban residents neither needed nor wanted. Numerous "peasants" moved to cities for work in construction, household services, restaurants and hotels, and other low–end work. Gradually, the government moved from fulminating against the illicit rural *liumin* in the cities, to relaxing policies to allow and then even encourage *nongmingong* to seek urban employment.[4] Driven by the push out of rural employment and the pull of urban opportunities, millions of rural people voted with their feet. According to official figures (see Table 2.2), the number of rural migrants in the cities in 1982 reached 6.6 million; they nearly tripled over the next five years. By 1990 there were over 21 million; in

[4] For an excellent background discussion of the measures transforming rural migrants' access to urban jobs, see Cai Fang et al., n.d. The different renderings of terminology for referring to urban-rural migrants could provide fertile ground for the work of archaeologists of urban attitudes. Over time, migrants have been called *liumin* (floating people), *wailai renkou* (population from outside), *nongmingong* (peasant workers), *liudong renkou* (floating population), *jincheng nongmin* (peasants who enter the city), and *xin shimin* (new city-zens). Only the last of those terms recognizes them as legitimate, permanent, and equal residents of the city.

another five years they more than tripled to 70 million. Fifteen years later they had again tripled, to over 221 million. Very few of them—even those who have lived in the city for two decades, and even a small but significant new generation who were born in the city—have been able to obtain urban *hukou* status, and the vast majority therefore remain classified as rural.

China had entered the reform era at the end of the 1970s with a population about three-quarters rural. In 2012 Premier Wen Jiabao told the National People's Congress that the country had reached an urbanization level of 52.6 percent (*Report*, 2012). In 2014, the new premier, Li Keqiang, announced a plan to reach 60 percent urban population by 2020. The target would mean essentially continuing the annual one-percent increase in urbanization level that has prevailed for some years already, but the plan aimed to replace the heretofore haphazard urbanization process with more carefully thought-out approaches to make the growing cities work for people.

Without a doubt, the movement of rural labor to the cities has contributed greatly to the rapid pace of growth in industry and services over the past two decades. As can be seen from Fig. 2.2, rural employment has declined by over 100 million since 1995, while urban



Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Data query page. http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01.

employment expanded by more than 200 million. Much of that expansion came from rural migrants. Using data up to 2007, researchers at the Institute of Population and Labor Economics (IPLE) at CASS estimated that migrant workers, who already contributed over a third of urban employment by 2000, constituted over 46 percent of the urban labor force by 2007 (Cai Fang et al., n.d.:10).

Urbanization, without the elimination of the *hukou* system, amounted to the urbanization primarily of the young and able-bodied. As Fig. 2.3 shows with the example of Shanghai, rural migrants have added preponderantly to the urban population between the ages of 15 and 44—a segment of the population that contributes to cities' economic development without needing many public goods and services. Given the many practical and local-policy obstacles for schooling their children in the city, and the lack of access to urban pension programs until very recently, migrants have tended to leave children and elders at home in the village; male migrants often left wives as well. By 2010 there were approximately 70 million "left-behind children" living with grandparents

or with a single parent; there were as many as 60 million "left-behind women." Many scholars and commentators began referring to the rural population as the "3-8, 6-1, 9-9 Corps," allusions to the dates of national holidays for women, children, and elders.

Moving migrants' families (including the grandparents) to the cities could mean a net increase in urban population of as many as 200 million people—which would stress the public goods burden of the cities without adding immediate productive capacities. When the national leadership announced the "new-style urbanization plan" for 2014—2020, a decade after the adoption of a general policy stance of eliminating hukou-linked restrictions, one-third of those residing in cities still had not obtained urbanresidency status.[5] Adjusting entitlements, including those to public education, to the realities of migrant parents' work and residence will form a complicated and costly part of the measures in the vital new urban development plan.

[5] 国家新型城镇化规划(2014－2020 年)(全文)。新华社北京[2014] 3 月 16 日电。 http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0317/c1001-24649809.html. The proportion pertains to those residing "long-term," which includes both migrants and original inhabitants.

Fig. 2.3. Demographic structure in Shanghai, differentiated by gender and migrant or local household registration (units in 10,000s)



Source: Zheng Zhenzhen and Yang Ge, 中国人口流动现状及未来趋势。2015-11-27。
http://iple.cass.cn/rkxzt/yjyts/qyld/201304/t20130422_1948633.shtml

The end of the demographic dividend

When reforms began at the end of the 1970s, China was a young country in terms of the mean age of the population, and the proportion of children. In 1982, shortly before the one-child family policy began to reduce births, one in every three Chinese was a child

(14 or younger). By 1995, the proportion had fallen to just over one of every four; by 2005, one in five; and by 2014, to one in six.[6] In the space of a generation, the Chinese population rose to middle age; now, it is aging rapidly.

The one-child policy delivered a "demographic dividend": a reduction in the population share of dependents relative to the working population. According to leading scholars of population economics, the demographic dividend accounted for nearly a quarter of China's economic growth up to 2012 (Cai and Yang 2016). The dependency ratio[7] helps to capture the strength of that dividend. As can be seen from Table 2.3, declining dependency ratios from 1980 to 2010 nearly halved the number of dependents supported by each worker, and nearly doubled the number of workers relative to dependents. When per capita

product or incomes were calculated, the changing ratios drove an arithmetic of growth.

However, as the smaller age cohorts from one-child families began to reach working age, the size of the working age population decreased. That decline appeared in 2012, when the National Bureau of Statistics reported a drop of 3.45 million in the working age population (ages 15 to 59) in the space of a single year.[8]

The expanding size of the population beyond working age delivers another blow: like children, these are largely economic dependents. But children will grow into producers; the elderly will not, and their weight in the population will continue growing as China captures another of the dividends of development: improved health and nutrition have extended life spans. A Chinese baby born in 1970 had an average life expectancy of 58.7 years; for babies born in 2014, that had risen to 75.8 years (WDI tables). Reflecting increased longevity, the dependency ratio of the elderly rose from 7.58 in 1980, to 13.05 in 2015.

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[6] NBS 2016, Table 2-4. In 1982, children up to the age of 14 constituted 33.6percent of the population; by 1995 they were 26.6 percent; by 2005, 20.3 percent; and by 2014, 16.5 percent.

[7] The dependency ratio is a standard measure that divides the total number of children and elderly by the total number of working-age population, and multiplies the result by 100. Child dependency ratios and elderly dependency ratios can be similarly calculated (e.g., number of children, divided by number of working-age population, and then multiplied by 100).

[8] Sources using different age ranges vary somewhat in pinpointing the date of the reversal. Another source dates the decline in the proportion of population in working age to 2010, and the rising dependency ratio to 2011 (Qu 2015). All, however, recognize that the reversal is fairly recent—and that it will become ever more significant.

Table 2.3. The demographic dividend, seen in the changing dependency ratio

Year	*Dependency ratio (number supported per 100 working age)*	*Inverse dependency ratio (number of supporting workers per 100 dependents)*
1980	68.60	145
1990	51.94	192
2000	46.45	215
2010	34.52	290
2014	35.85	279

Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, http://data.worldbank.org/country/china?view=chart.

Note: Dependency ratios are from the WDI tables. These vary slightly from China's National Bureau of Statistics(NBS) data. We have calculated the inverse ratios from the WDI data. WDI uses ages 0—14 for children and 65 and older for the elderly. NBS reports dependency ratios for the same age categories, but tends to use 15 to 59 as the age range for working age.

As Cai and Lu (2013) observe:

This trend will not be reversed even if there is a moderate relaxation of the one-child policy. Given that the population factor has had such far-reaching impacts on the determinants of China's economic growth, including labor supply, the savings rate, the marginal return on capital and total factor productivity, such a change in the population age structure is bound to reduce the potential GDP growth rate in China. (pp. 2–3)

The implication here is not impending disaster, but the need for a shift in development strategy. The era of relatively easy growth—fed by decreasing dependency ratios and by the transfer of underemployed, relatively unskilled and inexpensive labor from agriculture to industry—has ended. A number of new policy approaches will be necessary to sustain future growth and maintain China's global competitiveness. Education will be an ever more essential part of any such strategy, because the economy of the future will need workers who can help move the country up the technological ladder as technology itself rapidly changes.

2. Education policy and administration

The success of both economic development and structural adjustment depends on institutional, scientific and technological innovation…. In the next five years, … we have to give priority to the development of science, technology and education, further implement the strategy of developing China through science and education, invigorate science and technology, train more skilled personnel, and better integrate science, technology and education with the economy. (Premier Zhu Rongji, 2001)

Education is the bedrock of China's development, and fairness in education is an important form of social fairness. We need to make education a strategic priority and accelerate the development of all types of education at all levels. (Premier Wen Jiabao, 2007)

Ultimately, it is the people who are the inexhaustible source of power that drives development. A workforce of over 900 million, of whom over 100 million have received higher education or are professionally trained: this is our greatest resource and strength. Obviously, replacing old drivers of growth with new ones and achieving a shift in development toward greater reliance on human resources, human capital, and innovation is a process of painful adjustment. But it is at the same time an upgrading process with great promise. (Premier Li Keqiang, 2016)[9]

At the beginning of this century, China had already achieved levels of literacy and education that were remarkable, given its massive population and stage of economic development. Adult literacy rates stood at over 90 percent, and over 98 percent among young people. By 2000, just over 99 percent of primary school age children were in school, and junior middle school enrollments had topped 88 percent. Enrollment rates for senior middle school and higher education were considerably lower, but nonetheless had nearly doubled and tripled, respectively, since 1990.[10] The nation's leaders, seeing education as a major precondition for economic development and an underpinning for social development, have continued to emphasize continuing reform and increasing investment in education as the new century has progressed.

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[9] *Report* 2001: "Report on the outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development," delivered at the fourth session of the 9th National People's Congress, March 5, 2001; http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18334.htm. *Report* 2007: "Report on the Work of the Government," delivered at the Fifth Session of the Tenth National People's Congress on March 5, 2007; http://english1.english.gov.cn/official/2007-03/16/content_552995.htm. *Report* 2016: "Report on the Work of the Government," delivered at the Fourth Session of the 12th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on March 5, 2016; http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Speeches/2016-03/18/content_1985677.htm.

[10] The data on enrollment rates differ due to variations in categories used by different sources. Net enrollment rates for primary school come from the annual reports by the Ministry of Education, 全国教育事业发展统计公报.The statements concerning middle school and higher education enrollments are based on gross enrollment rate (毛入学率) data provided by CERNET. The National Bureau of Statistics provides data on a different type of enrollment rate (升学率), calculated as the proportion of graduates of one level of schooling who enroll at the next level.

Donors who now wish to work on education issues need to familiarize themselves with changes that have emerged in the past decade and a half and that shape the types of issues that may be important in future. In this chapter, we survey the major developments in education policy and achievements from 2000 to 2015. Some of the key problems for China's education system around the turn of the century are sketched in the next chapter, in the discussion of the inception of the Education portfolio's strategy in the Ford Foundation's Beijing office.

Change in this sector has been rapid and enormous. Always ambitious, policy priorities shifted over the years, partly in response to emerging problems or to changes in the larger environment, but also in order to continue moving forward as previous goals were reached. As the economy grew and state financial resources increased, government investments in education rose rapidly. The national administrative system for education underwent reforms that increased lower levels' range of choice in curriculum, hiring, and other education decisions; fiscal system reforms also changed the sources and locus of funding for education. Student enrollments in secondary and higher education rose rapidly. Vocational and technical schooling expanded in response to both government policy and student and employer demand. Private schooling, virtually unheard of at the beginning of the century, arose to offer options at all levels from preschool to higher education, and to serve large segments of school–age populations.

Space limitations here make it impossible to go into many of these developments in detail. Where relevant, details are provided as specific grants or clusters of grants are discussed in later chapters. Here we limit ourselves to a brief discussion of how education policies are made, followed by outline summaries of major policy developments affecting the various levels of education, emphasizing those policies most relevant for improved access to education, and to improving the quality of education. More details on policies may be found in the Chronology of Chinese Education in Appendix 3.

The major policies and plans for the education system, and the ultimate responsibility for supervising implementation of policy, are centralized at the national level. Since the 1985 "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China [CCPCC] on the Reform of the Educational Structure," the Ministry of Education (MoE), while remaining in charge of overall policies and planning, and maintaining a hierarchical administrative structure that extends to all localities, has gradually relaxed some of its direct control over lower levels' decisions and finance related to education.[11] Subsequently, numerous

[11] See Ngok 2007. The current responsibilities of the Ministry are listed in "国务院办公厅关于印发教育部主要职责内设机构和人员编制规定的通知" (国办发[2008]57 号), http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_zzjg/moe_188/201001/t20100114_46388.html;

policy decisions in the capital have pushed formal devolution of some powers and responsibilities to the provinces, local governments, and even schools. These have altered the MoE's role in the system, without undermining its primacy in all matters educational.

However, with China's huge range of variation in local resources and needs, centralization even at its strongest must be tempered by flexibility to allow for local adaptations. The *tiaokuai* tensions in the Chinese governmental bureaucracy—intersections between the vertical structures of specialized agencies and the horizontal coordination of local agencies by local governments, which must constantly balance competing demands from many different quarters above and below—keep centralization from ever becoming complete. And at the center, the MoE must negotiate with and accommodate other bureaucracies, particularly the Ministry of Finance. Even at its most centralized, it is far from monolithic.

These general observations lead us to note a distinctive feature of China's policy process, as true for education as for other sectors: the constant interaction of centrally prescribed priorities and general directions, with local/provincial experimentation and models of implementation (Heilmann 2008). Sometimes, central leaders explicitly invite experimentation, and may even select provinces, cities, or smaller jurisdictions to conduct such experiments. Sometimes, policy researchers from leading think tanks at the center cooperate with local authorities or researchers to pursue experiments, and directly report the results to central leaders. At the local end, the process can be creatively proactive. Chinese institutions and organizations of any size continually examine relevant central policy pronouncements relevant to their work, scanning for changes of direction or new opportunities. The more enterprising ones (and this includes local governments) may see signals of openness to innovative approaches for issues they consider important, and then innovate without a formal invitation. The circulation of information about all of these types of experiments and their results has long been a feature of the policy system. So, too, has the lively discussion about experiments and their implications, whether that conducted in public forums or within the confines of party or government circles.

One surface indicator of the fruitful advance of such a process is the gradual progression from a very general outline of policy direction or targets (for example, achieving universal compulsory 9–year education), to specification of priority areas (for example, poor regions in central and western China), to concrete measures to accelerate

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or in abbreviated English version in"The Responsibilities Of the Ministry of Education," http://en.moe.gov.cn/About_the_Ministry/What_We_Do/201506/t20150626_191288.html.

progress (for example, free textbooks in poor areas). At times, responsibility for certain measures may be assigned to local governments either in vague general terms ("should") or as specific but unfunded mandates ("must").[12] Commitments of specific funds or financial incentives for particular purposes related to the policy are further indications of policy refinement, as well as of buy-in by the Ministry of Finance.

The detection of education policy priorities requires no guesswork. The major goals are announced in decisions (决定), outlines (纲要), plans (计划), and laws (法).[13] Finer-tuned goals may appear as instructions (指导意见). Implementation methods may be spelled out in implementing regulations (实施条例), and more specific measures may appear in notices (通知). Ministries may issue policies within their own bailiwick; measures requiring cross-agency coordination may appear as joint statements of two or more ministries or other key agencies (such as the central bank). If important enough, they may be issued by the State Council. The most important but usually also the most general are issued by the CCPCC.[14]

Although some policies may be decided quickly and without careful consideration of the pros and cons,[15] most are issued only after reviews of research, numerous internal discussions, and sometimes—especially in the more transparent era ushered in by the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao leadership after 2003—ample public consultation. The generation of Plans, in particular, involves a long and complex process of research and discussion, both internal and public.[16]

In the education sector, annual, five-year, and longer-term plans announce concrete goals. Major goals in the coming year for the education system also figure in all the government work reports delivered by the premier at the annual March meeting of the National People's Congress, and general goals for the sector also appear in the national five-year plans. The plans, the reports, the data announced by MoE and by the NBS all

[12] Unfortunately, in this latter case there may be incitement to counterproductive innovations in local public finance (such as forced land requisitions) or mounting public debt, a problem that has bedeviled many poor and even middle-income localities. See for example Liu and Tao 2007.
[13] Chinese "laws" often state intentions rather than realities, and leave the implementation up to later implementation regulations at central and local levels.
[14] Examples of such documents related to education policies may be found in Appendix 3, Chronology.
[15] Some scholars have pointed to the 1998 decision for drastic acceleration of the expansion in college and university enrollments as one such example. See Wang 2014, for a discussion of that issue and for an excellent short summary of the usual processes MoE has used for policy making. I would, however, take issue with Wang's apparent suggestion that experimentation and local initiatives are attached to the "guerrilla policy style." Careful policy makers can make good use of experimentation without disrupting professional standards of decision making.
[16] MoE issued a circular outlining a nationwide consultation process preceding the drafting of the medium- and long-term plan for education announced in 2010 (MoE, 2009). Zhang (2012) provides a fascinating and detailed view of the process of drafting Shanghai's educational plan, from the perspective of an insider in the process; he also provides tantalizing hints of the process involved in forming the national ten-year plan for education announced in 2010. Zhang's description of the Shanghai document's research and drafting process shows the seriousness with which the task was treated, and the high degree of consultation involved.

permit the tracking of progress in expanding educational opportunities and transforming the education system. In what follows, we review the major policy goals and some of the indicators on their achievement over the past decade and a half.

3. Education policies and progress, 2000–2015

Policies for education since the beginning of the reform era have aimed at supporting rapid modernization of the economy and society. That has meant rapidly expanding proportions of children and young people receiving education, and, increasingly since the beginning of this century, concerted efforts to raise the quality of education as well.

To support those efforts, the government has massively ramped up education expenditures for buildings, teacher training, teacher salaries, technological upgrading, curriculum development, administration and supplies, subsidies and scholarships. At the same time, students and their families have come to bear significant portions of the costs of education, particularly for senior middle school and above. State budgetary expenditures on education had gradually risen under Zhu Rongji's premiership. From 1997 to 2002, their share of GDP increased from 2.5 to 3.3 percent (*Reports on the Work of the Government*, 2003 and 2014). Increasing the proportion of GDP spent on education was an important goal for education during Wen Jiabao's premiership. Under Wen, China finally broke through the target threshold, topping 4 percent in 2012.

But money alone cannot account for the progress of the education sector since the turn of the century. Assiduous efforts shaped policies conducive to reaching ambitious goals.

Here we trace the highlights in the evolution of policies and achievements in basic education (the six years of elementary and three years of junior middle school), secondary education (both vocational and academic), and higher education (emphasizing the undergraduate level, including expansion in vocational and technical colleges). We end with a summary of developments in private (*minban*) education, which has grown to play an important part in the range of educational opportunities, particularly for rural and migrant students,[17] and touch very generally upon some of the other areas of education that have received intensive policy attention, and that may be important arenas for donor activity in future.

[17] Sources for the policies are not given in detail here but may be found in the Chronology appendix.

Basic education

The opening salvo of education initiatives began with the revised Constitution in 1982, in which for the first time both the right and the obligation to basic education were stated (Article 46). The document also affirmed the role of the state in running schools to provide universal compulsory education (Article 19). A CCPCC "Decision" in 1985 elaborated the principle of compulsory education for nine years[18], but also added "society" and "family" to the list of those responsible for guaranteeing that education, and the Law on Compulsory Education in 1986 formally established nine–year compulsory education as a legal requirement. However, policy makers recognized that the principle was a goal rather than an immediate practice. The 14th Party Congress in 1992 set an aim of "basically" universalizing compulsory education and "basically" eliminating illiteracy among young people by the end of the century. The following year, the CCPCC and the State Council issued a joint "Outline of Education Reform and Development" reiterating that call.

Universal compulsory education was an urgent goal; even by the mid–1990s, many children of primaryschool age remained out of school. According to official Chinese government statistics, the net enrollment rate for primary schools rose from 97.8 percent in 1990 to 98.5 percent in 1995. But World Bank statistics showed only 87.3 percent making it into sixth grade in 1990, and only 76.6 percent in 1995. The bank also estimated that more than 9 percent of girls and over 6 percent of boys of primary school age were not in school in 1995, a total of nearly nine million children (NBS 2016, Table 21–23; WDI). By 1999, China counted net enrollments at primary school level at 99.1 percent. The Ministry of Education's own data, however, showed that enrollments in the western parts of the country lagged behind, at 97.9 percent, and with girls slightly behind boys. Enrollments at junior middle school level fell well below those at primary level, but were increasing healthily: the enrollment ratio surged from 66.7 percent in 1990 to 88.6 percent in 2000 (CERNET). Youth literacy rates also rose by four percentage points from 1990 to reach 98.9 percent by 2000 (WDI).

After 2000, then, with the "basic" goal of universal compulsory education nearly achieved, policies concentrated on general quality improvements and on improving access to schooling in the areas that lagged behind: rural, poor, western regions, and minority ethnic areas. Efforts for quality improvements emphasized management system improvements, better teacher training and recruitment of more teachers (*Report* 2001). For rural areas, national and local government funds were committed to handle basic education expenses, including the teacher salaries that in many areas had gone unpaid or been paid late, a signal improvement for the teachers. Tax reforms also eliminated

[18] Hereafter, we will refer to this as "compulsory education" for brevity's sake.

local governments' right to impose fees on farmers to help pay for schools (*Report*, 2003). There was also an attempt at systematic curriculum reform (新课改).

Educational equity goals began to move to the fore. In 2003 the State Council introduced targets for better access in rural areas, holding up a goal for western regions to extend compulsory education to cover at least 85 percent of their population, and for all students from poor families to be able to receive "two exempts and one subsidy" (exemption from textbook and miscellaneous fees, and subsidies for dormitory expenses) to remove economic obstacles to full educational opportunity. Dormitory expenses were especially crucial obstacles to educational access in poor rural regions where population was scattered, especially as MoE began to pursue a program of school consolidations to upgrade school quality.

In the two following years, Premier Wen Jiabao in his annual work reports to the National People's Congress announced specific funds and specific target areas for providing the two exempts and one subsidy, targeting first poor students in counties covered by the national poverty alleviation program, but extending the policy to rural areas nationwide by 2007 (*Report* 2005). For the poor areas, the premier was able to report in 2006 that 17 million students in poor counties had benefited, allowing "many students who had dropped out of school … to continue their studies" (*Report* 2006). The government targeted 410 counties for special efforts, and by 2007 Wen announced that over three–quarters of them had "reached the goals of making nine–year compulsory education generally available and basically eliminating illiteracy among young and middle–aged adults." In the space of four years, the target groups in the region which had achieved the compulsory education and literacy goals increased by nineteen percentage points over the 77 percent level in 2003 (*Report* 2007).

In 2005 the MoE moved beyond the exemptions and subsidies, announcing the goal of completely free compulsory education in all rural areas by 2010, and in the entire country by 2015. The nationwide goal apparently was met well ahead of that date, as Premier Wen Jiabao announced that compulsory education in both urban and rural areas was free as of 2010 (*Report* 2011). Over the years, and continuing to 2014, MoE and the Ministry of Finance gradually increased the room and board subsidies for poor students living in dormitories. In 2012 the *Report on the Work of the Government* noted that 30 million students in rural schools received their rooms free, and over 12 million of them received subsidies for living expenses.

Efforts towards more "balanced development" in compulsory education also began in the first decade of the century. These signaled intentions to improve quality across the board, rather than concentrating resources in urban and key schools. The revised

Compulsory Education Law (2006) called for spreading basic education resources in cities equally, and introduced a requirement that urban teachers rotate to rural schools to compensate for the less adequate resources there. The detailed *Outline of China's National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2010—2020)* included specific plans for balanced development: no elite (keypoint) schools would be permitted for grades 1 through 9, and the government promised preference "to rural areas in fiscal funding, school construction, and teachers' allocation."

Two big challenges for reaching the compulsory education goals were the schooling for children of migrant workers who accompanied their parents to the city, and schooling conditions for the children left in the villages by migrant parents. A revision of the Compulsory Education Law in 2006 affirmed migrant children's rights to education where they lived (Xinhua 2006). The 2010–2020 education plan reiterated that commitment, adding that

most migrant children should be able to attend urban public schools, and declared the intention to formulate regulations to allow them to take senior middle school entrance exams in the cities where they lived. For left-behind children, many of whom attended rural schools as boarders, the plan promised a government-operated "care and service framework and a monitoring mechanism" with some public participation, and gave priority to the needs of left-behind children when boarding schools were established.

The 2010–2020 plan also reaffirmed commitments to educational access and quality in national-minority areas, including financial assistance, confirmation of the rights to bilingual and minority-language education, incentives for college graduates to teach in national-minority areas, and a program to provide help from counterpart schools in other regions.

The CCP's 18th Party Congress in the fall of 2012 further underscored the commitment to "educational fairness" (教育公平). Party General Secretary Hu Jintao's report to the congress emphasized many already familiar features of education policies (Hu Jintao 2012).

Over the period since 2000, the already high net enrollments at primary school level crept steadily upward, reaching 99.2 percent in 2005, and 99.8 percent by 2014, reflecting real improvements in access in poor rural areas. Making it possible for all students to stay the course

through junior middle school was more difficult. Success in that endeavor is measured by the "compulsory education consolidation rate," which refers to the percentage of those in a given age cohort entering primary school who graduate from junior middle

school. The 12th Five–Year Plan (2011–2015) set a goal for reaching a national consolidation rate of 93 percent by 2015; for 2014, MoE announced having reached that target (Jiaoyubu 2015).

Table 2.4 shows the gross enrollment numbers for primary and junior middle schools. The demographic changes we reviewed earlier are evident in these numbers: while enrollment rates increased, the *absolute numbers* of students plummeted. At primary school level, the decline clearly stems solely from a drop in the number of students (and children) in rural areas. We do not have a rural/urban breakdown for junior middle school level, but the same pattern most likely holds there. This intensifies the challenge of providing access to good quality rural schools: dwindling numbers of students will necessitate more school consolidations and more students boarding in dormitories.

Table 2.4. Basic education enrollments (millions), 1995 to 2014

	1995	*2000*	*2005*	*2010*	*2014*
General elementary:					
all	131.95	130.13	108.64	99.41	94.51
cities	17.11	18.17	17.30	18.20	NA
towns	21.78	26.93	21.86	27.70	NA
rural	93.06	85.04	69.48	53.50	NA
Junior middle school:					
all	NA	62.563	62.15	52.79	43.85

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, data query pages. http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01.

And poor areas continued to lag behind. In practical terms, perhaps the greatest policy breakthroughs to raise educational levels in the western region came in 2014.

First was a concerted effort announced jointly by the General Offices of the MoE, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the Ministry of Finance to improve basic conditions in primary and junior secondary schools in the poorest areas. This largely pertained to constructing or reconstructing buildings (including school dormitories) and related "hardware" investments (Jiaoyubu et al., 2014). Later that year, the State Council's General Office announced the State Plan for Child Development in Poor Areas (2014–2020), which targeted rural children in 680 poor counties from birth until completion of compulsory education. To ensure that these children could develop at a level equal to or approaching the national average level, the plan called for reaching 75

percent enrollments in three years of preschool and a compulsory education consolidation rate of 93 percent, and for improving the general quality of education and developmental balance. The plan also called for raising to 90 percent the compulsory-education enrollment rate for children disabled by poor vision, poor learning, or poor learning capacities (Guowuyuan bangongting 2014).[19] The work continues.

Secondary education

Until recently, senior middle school education received less policy attention than either basic or higher education. However, with the success of the compulsory education policies and the expansion of higher-education opportunities (discussed below), this intermediate level has become more crucial, as have concerns about its cost for students and their families. In addition, for those students choosing not to go on to higher education, technical and vocational options at senior secondary levels have seen higher demand.

National policy has urged steady increases. The outline of the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001—2005) aimed at increasing the gross rate of senior middle school enrollments to 60 percent; ten years later, the 12th Five-Year Plan reported an enrollment rate of 82.5 percent in 2010 and set a target of 87 percent for 2015.[20] The 2010—2020 plan for education set a goal of senior middle school for all children by 2020.

As Table 2.5 shows, the numbers enrolled in both the academic track and vocational secondary schools increased up until 2010. Thereafter, enrollment rates continued to rise, but because of a decline in the size of age cohorts, the absolute numbers declined. Private (*minban*) secondary schools on both tracks drew a significant percentage of the total enrollments in 2014; the World Bank estimated a relatively steady 10 percent of enrollments at minban secondary schools from 2010 to 2013 (World Bank 2016).

Whether in public or private schools, it is unlikely that secondary enrollment ratios could have risen so fast without the expansion of vocational education.

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[19] That target pertained to children disabled by poor vision, poor hearing, or poor learning capacities.
[20] "The 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) ," http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/157629.htm; Joseph Casey and Katherine Koleski, "Backgrounder: China's 12th Five-Year Plan" (US-China Economic & Security Review Commission, 24 June 2011).

Table 2.5. Senior secondary school enrollments (millions)

	Regular secondary	*Vocational secondary*	Minban *regular secondary*	Minban *vocational secondary*
1995	7.13	—	—	—
2000	12.01	—	—	—
2005	24.09	16.0	—	—
2010	24.27	22.38	—	—
2014	24.01	17.55	2.39	1.90

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2015, tables 21–8, 21–4.

As early as 1993, the national plans for education called for rapid expansion of student enrollments in vocational and technical schools at both senior secondary and higher education levels (Zhonggong zhongyang, Guowuyuan 1993).

Because vocational education was more likely to attract rural students and those from less well–off families, cost was a greater consideration, and the prospects for immediate employment after graduation a *much* greater consideration, than for students on the academic track. During Wen Jiabao's premiership, assistance to students in vocational education figured in many of the annual Reports to the NPC. In 2008, for example, the premier noted that "government scholarships and financial aid" to students had nearly quintupled during 2007, to a total of 9.8 billion *yuan*; and that 90 percent of students in vocational secondary schools (as compared to some 20 percent of those in colleges and universities) had received financial aid (Report 2008). The following year, Wen reported annual grants of 1500 *yuan* to "secondary vocational school students from rural areas or needy urban families…" (*Report* 2009). Two years further along, the premier said that poor students and those studying agriculture or related fields now received free secondary vocational schooling. Only one year later, his annual report promised gradual progress towards eliminating secondary vocational tuition for all rural students, and more financial aid for poor students attending academic track secondary schools (*Report* 2011 and *Report* 2012).

Scholarships alone, however, are not enough to continue to raise and sustain enrollments. Vocational education is touted as a "major channel through which to boost economic growth, promote employments, improve people's livelihood..," but ensuring the acquisition of high–quality knowledge and skills and matching them to the needs of the

local market can be tricky. Therefore recent efforts towards developing vocational education have emphasized more direct involvement by employers in schools in their locale.

Schools may also find it difficult to attract or retain students if immediate employment is available for those without secondary vocational schooling. Interestingly, World Bank data show significant increases in the proportion of female students in secondary schools, both academic and vocational, with a slightly more rapid rise in their proportions on the vocational side (World Bank 2016). Some evidence suggests that male students are somewhat more likely to drop out (beginning in junior middle school, but later as well), and some experiments for improving retention rates have targeted them.

Higher education

In pursuing rapid modernization and first–rate world standing, China has placed high priority on policies for higher education as key to achieving those goals. Chinese higher education has undergone a massive transformation since the end of the last century. From a privilege enjoyed by a rare few, college and university educations are now within the reach of a relatively high and still growing proportion of the college–age population. A more diverse array of choices is now available to them. The growth of tertiary education has helped transform the landscape of many cities' suburbs, as venerable institutions, squeezed in urban areas where space was at increasingly expensive premiums, expanded into completely new campuses miles away from the first, and were joined by newer institutions as neighbors. Schools upgraded, rebuilt, or built entirely new classroom, office, laboratory, library, athletic, and dormitory facilities. Parents began pushing their children to study harder and longer, competing to get their (often only one) child into the best secondary schools in order to improve their chances for college entrance. In many cities, the dates of the *zhongkao* and *gaokao*, the exams for entrance to senior middle school and university, became notorious for greater than usual traffic snarls as anxious parents ferried their children to and from the exam sites. Many students and parents went deeply into debt to help pay for the precious years of college.

Higher education policies bifurcate between an elite approach (nurturing the best to get even better) and a mass approach (making higher education ever more accessible to ever more students). Since separate sets of policies relate to those two approaches—

even though they have been pursued largely in tandem—we will look at them in turn.[21]

The elite approach on higher education tends to concentrate resources on a small number of institutions (or disciplines), with the goal of generating innovative research and high-quality alumni ("talent") who are essential for a rapidly modernizing economy. With very scarce resources and an already huge population in the pre-Cultural Revolution era, the country's leadership chose an elite approach to ensure the human resources needed. In the Cultural Revolution decade, the pendulum swung to the other extreme, and higher education eroded drastically. In the reform era, recognizing that the higher education system in particular fell far short of the needs of an economy that was trying to compete internationally while raising domestic standards of living, leadership attention swung back towards expanding and rapidly improving the quality of a select few universities.

Until the late 1990s, the higher education administration system had grown along with the planned economy and was shaped to serve that economy. The MoE owned and operated thirty-six universities; other central ministries ran about three times that number.[22] Several hundred others (colleges as well as universities) were owned and operated by provincial and municipal governments (Yao et al. 2010). University graduates increased in the early years of the reform era, growing from about 147 thousand in 1980 to 805 thousand in 1995. In the earlier years they were usually assigned to employment in state institutions or industries upon graduation; later those expectations lingered even after the practice receded. The number of universities and colleges approximately doubled from 1978 to 1995 (NBS 2016), but despite some already substantial reforms away from state ownership and central planning in the economy, reforms to the administrative structure for higher education largely waited until the watershed years of 1998—1999.[23]

Simply by virtue of their small number and the small number of graduates, Chinese universities before 1998 constituted an elite group. But those owned by the central ministries constituted the *crème de la crème*. When in the late 1990s MoE took under its control the universities owned by other ministries, the elite nature of the core group of about 110 universities continued. In fact, it intensified with the impact of two major state higher education projects.

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[21] This discussion owes much to the analysis by 杨东平, in 中国教育公平与现实 (2006). Excerpts from the book are online at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/68294/72286/index.html.
[22] These generally were specialized in the ministries' fields, for example, telecommunications, aerospace, etc.
[23] Because of their complexity, we do not go into the pre-1998 reforms here. Zhao and Zhu (2010?) provide an excellent overview, along with discussion of the implications and limitations of post-1998 reforms. For a vivid depiction of a procession of mergers of institutions of higher education connected with industrial ministries, Donghua University provides a very useful graphic at http://english.dhu.edu.cn/95/d1/c5173a38353/page.htm.

First was the 211 Project, approved by the State Council in 1995.[24] The project concentrated funding on construction in a limited set of key universities in order to lift their teaching quality and research capacities. The project moved in phases, corresponding to the general five-year plan periods, beginning with the 9th FYP in 1996. The central government's funding increased substantially from each phase to the next: 2.8 billion *yuan* (1996–2000), 6 billion *yuan* (2001–2005), and 10 billion *yuan* promised for 2006 to 2010. Additions from other sources considerably outweighed the central funding (Zhao and Zhu 2010), but the fact of 211 Project status for a university undoubtedly attracted the other funds. Not surprisingly, the universities selected largely consisted of those under direct MoE jurisdiction, and they were heavily concentrated geographically. Of the 112 schools selected for the project by 2009, half were concentrated in Beijing (26 schools), Shanghai (10), and four provinces (11 in Jiangsu, 10 in Shanghai, 8 in Shaanxi, 7 in Hubei). Thirteen provinces and autonomous regions claimed only one each.[25] Although the 211 Project universities are only about 6 percent of China's total, they play a vastly disproportionate role: they train 80 percent of the country's Ph.D. students, for example, and claim "96 percent of the State's key laboratories; and utilize 79 percent of scientific research funding." (People's Daily Online 2008)

A second program, the 985 Project, began in 1998 after Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin, attending celebrations of Peking University's 100th anniversary, called for building a set of world-class universities in China. This project also advanced in stages, with a more selective group than the 211 Project. For Phase 1, thirty-four universities were selected. Two of those, Peking University and Tsinghua University, the first chosen, received 1.8 billion *yuan* each from MoE. Seven other universities joined them on the list in 1999, with much smaller amounts from MoE but matching funds from their provincial governments and, in two cases, from other central institutions concerned with science and technology (Zhao and Zhu 2010). The remaining twenty-five were named by the end of 2003. In later years, nine more schools were added, bringing the total to forty-three. Every school selected was also a 211 Project school. Of the entire set of 985 Project universities, all of those with vice-ministerial standing were included; the remaining handful were all administered by MoE. And yet, even among this elite group, there was a status hierarchy, depending on the order in which the schools had been chosen (Zhao and Zhu 2010). The first seven were all in Beijing.

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[24] "211" was chosen to indicate 100 universities for the 21st century. Twelve were eventually added to the original 100 to provide each province with at least one such university.

[25] "211 工程" , n.d. from Chinese Wikipedia, https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/211%E5%B7%A5%E7%A8%8B#cite_note-1; uses MoE list of schools from http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_94/201002/82762.html.

Some critics have raised questions about the over–concentration of resources in the 211 and 985 Project schools, and there have been a few scandals over misuse of some of the funds. One of the sharpest criticisms has concerned the unequal access to the key universities—especially those in Beijing and Shanghai—for students from outside those cities. One study showed that "on average, students from Beijing were fourteen times as likely to study in Beijing University as those from the rest of the country."(Yao et al.:850) The proportions of local student entrants to key universities in Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou and Wuhan were three to nearly four times as skewed as in Beijing.

Whatever city they study in or come from, students at non–key universities or colleges may encounter discrimination after graduation. *Beijing qingnian bao* (BeijingYouth News) (2016), for example, mentioned reports of employers' advertisements stating preference for students from 985 and 211 Project schools. Some have claimed that prospective employers will not even consider applications from any other students. A 2010 survey by Tsinghua University's Education Research Institute revealed that starting salaries for graduates of 211 Project schools averaged 28 percent higher than those for graduates of more ordinary schools (数据中心 2012).

This situation forms a sharp contrast to the rapid expansion of educational opportunities that began in 1999. The MoE had been planning for gradual increases in enrollment rates, and in its *21st Century Education Revitalization Action Plan* announced at the end of 1998 (Jiaoyubu 1998), had projected that higher education enrollment rates would rise to about 11 percent by 2000, and to 15 percent by 2010. Reaching those targets meant significantly raising the student recruitment numbers, but the ministry's genteel notion of a bold increase for 1999—by about 20 percent—was preempted by the CCP leadership's decision in June 1999 to push a much faster expansion.[26] New student admissions in that year were pushed up by over 47 percent (*Report* 2001; Wang 2014).

They kept rising thereafter, although not quite so radically as in 1999 (see Fig. 2.4). Subsequent education plans projected further rapid increases in the proportion of college–age students in school. Indeed, the 2010–2020 plan called for raising

[26] Analysts have pointed to varying reasons for the big jump, but one prominent factor seems to have had little to do with educational goals per se. Rather, it was one step the party leadership considered useful (by enticing families' savings into consumption) in counteracting the domestic economic effects of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.



Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2015, Table 21–7.

enrollments from the 2009 level of 29.8 million to 35.5 million in 2020. This was tantamount to raising the gross enrollment rate from 24 percent to 40 percent.

While the expansion of higher education brought considerable benefits to the country and to the many new students, it inevitably also brought new issues.

The first issue relates to how the millions of new students would pay for their education. The public coffers could not fund everything the educational system aspired to do, from achieving universal compulsory education throughout the country, to building world–class universities. Increased opportunity came at the price of changing the model of higher–education funding, from one reliant on public finance (divided among MoE, provincial and local governments) to one in which students and their families had to bear a large part of the cost. For the growing urban middle class, this was not an insurmountable problem. For students from poor families, it could well be. Starting in 2006 the national government set up scholarship funds and urged local governments to do likewise (Report 2007). By 2007, some 20 percent of college and university students received scholarship support (Report 2008). And for certain types of education, such as teacher training in normal schools, the education was eventually made tuition–free. But many still had to resort to loans to eke their way to the degree, and graduated under a load of debt. Thesecond issue concerns to what extent higher education—quite apart

from the cost—was genuinely accessible to certain groups of disadvantaged students. One large and growing group were the children of migrant workers, living with their parents in the cities and possibly the college entrance exams, local regulations often required that they make the journey all the way back to the "home" region to take the exam there, unprepared for the local exam even having studied in urban secondary schools.[27] When it came time to take expectations and possibly unsupported by family. By 2012, MoE issued an Opinion favoring allowing migrant children to take entrance exams where they were living, and asked all provincial level governments to formulate appropriate rules. In 2016, the ministry reiterated the principle of allowing migrant students to take entrance exams in the locality of residence, but thus far only for admission to vocational and technical colleges. There are indications of much local resistance to applying the principle for admission to academic institutions of higher education, and the principle has yet to harden into clear and binding rules in most cities.

Exams are not the only barrier to access for some students. Those in poor rural areas, especially in western but also in central China, have particular difficulty in gaining equal access to the kind of higher education that might work best for them. Recent policies have attempted to address this challenge. In 2013 MoE, the NDRC and the Ministry of Finance jointly announced a new *Plan for the Reinvigoration of Higher Education in Central and Western Regions (2012–2020)* (Jiaoyubu et al. 2013). This plan aimed to build higher quality educational resources in central and western China, and included measures such as an investment of 10 billion *yuan* (2012—2015) to bring up the quality of 100 schools of higher education in the regions, and to set up one local university of high quality in each of the thirteen provinces without any school directly under MoE. The plan also urged nudging enrollment quotas at colleges and universities to favor students from central and western regions. One encouraging sign of progress in this arena was that students from poor regions did seem to have gained better access to the best universities. Premier Li Keqiang's work report to the NPC in 2014 noted that "the number of students from poor rural areas who were enrolled by key colleges and universities increased by 8.5% over the previous year." (*Report* 2014)

A third issue pertains to the quality of instruction and learning experience. Complaints about the quality of teaching can be heard from just about every quarter. At the key universities, many professors were seen as interested only in research or in interacting with graduate students, and were accused of neglecting their undergraduate teaching or doing it poorly. Some universities and colleges with lower status (including some

[27] In many cities, they were not permitted to attend the urban public senior high schools.

vocational schools, and sometimes private schools), which needed to fill their classrooms in order to meet their budgets, recruited students whose needs and interests did not match the schools' programs. This was an especially acute problem for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, whose parents were less educated and less savvy about judging what prospective schools had to offer. In many schools at the low end of the hierarchy, including many privately operated colleges, teachers had lower qualifications, much higher teaching loads, and little in the way of mentoring or other opportunities for improving their skills. The government urged the use of evaluations to assess the quality of schools, but judgments of campuses' educational quality tended to be based on the state of physical plant and not of the teaching. However, the question of how to evaluate teaching or learning has elicited a fruitful range of ideas. Given the increasing diversity of higher education institutions and models, any methods that aim at cross–institution comparisons have to be carefully thought out.

Finally, a crucial issue for students, parents, schools, and the government is the success students enjoy in finding satisfying employment after graduation. This is a perennial problem, as enrollments (see Table 2.6) and the numbers of graduates continue to grow,

Table 2.6. Gross enrollments in tertiary education (undergraduate)

Year	*Percent of age cohort*	*Bachelor's degree enrollments (millions)*	*Technical and vocational enrollments (millions)*	*Minban HEI enrollments (millions)*
1990	3.01	2.063		—
1998	—	2.235	1.174	
2000	7.72	3.400	2.161	—
2005	19.34	8.488	7.130	—
2010	23.95	12.656	9.662	—
2014	30.16	15.411	10.066	5.872*

Sources: Percentages are from World Bank, World Development Indicators, China data table. http://data.worldbank.org/country/china?view=chart; enrollment numbers from China Statistical Yearbook 2015, tables 21–8 and 21–4.

** Minban enrollments include both bachelor's degree and vocational degree programs. They are not included in the enrollment counts in the other columns.*

while job openings always seem inadequate. Efforts to improve the design of educational offerings based on local market needs are one good step towards improving the situation. But many more approaches could be devised and tested.

A note on minban *education*

Private, "people-run" or *minban* education seemed for a while like a stopgap measure, meeting urgent educational needs that public education had not yet adjusted to meet. This was especially the case with primary and some junior secondary schools set up in city areas settled by migrant workers and their children. Early in the century, when those children still found the doorway into public schools blocked by regulations, by prejudice, or by exorbitant charges, *minban* schools provided many migrant children with the only formal education they were likely to get. The schools existed for a long time in a gray area: in one month perhaps lauded by a government official, and in the next month possibly ordered by local authorities to close down because of dangerous buildings or unqualified teachers.

The picture today has changed substantially. Although many *minban* schools still labor in substandard conditions and with inadequate resources, the national government and many local governments have come to see them as an important addition to the educational system. Legislation, in fact, provided a fairly early basis for *minban* schools; as Mok (229) notes:

> Article 25 of the 1995 *Education Law* gave full support to companies, social institutions, local communities, and individuals seeking to establish *minban* (private, or, literally, 'people-run') schools, so long as they fell within a state-defined educational framework (State Education Commission, 1995).

A set of laws and regulations early in this century provided more detailed legal foundations for *minban* schools. These included

a. the Law of the People's Republic of China on Promotion of Privately-Run Schools (2002) ;

b. the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in Running Schools (2003); and

c. the Implementing Articles for the Law on Promotion of Privately Run Schools (2004). (Mok; Guowuyuan 2004)

Private schools may legally operate at any level, from preschool to higher education, including graduate education. And, as can be seen from Table 2.7, *minban* schools were already flourishing in 2003. If we look at the students enrolled by 2014, remarkable developments are evident at the top and the bottom of the educational system. Students

Table 2.7. Minban education's growth

	Number of schools		*Students enrolled*	
Level	***2003***	***2014***	***2003***	***2014***
preschool	55,500	139,300	4,802,300	21,253,800
elementary	5,676	5,681	2,749,300	6,741,400
junior middle	3,651	4,743	2,565,700	4,870,000
senior middle	2,679	2,442	1,413,700	2,386,500
vocational secondary	1,382	2,343	793,800	1,895,700
higher education	173	728	810,000	5,871,500

Sources: Ministry of Education, annual statistical summary reports for 2003 and 2014.

in *minban* institutions of higher education in 2014 constituted nearly 19 percent of total higher education enrollments for the country. For preschool, the share is even more remarkable: 34 percent of children in preschool that year were in *minban* schools. While *minban* shares of enrollment at the intervening levels were smaller, they were still significant.

The implication is that private educational institutions are in China to stay. The question of course is whether they will be able, particularly at the higher levels of the system, to improve their quality and offerings.

And that, to some extent, will depend on the degree to which both central and local government are willing to cooperate with them, and whether public schools accept and interact with them as partners in educating the country's children and young people.

Other educational sectors

Several sectors that have figured fairly prominently in central government policies and plans have not been addressed directly here, but any of them could be important fields for donor action. Preschool expansion has proceeded rapidly, and was a target in the 12th Five–Year Plan, with a goal of increasing enrollment rates in one year of preschool to 85 percent. In poor areas in particular, though, with state help a goal of three years of preschool for most children might be advisable.

Other areas in which state policies on education have been most active are in adult education and special education. Much could be done in either of those sectors. Adult education may become increasingly important, in part because of the growing proportion of retirees, who have time to pursue a wide variety of learning interests. But over the long run adult education could be an essential adjunct in the formal education system, because fast-paced technological change in China's modernizing economy will necessitate the constant upgrading or retooling of knowledge and skills.

We move on now to the other context important for the grantmaker, the donor institution's own organizational context.

B. The Ford Foundation

In the United States, most foundations are chartered by state governments, and therefore under the American federal system are subject to different laws in different states. All, however, must also comply with national tax law. According to the Foundation Center, in 2014 there were 86,726 foundations in the United States, with total assets of over $865 billion, which gave grants totaling $60.24 billion during the year (Foundation Center 2014). The vast majority of these organizations are classified, under US tax law, as "private foundations," a subcategory of nonprofit charitable organizations that are tax exempt[28] so long as they continue to meet Internal Revenue Service requirements (Foundation Group, n.d.). Most prominent among those requirements are to refrain from political activities or legislative lobbying, and to pay out at least 5 percent of their endowment (assets) value each year.

It is impossible to point to one foundation as a typical example. As Joel Fleishman observed in his authoritative book on American foundations,

> Every foundation is sui generis, each reflecting the personalities, values, goals, and talents of the key people behind it, including the donor, significant trustees, and the major program officers. Over time, the decisions made by these individuals shape the distinctive culture of a foundation.... (2007, 27)

The variations Fleishman identifies among foundations include their orientation within their chosen field, their ideologies, their "risk tolerance," the way they make decisions (Fleishman 2007, 29). They also vary by their policies concerning the foundation's

[28] However, private foundations are subject to paying 1 to 2 percent in excise tax on the earnings of their endowments. A more detailed explanation may be found in the Foundation's *2012 Annual Report*, p. 56.

longevity: some aim to spend out the entire endowment within a period of time, while others aim to maintain themselves "in perpetuity," which means limiting their payouts from their endowments, while meeting at least the required IRS minimum payout.

In a report intended to provide information and insights useful to the Chinese philanthropic sector, it is important to emphasize the uniqueness of every foundation. While we hope that much of what we say will be useful to organizations in the nascent donor sector in China, readers should keep in mind that the organizational context of any donor organization strongly affects what is possible, appropriate, or advisable for that donor. Therefore this brief sketch of the Ford Foundation is *not* offered as a model, but rather as background information that can help make the foundation's work in China (particularly the work under the Education portfolio) more understandable, so that readers may more easily evaluate what is useful to them.

Until the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation was created, the Ford Foundation had long been the largest private charitable foundation in the US.[29] In 2014, the Ford Foundation still ranked second among the fifty largest US foundations, with an endowment valued at $12.4 billion (compared to the Gates Foundation's endowment of $44.3 billion) and total giving of $518.4 million (Foundation Center 2014).

Members of the public in both China and the United States often ask about how the foundation functions, and the origin of its funds. Like many charitable foundations, the Ford Foundation exists to provide grants to organizations for purposes that help advance its mission. The funds for the grants come from the foundation's own endowment. That endowment has grown substantially from donations and bequests of Ford Motor Company stock by members of Henry Ford's family from 1936 to the mid–1940s. At its founding in 1936, the foundation was registered in the state of Michigan and oriented towards "scientific, educational and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare." Its work concentrated in the Detroit area.

After a comprehensive strategic study just after Henry Ford's death in the late 1940s, the board of trustees approved the foundation's reorientation as an "international philanthropy dedicated to the advancement of human welfare through reducing poverty and promoting democratic values, peace, and educational opportunity." By the early 1950s, it had also decided to relocate the foundation's headquarters to New York City.

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[29] It was not, however, the country's first major foundation. The industrial tycoons Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, Sr. both capped their massive donations for educational and other charitable purposes by creating private charitable foundations chartered in the state of New York. Carnegie created the Carnegie Corporation of New York in 1911 with an endowment of $125 million (Carnegie Corporation). In 1913, the Rockefeller Foundation was also chartered in New York, with $100 million donated by Rockefeller, Sr. in its founding year, and $83 million more added before the end of the decade [by 1919] (Chernow 566).

Many American foundations' operations in their early years were controlled or strongly influenced by their founding donors or donor companies, and the early Ford Foundation was no exception. However, it grew increasingly independent after its transfer to New York, diversifying the holdings in its endowment and the membership of its board. By the mid–1970s, it had cemented that independence completely, with no remaining holdings of Ford Motor Company stock and no Ford family member on its board (Ford Foundation, n.d.).

Since then, like other independent private foundations in the US, the Ford Foundation remains accountable under the relevant federal and state laws and to its board of trustees, a diverse group of leaders drawn from business, academia, and the nonprofit sector, including the foundation's president but no other staff members. The senior officers (management) of the foundation are responsible for implementing board decisions, and report regularly to the board on foundation programs, activities, and management and investment of funds.

While some foundations require board approval of every grant, the Ford Foundation's board has delegated the authority for grant approvals to the senior officers. The grantmaking process is governed by rules intended to ensure that organizations receiving grants have internal governance and management systems to manage the funds well for the purposes intended. The normal process in making a grant is that a program officer discusses and agrees upon a proposal by a prospective grantee, and drafts a grant recommendation. That recommendation, depending upon its office of origin and the size of the grant, must be approved by either a thematic area or regional office director[30], or by the president of the foundation. Directors may also recommend grants that must be approved at presidential level.[31] No grantmaker, regardless of level in the foundation, has approval authority over his or her own grants, and strict rules of oversight prevent personal and organizational conflicts of interest in grant decisions, including grants made to any organization connected with a member of the board.

Such requirements indicate the foundation's procedural approaches to responsible management of its resources. Beyond those requirements, however, is an organizational culture of commitment to the foundation's core values. That culture is embodied in the way that the foundation's grantmakers work with grantees and prospective grantees who strive to create more just and more equal societies around the world. While the foundation sets certain priority goals, it does not create projects and go looking for

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[30] Until recently, those in charge of field offices were known as "representatives," but the title recently changed to "director" to make the parallel with theme area directors clear.

[31] For the sake of readability, this description greatly simplifies the process. As we will see in the education program overview, the discussion process may be protracted and complex, and the proposal finally accepted may be significantly different from the original one.

grantees who will implement them. Instead, it seeks innovators with deep commitment to the same core values, with keen engagement in solving key problems, and with enthusiasm to work with others in building those solutions. Foundation grantmakers see their grantees as equal partners, and while they may challenge prospective grantees to probe and rethink their plans, it is with the intention of helping grantees become more effective in their own endeavors.

Because the Ford Foundation's grantmakers recognize that long-term solutions to major social problems require long-term investments in people and in institution-building, grant support for some organizations or networks may continue over a long period of time. While committed to such investments, the foundation's grantmakers also note that, with limited funds and numerous needs, there is also some tension between providing stable support to existing grantees, and nurturing new people and organizations with new ideas.

The foundation continues to assert the same basic mission; as its website states:

Across eight decades, our mission has been to reduce poverty and injustice, strengthen democratic values, promote international cooperation, and advance human achievement. (Ford Foundation, n.d.)

But as with any long-lived organization, the strategies for pursuing that mission have changed as times and situations have changed. So—and in connection with strategy decisions—has the foundation's geographic footprint. After establishing its first international field office in India in 1952, the foundation added field offices in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. The Beijing office opened in 1988, after a decade in which a grant program for Chinese educational exchanges operated out of the New York headquarters. Currently the foundation has eleven regional offices, including its US headquarters.

The period we cover in this report on the Education portfolio in the Beijing office spans the terms of three presidents of the foundation: Susan Berresford (1996–2007), Luis Ubiñas (2008–2013), and now Darren Walker (2013 to present). The two most recent presidencies began with long processes of discussion within the foundation about the focus and major goals of programs and the strategies for pursuing them.

Without going into detail about these, we should note three facts. First, the strategy process in 2008–2009 culminated with a sharply defined focus on poor and marginalized groups as the intended beneficiaries of foundation-funded work, and the two years of deliberations under Darren Walker concluded in 2015 with a further sharpened focus on

combating inequality. Second, all regional offices developed new strategic plans towards the end of both these processes. In 2009 the Beijing office proposed a strategy focused on system-wide improvements for all marginalized groups to attain social equity goals. In 2015–16 the strategy was refined to concentrate on economic security and social inclusion for rural migrants and those who are urbanized in place. Third, new strategies changed the shape of the Education portfolio over time, as they changed the shape of other portfolios in the Beijing office: the fairly broad mandates for program officers that were standard early in this century have been progressively narrowed in focus as the foundation's leadership has selected a smaller number of initiatives (social issues on which certain approaches for solution are concentrated), in hopes of greater impact. The processes in 2008—2009 and 2013—2015 progressively reduced the total number of initiatives in the foundation as a whole from over three hundred to fifteen.[32] Program officers continued to play a crucial role in defining the initiatives' strategies in their own country and regional contexts.

[32] Over successive phases of planning, "initiative" and "line of work" have tended to alternate in use. For the convenience of readers, we are using the term "initiative," but it should be kept in mind that these may be referred to differently at different times in the foundation's recent history.

FORDFOUNDATION

III.

STRATEGY: DEVELOPING THE PROGRAM

The Beijing Office's work in education and culture evolved over time in response both to changes in the China context and changes in the Ford Foundation's strategies and approaches. Some of the foundation's earliest support in China went for educational programs, particularly for educational and research exchange programs and for rebuilding higher-education programs in law, economics and international relations after the Cultural Revolution decade of 1966–1976. However, an initiative dedicated to the education sector in China was not introduced until 2001. During a preparatory period in 2000 to 2001, a consultant made exploratory grants and assessed needs in the program area, reporting on findings and making strategic recommendations. The dedicated portfolio began in 2001, with the creation of a program officer position for Education and Culture. After the new strategic planning process in 2008–2009, the program officer's position was redefined to include only education.[33]

Dr. He Jin, who had extensive experience in education funding with both UNDP and the World Bank, began in the program officer position in July 2001. He was promoted to senior program officer in October 2006 but continued with basically the same duties.

This chapter presents an overview of strategies informing the Education and Culture work in the Beijing office from 2000 to 2015, emphasizing the Education component, which has been a constant throughout.

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[33] Initially, the program officer's position was under the foundation's EMAC (Education, Media, Arts and Culture) program. That program was subsequently renamed as Knowledge, Creativity and Freedom (KCF), and after the first new strategic planning process in 2008-9, again renamed, to Education, Creativity, and Freedom of Expression (ECX).

A. Early development: consultant's work

As the Beijing office considered the addition of a program officer position in Education and Culture, a consultant expert in Chinese education was retained to generate strategic recommendations. His study worked within a framework created by a worldwide meeting in 2000, which defined the general goals of the foundation's Education, Media, Arts and Culture program:

EMAC seeks to reinforce the ability of educational and cultural institutions to develop the talents, expertise, values and leadership skills that promote and sustain democratic, equitable, just, peaceful and creative society.

The global program had identified three fields potentially relevant for EMAC programming within China:

Educational Reform: The goal of the foundation work in the field of education is to enhance the capacity of education systems and institutions to foster access and equity in pursuit of excellence, especially for under served groups….

Higher Education and Scholarship: The work strives to enhance access, affordability, and quality in higher education, and to build fields of knowledge that deepen scholarly and public understanding of pluralism, the world, and the human condition….

Arts and Culture: This program works toward ensuring that artists and intellectuals from all cultures have opportunities to develop and transmit expressive traditions and new creative forms….

After assessment of the field and needs within China, and building on previous work supported under other programs in the Beijing office, the consultant made grants within each of these fields, focusing under the rubrics of *Community college models in China* (educational reform), the *Development of Women's Studies* (higher education and scholarship), and *Cultural vitality in Yunnan* (arts and culture). His final report pointed to lacunae in the work that, if addressed, might make the solution of root problems more effective. Among the suggestions for changes, several should be highlighted here:

a. Community college models: explore developmental possibilities in private (*minban*) universities and colleges and existing technical middle schools (*zhongzhuan*); support community college development in ethnic minority areas of Western China; and evaluate or support research on the colleges' linkages with employment opportunities.

b. Women's Studies: develop strategies for institutionalized support of

Women's Studies programs; build links and information-sharing networks among Women's Studies centers; support a variety of international exchanges in the field; create connections between Women's Studies programming and gender-related issues in educational reform.

c. Culture and development in Yunnan: strengthen links between culture and economic development and community life; connect the work with state cultural institutions and educational administration; and expand culture work into other Southwest China provinces.

In addition to those three existing fields, the consultant explored a new line of grantmaking under the rubric of *Culture, schooling and development*. Projects supported under that rubric explored ways to link work on culture with work on basic education, concentrating primarily on ethnic minority areas and cultures in western China. These involved a diverse array of efforts, such as community engagement in school planning and teacher training; evaluation of textbooks in minority languages and the cost of textbooks in minority areas; reducing dropout rates of girls from ethnic minorities; support for bilingual education; and training programs for local economic development.

The consultant also highlighted very briefly the significance of Chinese information technology policy and the digital divide for education and poverty alleviation.

B. Defining the portfolio, developing initiatives (2001–2008)

When He Jin joined the Beijing office, the standard practice for new program officers was to survey their field and the needs, and to draw up a strategy for concentrating funding on a finite set of problems, using a specific set of approaches. The strategy and approaches and the rationale behind them (including careful consideration of how to fit the strategy and choice of problems with the policies and priorities of the Chinese government) were set forth in a Program Officer Memo, or POM. Each new program officer's POM defined one or two *initiatives* that the program officer planned to pursue through grantmaking. This internal document had to be approved by the regional office's director, the program's director in New York, and the vice-president responsible for that

program.[34] Normally this process took twelve to eighteen months, during which time the program officer made grants under inherited initiatives, while also making grants that branched out into new areas to find promising new grantees, explore the relevant problems, and test potential types of solution.

He Jin took up the program officer position in July 2001. His POM was completed in 2003 and received final approval in January 2004. He defined two initiatives:

a. *Strengthening equity in education through innovation and management reform, and*
b. *Cultural diversity, preservation and transmission through education*

These initiatives will hereafter be referred to as Education and Culture, respectively. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the types of work supported under these initiatives. Here we offer more general considerations on the strategic thinking that went into shaping the initiatives.

The thinking that goes into defining any initiative is bound to vary depending on the particular environment, the state of the field and related work, and the funds that are available for the grantmaker. It also reflects the individual grantmaker's experience, professional capacities, and judgment about what drives change in the field.

He Jin's thinking developed in part from his experience with international organizations, where he observed huge amounts of funding going to projects that worked as long as the funding lasted, but were usually unsustainable once they ended. The challenge, as a Ford Foundation program officer, was how to deploy a far smaller budget—where project budgets might be $100,000, rather than $100 million—to achieve significant results that could be sustained and scaled up even after the foundation's funding concluded. The challenge here was all the more intense because the education and culture work, in He Jin's judgment, should focus on benefit to poor and marginalized groups, where the needs were greatest.

As noted in Chapter 2, rapid changes in China's education sector had brought major progress but revealed new problems. Despite literacy rates and school enrollment ratios that were the envy of many developing nations, inequities in education persisted. Poor, rural, and ethnic minority areas, particularly those in western China, had much lower educational attainments than the wealthier major urban areas. They had significantly

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[34] The terminology within the foundation has changed over time. While POMs were required, there were three major arenas of work, each overseen by a vice-president; these were labeled as "programs." Under that were "fields of work," each overseen by a director. Program officers were located within a field of work, but in He Jin's case, he was in two fields. By the time his POM was approved those were categorized as "Education and Scholarship" and "Arts and Culture." By that point the vice-presidential program was termed Knowledge, Creativity and Freedom.

lower rates of basic education enrollments, high dropout rates, and difficulties in building high quality teaching staffs. Government policy makers and education researchers were especially concerned with thoroughly implementing the state policy for nine years' compulsory education. For education work, then, the priority for a strategy should rest upon finding solutions for the most recalcitrant problems of inequities surrounding basic education.

China's national government, at the beginning of the century, allocated less than 3 percent of GDP to education.[35] But the problems for Chinese education were due not so much to the lack of funds as to the way the system managed the resources it already had. Therefore, sustainable solutions required new approaches to decision making and administration in the educational system. That in turn meant that the program officer would have to take pains to involve national and local government bodies in the work.

With respect to culture, the penetration of market forces in poor minority nationality areas had undermined traditional local cultures' vitality and the communities they both sustained and depended upon. Program officers for Gender and Reproductive Health and for Environment and Development had supported cultural preservation research in minority nationality areas of southwestern China for many years, providing a solid base to build upon. One of the key strategic choices He Jin made in designing the initiatives was to seek synergies between the work in education and that in culture. His strategic approach aimed to integrate an education component into the work on culture in order to enhance cultural transmission and provide sustainability in cultural projects.

To be effective in either arena, funds had to be targeted judiciously. Fortunately, China's policy system typically innovates through the testing of pilot efforts that can then be more broadly adopted and scaled up by government action. This pointed naturally toward a set of approaches that could be supported through grantmaking: pilot projects to address key problems; action research involving decision makers, practitioners, and other stakeholders, and networking among them to share knowledge about best practices; and communication with media, stakeholders, and policy makers. Themes running throughout the POM presaged the watchwords that soon became explicit and distinctive expectations that He Jin held for all projects funded: innovation, sustainability, replicability, and participation (of *all* relevant stakeholders—including beneficiaries). Those notions so strongly characterized all of his grantmaking that our report devotes much of Chapter 5 to discussing them in detail.

[35] For OECD countries, the standard was 4 percent or more.

Early in his tenure, a major national policy centered on poverty alleviation and development in China's western regions. Seeking synergies with policy priorities, He Jin decided to concentrate much of his funding on work related to those regions. And because of the areas of greatest need, as well as the foundation's historic commitments in China, the target groups were identified as the rural poor, ethnic minorities, and girls.

In addition to the work on education and culture, the portfolio was to continue grantmaking for inherited commitments on Women's/Gender Studies, and community college development. In addition, the program officer participated in the foundation's global initiative Pathways to Higher Education (PHE),[36] which aimed to improve poor students' access to and successful completion of bachelor's degree programs.

The POM served essentially as a roadmap for the program officer's work over a period of several years. However, the routes taken toward the major goals of the portfolio might change over time with changes in context—government policies or priorities, major social needs, or even successes of earlier work which then call for new ideas—or refinements based upon new learning among grantees and program officer arising out of project work. Until 2008, program officers assessed the progress of their initiatives in annual "reflection memos," which summarized the major efforts in the previous year and any significant changes in the environment, and identified the likely focus for the coming year.

Successive years of reflection memos for the Education and Culture portfolio demonstrate both adjustments and refinements. Even while still working on the POM, He Jin convened or attended numerous meetings with potential core grantees and institutions significant for the portfolio work, and sought to improve linkages among grantees and former grantees and between grantees and the media. He funded research on equity issues in elementary and secondary education, and in higher education, as well as research and training on best practices in vocational education. New needs became apparent as grantees effectively solved older problems. Sometimes this meant a significant adjustment of strategy. For example, the stream of migrants from China's rural to urban areas continued to swell. The problems in the education of their children, whether they accompanied their parents or remained in the villages, became increasingly severe, and therefore migrant and left-behind children became an additional target group for the portfolio's work.

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[36] PHE provided support through grants to institutions. Another global initiative begun at the same time, the International Fellowship Program (IFP), funded individuals from poor areas for advanced study abroad.

C. New strategies and focus (2009–2015)

Shortly after the beginning of Luis Ubiñas's presidency in 2008, the entire foundation embarked on a strategic planning process that lasted into 2009 and substantially changed the way grantmakers worked. Reflection memos were eliminated. POMs were discontinued. The previous POM initiatives, unique to each program officer, folded into a more limited number of initiatives that were expected to involve program officers working in several offices.

Teams working across offices developed those initiatives. The new initiatives remained somewhat fluid and underwent repeated refinements, up to the time when Darren Walker stepped up to the presidency in 2013 and a new strategic planning process began. He Jin provided numerous detailed statements of his portfolio's strategy after 2009, and we found that his occasional presentations on the goals and methods for the work he supported provide the best insight into his specific strategies for China.

Under the new approach, the Foundation explicitly identified a mission of improving the situation of poor and disadvantaged populations, which brought to the fore something that clearly was already core to the education portfolio's work. Beginning in 2009, the Beijing office strategy emphasized support for "system–wide improvements for all marginalized groups to attain social equity goals," and for efforts to help build the social sector to assist in achieving those improvements. The principal target groups corresponded neatly with the groups that He Jin's grantmaking had been seeking to serve all along: women and girls, ethnic minorities, migrants and the poor.

As mentioned above, under the new foundation–wide initiatives, the previous *Cultural* initiative was suspended. Henceforth, most grantmakers in all offices could work on only one initiative. Fortunately, in view of important complementarities in Chinese education, the Beijing office was permitted to pursue two education initiatives, covering basic and higher education. These were defined as:

a. Transforming secondary education[37]

b. Higher education for social justice

The former built on previous work on basic education, and on China's major policy goal of providing compulsory basic education through grade 9 (elementary and junior middle school, in the Chinese system). Since the proportion of the elementary school–age

[37] Initially labeled as *Education reform for students ages 9-17*.

cohort in school had already exceeded 99 percent, the major challenges were at the junior middle school level. The second initiative coincided with China's ongoing expansion and diversification in the higher education system, in which regional and urban–rural disparities in access and quality contributed to a persistent imbalance of opportunities. As He Jin explained in internal discussions, both initiatives aimed "to promote equity and justice in education to ensure that all people, especially the poor and marginalized, have equal opportunities to receive quality education."

The initiative for *Transforming secondary education* identified two key access problems and two key quality issues. The access issues revolved, first, around skewed opportunities throughout schooling, contributing to high dropout rates in rural schools, especially at the crucial transition from junior to senior middle school; and second, migrant children's access to education (whether in public or *minban* schools) in the cities where they lived with their parents. The quality issues centered on the quality of teachers and curriculum, particularly in rural and *minban* schools; and the relevance of the curriculum (especially for rural and migrant students) and the need for student–centered learning. Goals set for the initiative included substantially increasing the number of students in senior middle school; quality improvements through innovation and management reform; adding the promotion of practical skills training to academic learning in curriculum and teaching; and supporting the development of *minban* education catering to migrant children. The target groups and geographic regions remained the same overall as for the original education initiative from 2005 onwards.

The initiative for *Higher education for social justice* addressed some key issues emerging out of the rapid expansion in higher education since 1999, which had not anticipated differences in students' needs, institutions' capacities, or local labor markets. Related to this, problems had been compounded by the emphasis on "hardware" funding for expansions (school buildings, equipment, etc.) at the expense of funding for the "software" so essential to quality education (teachers, curriculum, textbook development), so the quality of teaching and learning fell short. In addition, by 2009, after the decade of greatly expanded college and university enrollments, unemployment among new graduates had grown to worrisome proportions. To address these problems, the initiative proposed four main goals: improving disadvantaged students' equitable access through policies and structural changes to accommodate the diverse needs of more numerous and more diverse students; enhancing the quality of education through better assessment and evaluation methods; building institutional capacity to afford equal development opportunities for both public and private institutions of higher education; and promoting post–secondary vocational education with a community focus

to meet both the social demand for more post–secondary education and the market need for employees with professional and technical skills.

Under both initiatives, He Jin planned to continue the use of the same kinds of approaches that had been effective in the POM initiatives:

a. introducing new ideas and innovative methods;

b. testing those through pilot projects;

c. bringing new and diverse stakeholders into engagement in policy discussion, including on refinements that improve policies' suitable adaptation to local situations; and

d. building institutional capacities and system mechanisms that support sustainable reform.

These approaches and the groups targeted aligned neatly with the 2009 field office strategy.

In Chapter 4, we provide an overview, within the general framework of the initiatives, of the work supported by He Jin's grants over the fifteen years of his work in the foundation. In Chapter 5, we discuss in detail the principles that underlay his selection of grants and grantees and his work with the philanthropic field in China. Finally, Chapter 6 presents several case studies that illustrate both the breadth and the depth of the work supported.

FORDFOUNDATION

IV.

GRANTS OVERVIEW

Any grantmaker or donor institution needs to map the environment in which grantmaking is planned. The mapping helps to identify the social needs to which the grantmaker can respond, and the circumstances that both constrain the possibilities and generate the opportunities for effective grantmaking. Two elements in the context are fundamental: first, the country context (or, for a locally focused donor, the local context), and the institutional context of the grantmaking institution itself.

For the Beijing office's Education portfolio during the entire fifteen years of its existence, both of those contexts have been dynamic, with continuous change seeming, at times, the only constant.

A. The Body of Work: A Macro View

Grants for research, pilot projects, training and education, and sharing and communication of ideas and information have spanned work from the basic institutional level of schools up to central government offices concerned with education issues. Grantees have included colleges, universities, local schools, state and private research institutes, local governments, central government agencies, and the media.

In all, approximately three hundred grants were made under the Education portfolio (including related work under the early Culture initiative, and grants made by the consultant who preceded He Jin's appointment). That number includes about 250 standard grants and about another fifty small institutional grants (SIGs) administered through the Institute of International Education (IIE). Most grants were based entirely on the program officer's budget. A few were made jointly by He Jin and another grantmaker in the office; those for one important set, Pathways to Higher Education (PHE), relied primarily upon funds allocated through PHE's global initiative, supplemented by the Beijing program officer's budget. The collaborations made it possible to leverage significantly larger amounts of funding for the education program than were available under most portfolios. In addition, funds supplementing original projects or supporting scale-ups came program projects after 2007. However, the key factor in the impact, as we will see later, was not so much the amount of funding provided, as its careful targeting and the way the program officer worked with grantees and their partners.

The POM and post-2009 initiatives related to basic and secondary education dealt with access challenges ranging from lack of access to schooling for minority-nationality girls in poor rural areas and migrant children in urban settings, to reducing dropout rates of students in secondary education and other levels. Quality issues addressed ranged from increasing the relevance of textbooks and school curricula to students' needs, to improving teaching, management and evaluation. Some grants concentrated on access or quality separately, but often those issues entwined in a project. Ultimately the goal was access to high quality education for all.

The work on higher education, under both the POM and the newer initiative for *higher education for social justice*, tackled issues such as how best to help students from disadvantaged families get to and succeed in postsecondary education; support for missing or underdeveloped academic disciplines; the improvement of new, non-mainstream postsecondary educational models, like *minban* universities and vocational and technical colleges (particularly important for meeting the educational needs of migrant or poor rural students); and some urgent and fundamental issues in higher

education, such as student loans and the unemployment of college graduates. The commitment on community college development evolved into a substantial set of grants on development of vocational and technical colleges. The inherited commitment for building Gender and Women's Studies involved grants from 2001 until the final grant made in 2008 and concluded in 2012. In the second half of He Jin's tenure, significant funding went to helping Chinese universities build new fields in development studies and experimental economics of education.

Table 3.1 summarizes the grants made within the Beijing office for work on culture and education, beginning with grants made by a consultant from 2000 to early 2001, and continuing through several stages of He Jin's portfolio. The table categorizes grants by major period under the rubrics used in the foundation's records, showing for each rubric the total value of the grants, their number, and the range in their size. The consultant's grants totaled not quite US$3 million. He Jin made grants of a little over $3 million during the exploratory period developing his POM, and then approximately $14.3 million under the POM, and $13.6 million under the post–2009 initiatives. In all, from 2001 to 2008, the grants for culture totaled just short of $3 million. The grants for education from 2001 to 2015 totaled about $27.9 million. These totals exclude the PHE work, for which another $7.9 million in grants was made from 2001–2009. Total grants for all education work added up to just under $35.8 million.[38]

Clearly this signifies a very substantial investment by the foundation, and we would expect to see significant results from it.

In this chapter we describe the grants grouped in key categories according to principal subject matter, survey the work conducted by grantees, and briefly summarize results. The major categories include:

a. culture

b. basic education access and quality

c. vocational education at secondary level

d. higher education

[38] These numbers have been rounded off to the nearest 0.1 million.

Table 3.1. Grants under Beijing Office Education and Culture Programs

	Total value	No. of grants[a]	Range of grant size ($1000)[b]
1. Consultant grants, 1999–2000[c]	**$2,917,013**	**30**	
Community college development	603,013	3	98–414
Cultural preservation & vitality	483,800	7	9–160
Culture, schooling, & development	634,600	14	8–100
Women's studies	474,600	6	23–230
Other	721,000	3	15–655
2. Pre–POM explorations (2001–2003)	**$3,125,374**	**39**	
Culture	663,000	10	25–120
Education reform	667,104	7	20–250
Education/higher education & scholarship (other than Women's Studies and PHE)	1,795,270	22	30–185
3. POM initiatives and related grants (2004–2008) (other than PHE)	**$14,294,034**	**93**	
Cultural diversity, preservation & transmission through education	2,301,807	17	33–650
Strengthening equity in education through innovation & management reform	9,943,071	59	29–2760
Women's and gender studies (2001–2007)	1,665,376	14	13–530
Other education–related	383,780	3	100–160
4. Foundation–wide initiatives	**$7,898,100**	**21**	
Pathways to Higher Education (PHE) (2001–2009)	7,898,100[d]	6	119–2314
5. Post–2009 initiatives (2009–2015)	**$13,574,312**	**70**	
Transforming secondary education	7,375,446[e]	39	60–508
Higher education for social justice	6,198,866	33	32–704
TOTAL	**$41,808,833**	**238**	

NOTE: grants made during 2016 are not included in these tallies. The table also excludes SIGs and individual grants administered through IIE, and grants made by the program officer in the capacity of Acting Representative for the Beijing office during 2013, when those grants pertained to a portfolio other than Education.

[a] When an original grant was re–granted to a different institution, only the newer grant is counted.

[b] Rounded to nearest thousand.

[c] Note: grants made in FY1999 may have been categorized as "Commitment" or "Unassigned."

[d] Includes substantial input of funding from global initiative funds.

[e] This total includes two grants co–funded with the program for Transparent, Effective, Accountable Government.

In most of these categories, the number and variety of grants warrants their subdivision into topical areas with one or more clusters of related grants. Some clusters were designed for work to take place simultaneously, while others consisted of cumulative series.

Because the number of grants is so large and the volume of work done was huge, we cannot go into depth on most of them in this chapter. Even the 178 that our team reviewed closely cannot be discussed in detail. Rather, we provide a capsule description for each major category or sub-category of work, and highlight a small number of especially noteworthy grants or clusters, to help provide the flavor of the work and its impact. Chapter 5, which presents distinctive aspects of the program officer's approach to grantmaking and monitoring, draws on additional details on some grants by way of illustration. And Chapter 6 of this report provides a group of three case studies for a more in-depth look at the work supported, and at both He Jin's and the grantees' reflections on the value of the projects and their impact both short- and long-term. Our survey in this chapter flags the projects featured in that later chapter.

One point should be kept in mind concerning grantees: foundation rules require that one, and only one, institution may be the responsible grantee of record for a grant. However, many grants in China feature collaborative efforts by two or more institutions. He Jin's grants in particular often featured cooperative work by several institutions. While many grantees of record may be educational institutions, the actual work, from the long process of project design and grant negotiation on to the final wrap-up activities, typically shows involvement by many stakeholders—institutional and individual—ranging from central government ministries and national research universities, to NGOs both international and domestic, to local schools, enterprises and communities, to parents and children.

B. Culture

The *Culture* initiative grantmaking emphasized piloting new mechanisms for cultural preservation, especially among minority nationalities, and encouraging policy enhancements to heighten public consciousness of minority and other folk cultures. The culture grants in general were designed to integrate educational elements into the culture work from the outset, in order to maximize the sustainability and replicability of the projects.

Most of the work concentrated on western China, and explored a wide range of methods of cultural preservation, including video recordings, folk art and folk culture museums, a

cultural and ecological village series (to integrate community development and tourism with cultural preservation), development of key reference works in minority languages, and creating community–based institutions for traditional cultures' preservation with strong community participation. Some grants supported related research to develop policy recommendations for cultural preservation.

Most of the grants made under the *Culture* initiative formed clusters aimed to achieve synergies among grantees' efforts, or to build a series of demonstrations of ways to make cultural preservation into a living practice, not a static conservation of artifacts. Collaborations were key features for all of them: everyone from ordinary villagers to academic experts to officials at local and national levels played active parts in the projects.

One example of that work is an early grant made to help preserve China's intangible cultural heritage, using the traditional art of paper–cutting to demonstrate effective ways of linking local artisans, local communities, and cultural authorities in preserving traditional arts and cultural forms. The original grant went to China Research Association for Folk Paper–cut, but after the Association lost its registration status under a regulatory change, the funds were re–granted to the Central Academy of Fine Arts. The work progressed well despite the institutional change.

The activities included identifying masters of the art, documenting and celebrating the work of paper–cut artists, promoting instruction in paper–cut techniques in schools from elementary to university levels, and preserving the products of the art through a museum and an image library/database.

From the outset, one higher order of goal was to clarify the steps for conservation of intangible cultural heritage so as to raise artists' capacities for conservation, and to develop the documentation necessary to apply for listing with UNESCO's Intangible Cultural Heritage. The grantee successfully mobilized hundreds of volunteers to join in activities ranging from restoration of a thousand–year–old cave to setting up cultural/technological showrooms in two villages. The project led to establishment of a Folk Customs Museum—one of at least five museums that grew out of various of He Jin's culture grants. Another goal for the grant was to heighten the Ministry of Culture's capacity to coordinate efforts of this sort and then disseminate them. A strong indication of success came in 2009, some years after the conclusion of the grant, when the art of Chinese paper–cut was added to UNESCO's cultural heritage list.[39]

[39] See the UNESCO page on the listing, http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/en/RL/chinese-paper-cut-00219.

In order to create synergies between the early years' initiatives in culture and in education, He Jin integrated the culture work with work on education, as well as with community economic and social development. An excellent example of this is the work conducted by Sichuan Normal University under four successive grants that began under the *Culture* initiative but continued under *Transforming secondary education*. These began with efforts to revive and preserve Tibetan cultural heritage in one county in a Tibetan autonomous prefecture in western Sichuan province. They progressed to creation of local cultural centers and strengthened links between schools and communities that promoted environmental sustainability along with cultural conservation and community development.

A strong team based at the university continues that work to the present. As one indication of the project's impact even midway through the work, the local government made cultural centers' construction one of the indicators of performance under the national government's "new socialist countryside" program.[40]

C. Basic Education: Access and Quality [41]

The portfolio's work on basic education at first came under the *Education* initiative, and after 2009, the initiative for *Transforming secondary education*. Improved access and quality were emphasized throughout. Grants in this section fall into seven major categories.

1. Increase access for small ethnic minorities and girls (2001–207)

Grants in this category consisted of a cluster of seven, aimed at testing and disseminating solutions to the problem of basic education access for girls from national minority groups in poor areas. For many minority nationalities, the dropout rate from primary school was

quite high for girls. Keeping them in school through junior high school fit precisely with the national policy goal of reaching universal basic education (through junior high), but even ensuring they completed primary school was a big challenge.

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[40] The New Socialist Countryside program was adopted as a national policy by the Chinese Communist Party at its 16th Plenum in 2005. As with many "Big Policies" at central level, local areas had to follow them but could adapt the program as appropriate for local circumstances.

[41] In this and later sections, the dates in parentheses in the subtitles refer to beginning dates of grants.

In order to make the best use of limited funds, He Jin chose projects working primarily with girls from "small national minorities"—those with fewer than one hundred thousand population. The minorities chosen, as is the case for most such small minorities, lived in poor regions of western China; the choice of the groups therefore also accorded with the national strategy for development of the west (西部大开发). The work included research to discover the true obstacles to girls' school attendance, and pilot programs for overcoming those obstacles. The effort began modestly: the original grant covered work with a single class for forty-three girls from the Lahu minority. Pilots eventually covered six minority groups. Different pilots then tested a variety of different innovative mechanisms: scholarships coupled with community participation to choose recipients, or with microloans and technical assistance to girls' families; teacher training; bilingual education; and self-funding methods for boarding schools. Grantees included national institutions (Central University for Nationalities and the National Institute of Education Science); provincial or regional institutions (Guangxi Institute of Education, Inner Mongolia Female Talent Research Center, Northwest

Normal University, Yunnan Provincial Department of Education), and a local one, Narisi Primary School of Dongxiang County. From the outset,

the Ministry of Education and the State Ethnic Affairs Commission monitored and participated in the work. The efforts proved, on a small scale, the efficacy of specific measures to encourage ethnic-minority girls to stay in school, and fed directly into a new national development strategy for small ethnic minorities.

2. Reduce drop-outs and increase completion rates in rural areas (2002—2011)

This series consisted of five grants, made primarily from 2002 to 2006. They covered research and pilot interventions for both primary and junior middle schools. The goal was to keep more rural students, especially poor ones, from dropping out of school. Grantees examined non-economic measures or those that went beyond giving scholarships: community networks and poverty alleviation, measures to keep good teachers at the schools or to improve students' physical and psychological health, and curricular revisions. Grantees included the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS, Sociology Institute), Changchun University of Technology, the Research Center for Rural Economy (RCRE), Northwest University, and China Education Press Agency.

One especially interesting intervention by the CASS Sociology Institute, which had already researched rural social traditions in many counties throughout China, used the

traditional rural credit mechanism of rotating loan funds to help support children through secondary school, with participatory village management of the rotating fund. The project encompassed eight villages in three impoverished counties of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Hunan. A great part of the loan funds eventually came from village sources, leaving a balance in the grant funds that allowed extension of the work for an additional year. In the end, the project supported five times as many students as originally planned. Data at the end of the project showed a dropout rate significantly lower than the local average; some of the better students went on to senior middle school or vocational schools, and a handful went on to college. The project also demonstrated the effectiveness of village networks in making junior middle school more affordable.

A point worth noting is that projects to try solutions to a particular problem (e.g., inadequate investment in rural schools) might find their original goals rendered moot by major changes in government policy (e.g., increased public investment) that could not have been predicted beforehand. This sometimes meant making adjustments to work plans in mid-project. Grantees usually proved nimble in making those adjustments.

3. Access for migrant and left-behind children, rural population (2001-2015)

This series consisted of fifteen grants, approximately one made each year.[42] Their general goal was to ensure equal access to quality basic education for tens of millions of migrant children and children left behind in rural areas when their parents migrated out for work. Grantees included policy research institutions (Beijing Academy of Social Sciences, China Rural Labor Development Institute, National Institute of Education Sciences), universities (East China Normal University, Beijing Normal University, National Chengchi University), NGOs and foundations (Beijing Growing Home, Sun Culture Foundation, Beijing United Charity Foundation, Beijing Water Source Conservation Foundation, Chengdu Huizhi Social Work Service Center), and one school serving migrant students.

As noted earlier, the national government recognized early in this century the need to extend equal rights—including education—of many sorts to migrants in China's cities. But making those rights a reality meant, and still means, a long process of disentangling institutional arrangements and financial systems inherited from the old system bifurcating city and countryside. Many of the grants in this arena supported work

[42] Others, which dealt primarily with vocational and technical education, have been included in the Vocational Education category below.

exploring potential parts of an eventual big solution, while devising smaller solutions to immediate needs. The impact of the work, therefore, was incremental but cumulative.

An early cluster of four grants supported research on migrant schools and on the educational needs of left-behind children. The grantees in most cases also tested various interventions to engage all relevant stakeholders (including local officials, teachers and school principals, and parents along with researchers) to discuss possible solutions and best practices, to improve schools' management and teaching quality, and to develop rules for *minban* schools. Grantees included the Beijing Academy of Social Sciences (BASS), China Rural Labor Development Institute,[43] East China Normal University, and the Xingzhi School.

An example of work in this cluster is the early grant to BASS for work on schooling for migrant children, which included research, training, and community coordination. BASS prepared a survey report on Beijing public schools' attitudes and practices concerning migrant students (admission and treatment once admitted), and compared these with practices in Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The survey report, covering three districts of Beijing and focusing on ten public primary and three public secondary schools, was cited in an internal State Council newsletter and in numerous publications.

The BASS researchers trained principals and teachers in public schools to take migrant children's experience and perspectives into account to provide truly equal education. They coupled this with action research by teachers themselves, for intervention in migrant children's learning and living. The project team launched pilot projects in Beijing's Chaoyang and Shijingshan districts, working on township-based integrated planning for migrant children's education. One part of the project work, at Yuquanlu Primary School, broadly engaged the surrounding community in improving the school's environment. This included getting the local Urban Management office to cooperate with the school to negotiate with peddlers and parents to reduce disorder at the school gates; and involving the local residents' committee to hand out recruitment materials for school enrollment and—since the school lacked a playground—provide a place for the children to exercise. Local police and fire departments also provided some lessons for the children. Official recognition of the project's accomplishments, and the importance of addressing the schooling opportunities for migrant children, came when Premier Wen Jiabao visited the Yuquanlu school and made an inscription: "Under the same blue sky, let's grow up together."[44]

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[43] CRLDI is an independent research institute with strong ties to the Ministry of Agriculture.
[44] This was reported in *People's Daily*. 何三畏, 《"同在蓝天下"，谁解其中味？——看农民工子弟受教育权》, 2003 年 09 月 11,http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/1034/2084063.html.

A grant in 2006 to Beijing Normal University helped advance understanding of one of the most crucial factors in ensuring equal access to education: municipal finance. Three research teams working in parallel in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Kunming, studied how financial arrangements affected the quality of schooling available for migrant children. Their goal was to construct case studies of feasible interventions, based on government fund allocation in the three cities; two concluding conferences were planned, whose proceedings and policy recommendation would go to local and national governments and people's congresses. Even during the grant period, the project work resulted in some policy advances. The Beijing Municipal Government set a goal of providing free compulsory education to 90 percent of migrant children by 2012. In Kunming, the research helped support motions in a district people's congress and the municipal consultative congress, and the research may have contributed to new municipal policies for funding schools accepting migrant children as students, and for resettling children whose schools were demolished in urban renewal. The Guangdong interviews and conversations with local officials there helped raise the priority of schooling for migrant children. The Beijing team's report for the Chinese Education Policy Research Institute, concerning compulsory basic education for migrant children, went to leaders at the central level.

At the level of the schools, one action project is illustrative of the challenges and possibilities of the *minban* schools set up to serve migrant students. A grant in 2009 supported work by an NGO, Beijing Growing Home, to help migrant students integrate into urban life and learning. The project experimented with modifying *minban* schools' curriculum to equip children with better understanding and appreciation of urban life. Growing Home relied on the expertise of a prominent child psychologist to develop courseware for different grade levels and teacher training in its use. The children were exposed to activity outside the classroom, including field trips and a photo contest connected with field trips. The teaching manuals and audiovisual courses created during the project could be downloaded from Growing Home's website, as could photos taken by the children. Not everything went smoothly. Teacher training proved more demanding than anticipated, and plans for extending the field–study model ran into many school administrators' concerns about safety. Therefore, by the end of the grant, although a few schools had expressed interest in adopting this model, the numbers were not as high as originally hoped.

The project did excellent publicity work, however, which helped attract some eighty student volunteers from local universities. Some photos were made into postcards and distributed to about one hundred organizations so urban residents could write to migrant children; over two thousand postcards were received. The project also gained media

coverage by radio, social networks, and online and print news media; and attracted support from several companies and foundations. Especially notable was its cooperation with Beijing Mass Transit Railway Corporation to put student photos on display on subway line 4. And the project won second place in a competition "Seeking for Dreams Action" sponsored by the volunteers department of the Communist Youth League (central level) and the China Youth Volunteers Association. At the project's conclusion in 2011, Growing Home was preparing for the second-round selection process for China Charities Aid Foundation funding, and planning to continue with this work.

Despite the growing awareness of migrant children's education needs among education authorities in both national and local government, *minban* schools have continued to provide the only accessible educational opportunities for tens of thousands of migrant children. Those schools lack many of the resources necessary to deliver high quality education to their students. In particular, they are weak in subjects like art, music, and English, and the poor or nonexistent instruction in those subjects not only lowers the overall quality of the education, but also places *minban* schools' students at a serious disadvantage in taking the *zhongkao*, the exams for admission to senior middle school.

During the last third of the program officer's tenure, two grants supported pilot efforts in the enrichment of *minban* migrant schools' curriculum. Both projects were designed to incorporate more external resources and to draw local governments' attention to the need for more public resources for such schools.

Under the first of these grants, Beijing United Charity Foundation emphasized experimental work in music education to test new approaches that could be used in other arts subjects and physical education. The pilot was conducted in one school in the Beijing suburbs. The team worked on teacher training and on course materials, organized musical performances, improved management, and tested methods for recruiting and retaining volunteer teachers. The project trained a core of "backbone" music teachers and developed a teacher-training video. In later phases the project team also worked with Sun Culture Foundation, developed digital photography classes in collaboration with a Shanghai volunteer organization, and conducted fine arts education exchanges with the migrant school at Capital Normal University.

Under the second grant, Chengdu Huizhi Social Work Service Center undertook the improvement of English-language teaching in four migrant schools on the outskirts of Chengdu. From the outset, this work was supported by parallel funding from Sun Culture Foundation. The project trained English teachers in pilot schools, improved the management of teaching, and enhanced schools' accountability to parents and

community through the use of Citizen Report Card[45] methods. The project team gathered academic studies on pedagogy for teachers' reference, built a network among teachers at the project schools, initiated contests among the schools, and arranged exchanges among the project schools for classroom observation and with elite public schools for demonstration teaching. Throughout the project, the team kept in touch with the local education departments through visits (including a pre-*zhongkao* training attended by experts from two district education bureaux), reports and discussion. Ultimately, their efforts led to some improvements in English teaching in the pilot schools. Of more far-reaching significance, their policy reports also alerted local authorities to heretofore unmeasured gaps in English learning and education costs between the *minban* schools and public schools, gaps which affect *minban* students' opportunities for further education. They pointed also to the need for better regulation of *minban* schools to ensure that part of school owners' profits should go to improve educational quality. The reports did not bring immediate policy changes but did garner an invitation from the local government to conduct further pilot experiments.

Finally, a small but important set of work in this category concentrated on left-behind children. Another action project by Growing Home, funded by two successive and slightly overlapping grants, won notable success. In this project, eventually named "New 1001 Nights," Growing Home proposed a novel approach to helping the children in rural boarding schools: bedtime stories. (Approximately half of school-age left-behind children are in such schools.) Boarding school students showed many signs of psychological difficulties, including frequent fights and discipline problems. Bedtime stories, the project team believed, could go a long way towards helping resolve many of these difficulties. The project adopted a method well suited to later scaling up. They consulted child psychologists to select suitable stories, which were then recorded on CDs, and broadcast every evening, using schools' existing broadcast systems. The project got reading volunteers from Beijing People's Broadcasting Station, students and teachers at Communications University of China, and working broadcasters and program hosts, ensuring a high quality of reading and recording. They also trained teachers to use the stories in the classroom.

The original scale was expected to be small: start with 150 stories, choose four pilot schools, train the teachers, and test the stories for a semester. The following semester, add another 150 stories, and train more teachers. The project also aimed at publishing a

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[45] The Citizen Report Card method is a participatory governance tool for evaluation of public services. Its earliest effective use may have been in India, promoted by NGOs working with local citizens and governments. It is now promoted more generally; both the World Bank and UNICEF provide materials to help with its use. See for example the World Bank's *Social Accountability E-guide* at https://saeguide.worldbank.org/sites/worldbank.org.saeguide/files/documents/3_Citizen%20Report%20Card.pdf

book based on a survey on rural boarding schools (102 schools in ten provinces). In fact, the project took off extremely fast once local authorities learned about it.

The stories were actually tested in forty schools in the Chongqing area; six hundred stories were recorded for primary students and another 301 for junior middle school students. Teachers in Chongqing, Qinghai, Yunnan, Beijing, and Hebei received training. Regional seminars discussed the project with county education commissions, which led to adoption in many more boarding schools (for example, forty in Wuxi alone). The latest telecommunications tools came in useful: the project team worked with an enterprise to use *weibo* to spread "1001 Bedtime Stories for Left-behind Children," which drew over 92 million *weibo* page views in just one week. Many major national media outlets reported on the project, and the major news portals all carried reports on it.

The output definitely far outstripped the plans: three times as many stories, nearly twice as many teaching plans and five times as many teachers trained. Originally the project aimed to reach one thousand students; it ended up benefiting over 70,000 students during the grant period. Over the short term, teachers also reported a marked improvement in students' emotional state and behavior.

By the end of the grant, *Guangming Daily Internal Reference* provided the gist of the team's report to the vice-premier in charge of education and various vice-governors responsible for education, and it was expected that the report would also feed into a proposal to CPPCC. Meanwhile, Growing Home's efforts attracted funding support from nine foundations, five companies, and two local education departments (two counties provided funding to use the stories in all the county boarding schools). Cooperation without funding came from more units, including eleven local education departments. The project team itself, however, noted that the stories only solved problems over the short term. The longer-term significance of the project was to awaken public attention to the problems of rural boarding students.

Early success in the first phase prompted a second, overlapping phase of funding for evaluation of the project work alongside new expansions and enhancements. The collaborations with local officials permitted expansion to many more schools, and help for more pilot schools to integrate stories with the curriculum and counseling. The team began coordinating with other NGOs and donors working on children's stories. Information at the time of writing is that Growing Home now works with more than forty foundations and NGOs, and the project schools now number more than two thousand.

One refinement in the second phase was to deal more directly with psychological problems. Story-based mental health classes were developed, and the project compiled

a dozen videos and a teacher's counseling manual that teachers could use for group counseling. Over one hundred story videos were created, speaking to twenty core psychological issues selected to match boarding students' most common complaints (for example, "my teacher doesn't like me"). Six schools tested these videos that children could choose and watch on their own. A major reason for using self-watch videos was that relying on teachers' ability to provide story guidance had become an obstacle to expanding use. In addition, because the videos were set up for online viewing, the selections provided excellent data on students' psychological needs.

The team eventually decided to use online training for teachers as a more replicable and sustainable model than on-site training. They continued their public outreach, holding on-site workshops and regional seminars, and concluding with a national conference. In retrospect, the team leader reflected that many others in the philanthropic sector by 2015 had begun adopting broadcasting methods as a tool. The policy impact of the project is indirect, but impressive: Growing Home's reports have been cited by national media on several recent occasions, including after Premier Li Keqiang's work report at the NPC emphasized the issue of boarding schools, and after major incidents involving problems like bullying. The team leader was also invited to participate in a central government-organized conference to discuss the issue of left-behind children.

4. Provision of fine arts and English courses to students in rural schools (2003–15)

The previous section highlighted a pair of grants for improved music and English education in *minban* schools serving migrant children. Many rural schools also lacked courses in such subjects, partly because of a dearth of teachers with the requisite skills, and partly because of the lack of appropriate textbooks and curricular resources. A total of nine grants were made for new approaches to improving rural schools' arts and English education in order to advance educational equity.

Notable among them, as an example of scaling up from a small pilot to national practices, is a cluster of grants covering four phases of the "Dandelion" program.[46]

The basic goal of this series was to train rural teachers to instruct in art. In the poor, rural, national-minority areas in particular, schools had almost no specialized art teachers. For example, only about 150 art teachers were spread among approximately two thousand rural schools in western Hunan. Schools lacked the budget for specialized

[46] In addition to the grant documents, this discussion draws upon "蒲公英行动" (2009).

art teachers, and many such teachers wanted to avoid poorer rural areas. Art courses appeared in the formal curriculum, but teachers in other subjects had to handle the art classes without any idea of how to teach the subject. Moreover, many schools were too poor to afford even basic art supplies like paint and brushes.

Dandelion began with grants to the Hunan Center for Women and Children, the first of them in 2003, to explore a new way to offer poor and ethnic–minority students an arts education—one that engaged children's interest while conforming to the national curricular guidelines. The project started on a small scale with pilot schools in Xiangxi Tujia Autonomous Prefecture of Hunan. In this inception phase, the Dandelion team focused on training teachers to develop new lesson content by exploring local folk cultures and integrating local folk art into the curriculum. One advantage of this approach was that for folk arts, the necessary materials were easily available locally. The project introduced new teaching methodologies; incorporated children's field trips, competitions, and exhibitions; and published the best art done by children.

From the beginning, the project team aimed to involve key agencies and stakeholders: the provincial departments of education and culture, and the provincial and prefectural women's federation, all of whom were invited to observe and monitor the project. The Arts Education Committee of MoE and the China Artists' Association Children and Youth Arts Council were also involved from the beginning. A second grant supported expansion of the program, which then spread to four more provinces, always with the goal of cultivating children's familiarity with their own local cultures, while providing a solid grounding in fine arts. By 2008, the Dandelion program had spread to schools in ten provinces, primarily in western and northeastern China.

In the third phase, the responsibility for elevating Dandelion to the national level passed to the National Art Museum of China with two grants in 2009 and 2011. The work in this phase focused on creating an entire module comprising curriculum, teaching/learning materials, and training models for teachers; providing teachers with sets of books on folk and classical arts; and building a foundation for dissemination with teacher training, training of trainers, and a dissemination camp. For the curricular materials, the core was to develop thirteen art textbooks, each focused on a different minority group and compiled by teams of national experts and local teachers. The project team held national exhibitions of children's art, collecting the best examples of children's work in the eleven provinces for exhibit at the National Art Museum of China. A national workshop looked at how to expand such programs to benefit more disadvantaged children. The project team made good use of new media for teachers' communications and for reaching the public: a website, WeChat, QQ groups, and *weibo* all included.

By the end of the third phase, half of the textbooks had been finished and more were in progress, an overview of courses in folk and fine arts had been published as a book, and a series on folk fine arts pictures was complete and ready for publication. Articles about the project's achievements had appeared in the magazine for middle and primary school arts, in *People's Pictorial*, and other trade publications.

Phase 4 began with a final grant to Hunan Fine Arts Publishing for work beginning in 2015. By that point, the Dandelion program was active in one hundred schools. The goals for this grant were to provide guidance for teachers of fine arts in the pilot schools to introduce new teaching materials and pedagogical methods for folk and fine arts for children; set up mechanisms to ensure that the school principals would see fine arts education as important both for children's development and for general educational quality; and upgrade Dandelion's website to give fine-arts teachers a platform for networking and improving their skills. The grant supported another national workshop and publication of case studies, courseware, and other materials to demonstrate the progress of the Dandelion program.

One indication that Dandelion's seeds have taken root came from a report late in 2016, concerning a public-interest "Dandelion Action" effort through volunteer work by graduate students at the College of Art at Capital Normal University, who supported art teaching in Miao nationality areas of Guizhou. An exhibition in November 2016 showcased some of the results of that effort; at the same time, KooLearn (新东方在线) presented a donation of one million yuan to support similar efforts (美术学院 2016).

Other than the organizations engaged in the Dandelion work, grantees for other seminal work included South China Normal University (two grants) for pilot projects in phonics-based training for rural teachers of English in Ningxia province, and Yunnan International Non-Government Organization Society for action research to prevent violence against teenagers.

5. Research and intervention on equity in rural areas (2003—2014)

A total of seven grants were made under this category. The majority concentrated on developing an equity index for basic education. As He Jin wrote in 2010,

[The] current M&E [monitoring and evaluation] system, which was designed in 1994 to ensure the expansion of learning opportunities, has the following shortcomings: 1. Overemphasis on enrollment, buildings, and equipment, and less emphasis on equity, quality and relevance; 2. Inappropriate for different conditions and needs of provinces

and counties at different stages of development; 3. Lack of information and methodological capacity at county government level, which has leading responsibility for conducting and overseeing monitoring and evaluation work for schools; and 4. Under–

participation of non–government stakeholders such as school staff, parents and students, and third party agencies.

Under the existing system for evaluating educational quality, only the best–resourced schools could come out on top. If equity indicators (for example, serving poor students) could be added to the evaluation system, less favored schools might come out ahead. Equity indicators therefore could provide poor areas' schools with leverage to secure more funding.

The earliest work in this arena supported the China Education Press Agency for research, and the Beijing Modern Educational Research Institute for research, training, and some pilot interventions. Of greatest significance is a subsequent series of four grants supporting work by Beijing Normal University (BNU) and Changsha University of Science and Technology (CUST) to develop, refine, test, and expand an equity index aimed at remedying some of the inadequacies of the standard evaluation systems.

The first grant, to the Research Center for Multicultural Education in BNU's School of Education, was made in 2006, supporting the first–ever introduction of indicators to monitor and evaluate equity in Chinese basic education. The first part of the work consisted of desk review of foreign models, field visits to Jiangsu and Sichuan to observe local practices, and a series of consultation meetings to discuss adaptations of foreign indicators to suit Chinese conditions. This was followed by a workshop to solicit feedback about the indicators from key domestic participants (ranging from various levels' government agencies to NGOs and the media) and some international experts. The project team then conducted testing at pilot sites while providing technical assistance to local evaluators. A second workshop followed. A number of scholarly publications came out of the project, and the indicators were submitted to national authorities for consideration.

Following this initial work, CUST received a series of grants in 2008, 2010, and 2014 to pilot an equity index in basic education in Hunan, refine and expand its use to as many as five counties, and promote further expansion to help local governments improve educational quality.

The first of these grants covered experiments in some Hunan pilot counties, using a participatory M&E system. That system adapted and applied the BNU indicators. The

project chose thirty villages in three different prefectures; selected villagers and cadres in each village, balancing group composition; trained them on the participatory approach and on indicators; and conducted participatory mapping of educational resources, doing semi-structured interviews. They collected baseline data, and worked with local authorities to set up a standardized system for participatory M&E. The team invited Hunan's PEB to select ten schools at primary and secondary levels in which PEB personnel would conduct M&E along with other stakeholders. They also set up a website to record progress and reach larger audience. Impressed by the results of these pilots, the Director-General of Hunan's PEB wanted to expand use of the equity indicators to a wider area.

That work was supported by a second grant to CUST in 2010. In keeping with the PEB's goals, the team revised indicators based on previous work, to make them easier for grassroots teams to grasp. They selected five schools in each of five counties to conduct M&E, "with results linked to the performance evaluation of key institutions and stakeholders."[47] In the course of the work, a major problem was identified: the equity index in practice tended to focus on facilities and equipment and on student test scores. It could not capture individual student's learning, which made it hard to leverage results to improve resource allocation.

A third grant was made to move the experimental index forward. By that point, the MoE's 2010—2020 plan had embraced the need to ensure "balanced development" of schools, and mandated improvement to M&E systems to help reach basic equity among schools within regions by 2012 and across regions by 2020. The third grant supported Hunan researchers and educators to work with government officials, with the aim of developing an index that could help "leverage resource allocation in favor of disadvantaged schools and students…." This meant a longer term and more complex effort. It began with crafting student-centered indicators. New indices (two types, for school and county level) were to be tested in four counties and refined after expert meetings and workshops. A second round of trials was slated for all schools in two counties, and a third round in three more, with the results to be compared with the education agency's monitoring data. The activities included training of the project team by experts in third-party M&E; a study tour to Guangzhou to look at M&E of education expenditures; and involvement of representatives of students and parents in the M&E. The ultimate goal was to create a set of rules and methods for future work. This work was still in progress as our report was drafted; the one report thus far suggested good

[47] This factor is often vital to ensure adoption of innovations that require officials to expend effort. If the effort makes no difference in their annual performance evaluations, they are likely to focus their time and energy on the activities on which they do get rated.

progress. Already, these indicators have changed the allocation of funds for education in Hunan, and the grant team has publicized the results through presentations in various venues.

A separate, single grant to Shanghai Academy of Educational Sciences supported work with MoE on a national M&E system integrating balanced development and equity in basic education indicators.

6. Increasing relevance in textbooks/curriculum (2001—2010)

He Jin made six grants in this category; two earlier small grants made by the consultant in 2001 provided a foundation for some of the later ones. All concentrated on developing educational resources more relevant for the needs of ethnic–minority students in rural communities. Grantees included Beijing Normal University, the National Institute of Education Sciences, the Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge, the Central University of Nationalities, and Yunnan Normal University.

A series of three grants to Yunnan Normal University provides good insight into the progress of this work and what was learned from it. These grants supported multi–layered work involving education, poverty alleviation and community development in a comprehensive approach, reflecting the conviction on the part of both He Jin and the grantee that education work must go hand–in–hand with community development and poverty alleviation if it is to succeed in poor areas.

The first grant, made in 2001, supported a project in one minority–nationality township in Yunnan, which began with the community's perspective on schooling and education, and with finding links between learning and solutions to community problems. The project team aimed to engage all parts of the community in designing and implementing a development plan for the school, using a PRA (participatory rural appraisal) approach.[48] The activities included multifaceted training for all the stakeholders, curriculum and textbook development, and application of existing community skills—to shape education that could serve local economic development. Specific measures used included introduction of a new crop strain and community building through revival of traditional

[48] According to the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Sussex, which pioneered in the use of participatory methods (PMs) in international development from the 1970s: "The first set of PMs to emerge from this work with a clear identity was Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), which focused on how outsiders could quickly learn from local people about their realities and challenges. Reflections on RRA led to the development of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), which had a stronger focus on facilitation, empowerment, behaviour change, local knowledge and sustainable action. PRA, now used interchangeably with Participatory Learning and Action (PLA), embraces reflection, learning and an understanding of power and relationships." Although the use of PRA began in rural development projects, the term is used to refer to methods that can be used at the grassroots in urban or rural settings. http://www.participatorymethods.org/page/about-participatory-methods.

songs and dances. This first grant helped the project team identify a feasible method for township level.

In a second phase of work, under a grant made in 2004, the project team expanded the scale of its efforts. It continued to combine educational reform, cultural preservation and poverty alleviation to support community development at the township level, but now seven counties asked to be included in the pilots, based on the results in phase 1. The challenge in this phase, working for comprehensive development efforts, was to break down the silo effect: to bridge the administrative system's boundaries between essential components including economic development, health, and education, and to help government officials learn to coordinate their strategies more productively. Activities included those used in the first phase, augmented with the creation of community learning centers, more curriculum and textbook development, and developing and teaching practical skills in the schools. With the addition of the new townships, the team trained more than three hundred teachers, principals, and local cadres in PRA methods.

The third grant, made in 2010, supported further work that started with relatively modest intentions but expanded quickly beyond those. That gap between urban and rural schools had been widening despite a decade of government investment. The government had focused funding on "hardware," and consequently lost valuable "software" (good, experienced teachers). The schools ended up with poorly trained teachers, and both curriculum and textbooks failed to meet the needs of rural students.

The third–phase project was intended to mobilize community resources and narrow the rural–urban gap between schools. The approach was to transform rural central–village schools into community learning centers that could meet the learning needs of diverse groups (adults, not just children) and create synergies for community development. The community learning centers were to provide four types of training: general, for all villagers and teachers (emphasizing mutual support for community development); in–service, for teachers to develop school curriculum and texts, focusing on student skills relevant to community and employment needs; cultural, to introduce teachers, parents and students to the diversity of ethnic cultures; and productive, to help locals establish a production base where students could learn practical skills and villagers could gain latest technical knowledge.

Originally the team planned on working in two townships, but because of local demand, they ended up with eighteen schools in six townships. This overstretched the project team's capacities; they were not able to develop the work evenly in all locations, and the vocational education plans did not go very well. However, there were undeniable improvements despite shortcomings. Every project site formed an activities group,

mostly consisting of teachers. Training reached 95 percent of the teachers, notably better than the original 70 percent target. Teachers felt they made great improvement. One teacher was rated Outstanding Teacher in the township, and one was rated Backbone Teacher at provincial level. The schools sparked more reading and raised students' reading ability; they also created new curricular resources, like a course on local children's games. Township libraries were set up, partly with books donated by the project team, partly by each project site's own fundraising. The cultural heritage activities were welcomed; dance teams were created, and villagers generally began taking more pride in their cultural heritage. As for vocational–technical education, primary and secondary schools began offering electives in agricultural technology and provided work–study opportunities for students. The learning centers' technical training also spread technical knowledge among the villagers, spurring adoption of new breeds, new methods like greenhouse technology, and generally help improved the local economies' sectoral structure. The grantees later reported that the provincial government picked up and replicated a number of these practices in seven counties.

7. Quality improvement via teaching, management and evaluation (2001–2015)

A total of thirty grants were made in this category, an average of two per year. Many fall into a handful of sets. We will summarize those very briefly before focusing on one set of grants that had particular impact.

One set of grants from 2003 to 2008 supported work on innovative teacher–training approaches. These included work by the Department of Trade and Economic Cooperation of Gansu Province to train ethnic Tibetan women teachers so they could meet certification criteria; by South China Normal University using an innovative and easily replicable model for training Ningxia rural teachers in English; by the Ye Shengtao Association of China, for action research on improving teacher training in China's west; and by two research centers at Beijing Normal University to use new technologies to help teachers improve their professional skills and to enhance the quality of teaching in rural primary schools.

A second set of grants supported work on public financing for education, by grantees who occupied key policy–making niches. The Anhui Provincial Department of Education conducted two phases or work on reform of budgeting and management mechanisms in rural primary and secondary schools. Anhui at the time had been designated to test new approaches on these issues. The research results helped with refinements to national

policy, particularly with respect for moving financial responsibility for school funding from the township up to the county level, which was better able to muster resources to support the weaker schools. In other projects on education finances, the National Institute of Education Sciences did research on education budgeting at the national level, and the Development Research Center of the State Council reviewed and evaluated education reforms from a public finance perspective.

Another set of grants that began in 2007 dealt with reforms of evaluation systems. These included action research and pilot efforts to develop comprehensive evaluation systems for schools and student learning to replace the reliance solely on test scores. One grantee conducted an exercise on participatory evaluations of educational services in northwest China. Another did work helping the Ministry of Education to develop and pilot an improved national monitoring and evaluation system to promote balanced development and equity in basic education. Finally, one grantee worked on developing an M&E mechanism to assess the impact of educational projects on basic education. Grantees included Adream Charitable Foundation, Beijing Normal University's Center for National Assessment of Educational Quality, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy), the National Institute of Education Sciences, and the Shanghai Academy of Educational Sciences.

Several grants to the 21st Century Education Development Research Institute supported the creation of platforms to discuss important educational innovations. (These were in addition to research by the institute on educational system reform and a pilot project it conducted for employing recent college graduates as rural substitute teachers.) The institute received grants in 2003 and again in 2006 to support an education discussion forum series that linked people working on grassroots projects to local and national decision makers. In 2007, the institute received a grant to conduct an Education Innovation Awards program to identify and honor locally based education system innovations—the first program in which a private (*minjian*) think tank independently evaluated and rewarded government agencies in the education sector.

The institute's director credited this awards program with clear impact. First was the creation of similar programs by the government: MoE's newspaper *China Education News* began doing innovation evaluations, and the Hubei PEB started its own innovation awards program. Secondly, such moves, along with the 21st Century awards, created more incentives for local education departments' policy innovation. The awards themselves inclined some awardees towards new pilot experiments. Ningbo, for example, introduced some reforms on *minban* education. Although the grant for the awards program ended in 2009, the institute has continued making the awards on a two-year cycle.

One grant in 2008, supporting Suzhou University of Science and Technology (SUST) for research on rural substitute teachers, also had significant impact. Hundreds of thousands of "substitute" teachers in rural areas had become essentially permanent; there were half a million of them in 2005. The MoE announced in 2006 that it would phase them out quickly, partly to ensure that those teaching in the schools would be qualified and meet certification standards. However, the ministry had no plan to soften the adverse impact on local schools and on teachers themselves, and without a workable plan, the phasing out stalled at the grassroots. Poorer rural communities in particular depended on substitute teachers to keep the schools open. In 2008, four hundred thousand substitute teachers were still in the classrooms.

SUST's project began with research on solutions used by local governments. The team made research visits to four provinces (Yunnan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Anhui), and found considerably more substitute teachers than official numbers suggested. A workshop followed, where the findings were discussed. From the research and the discussions, it was clear that the issues for removing substitute teachers were complex, and that MoE could not act unilaterally. The Labor Law and the Labor Contract Law limited what could be done even if teachers did not meet certification standards, and the general public recoiled at the notion of removing people from their jobs after they had served for years or even decades. Key questions for the implementation of the MoE policy also remained: how to evaluate substitute teachers' qualifications, what would constitute fair compensation if they were to be removed from their posts, and how would poorer counties afford fully certified replacements.

SUST planned to conduct a pilot experiment in one county. All stakeholders at the county level would be involved in planning and implementation for assessment (who qualifies), training (for some of those who don't make the grade; and then hire them), and compensation (for the rest). In practice, they found, local governments were concerned about social stability and financial impacts. Few would agree to participate; those who participated did only evaluation and training, stopping well short of dismissal and compensation. Eventually the team ended up choosing several pilot areas: one county in Yunnan interested in assessment and training; Chongqing City, where the problem had been "resolved;" Guangdong, where substitute teachers were under a "large-scale settlement program;" and Bengbu City in Anhui, which used a two-step action solution involving labor law and annual examinations that might admit some substitute teachers.

They found that the solutions in Guangdong and Chongqing worked only because they had the attention of top leadership. Guangdong used different measures depending on the nature of the region; but it also relied upon coordinated input across departments

(human resources and social security, personnel, finance, and education). Good solutions ultimately depended on financial support from above, since the poor rural areas where most substitute teachers were concentrated were least able to afford solutions.

SUST then collaborated with CPPCC Education News Online Weekly to hold a salon on the subject of substitute teachers, which drew experts from MoE, the trade union, universities, officials in charge of education at provincial to county level, substitute teachers, and social media. A consensus emerged from the salon, pointing to the multi-departmental nature of the issue, the need to deal with it gradually and to acknowledge that substitute teachers would be needed until long-term mechanisms were in place. The eventual policy recommendation pointed to adopting a phased process in which, depending on teachers' experience and qualifications, they would have a specified time within which to meet standards. After feedback from MoE, the project team revised a proposal to be submitted to the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

A member of the NPC Standing Committee presented the proposal at the 2010 meetings of the NPC and the CPPCC, attracting considerable attention from news media and social media/portals. His proposal was sent in a letter to the vice-premier responsible for education, who approved and referred the letter to the MoE. After discussion, MoE leadership set up research groups to examine the issues in more detail—in effect, putting aside the policy to hasten the elimination of the substitute teachers, and going back to the drawing board. The grant team joined in those research groups.

Another grant, after the devastating Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, supported Beijing Normal University to provide psychological counseling for children in the affected area, including many orphaned by the disaster. Previously, provincial governments had devised their own policies for caring for

orphans in the wake of natural disasters. Following upon a report and recommendations by the grantee, the central government issued a new national policy on children orphaned in disasters; the grantee subsequently received a national award for this work.

D. Vocational Secondary Education

Vocational education at the secondary level did not receive a large number of grants, but some of those grants were important in developing better options for senior middle-school level education for rural and migrant students. This input was especially crucial:

the government had set a goal for secondary school enrollment rates to reach 90 percent by 2020, but the primarily academic orientation in most schools failed to attract students who did not plan on continuing to college. Enrollment rates in secondary education lagged seriously in rural areas, especially in poorer regions. The national government had affirmed the importance of vocational education, and many employers, facing shortages of skilled workers, applauded that stance. But local governments and educators, long locked into the academic–track model for secondary education, struggled to understand how to develop curriculum and instruction methods appropriate to vocational education, let alone how to link that education to market needs. This situation made work on vocational education at both secondary and higher education levels both necessary and timely. (Additional clusters of grants in higher education focusing on vocational and technical schools will be discussed in the section on higher education.)

1. Reform of teaching, curriculum and management to meet students' and market needs (2004—2013)

Five grants were made in this category. Three projects included action research and a pilot project for provision of vocational secondary education in rural areas. A fourth grant supported an innovative pilot to reduce secondary–school dropout rates by integrating academic and vocational tracks in three rural Sichuan senior middle schools. Grantees included Beijing Modern Educational Research Institute, Chengdu Ruilian Vocational and Technical Training School, the Counselor's Office of Anhui Province, and the Secondary Vocational School of Changsha County.

A fifth project, by Horizon Education Center of China, helps give a sense of the need for and the difficulties of work in this area. The project aimed to address the problem of mismatch between school and market with a pilot project for one county in Xinjiang. Through a series of meetings, negotiations, and collaborative research, the project team ended up with relations with several counties under one prefecture—a strong indication of the felt need for help on this issue—and with the prefectural education department.

One of the major challenges encountered was the confusion and frustration of local governments and schools over how to even begin defining a vocational education development plan. The project team turned this into a learning point, getting local stakeholders to do research on the issues that most perplexed them. Eventually the subprojects took form: constructing teams of "teacher/master" teachers, joint courses conducted by schools and enterprises, syllabi for skills training, career planning courses for students in junior high schools, and innovations in vocational education systems.

They set up "research and practice groups" in the prefectural education department, the prefectural city, a county, a vocational education center, and another county's education department. They also created a textbook editorial team to support development of vocational education textbooks that were needed but nonexistent. The project team placed major emphasis on creating strict training standards for a teacher/master system.

Over all, the project made major headway in refining principles for market-oriented vocational education and in engaging local stakeholders in developing and embracing the principles, and all of this in an environment where communications difficulties and lack of experience posed significant obstacles. With respect to the project's impact on the larger national scene, it is interesting to note that after protracted negotiations, the grantee persuaded *China Business Times* to run a vocational education column to follow reforms in vocational education.

2. Capacity building through strategy, management reform and law (2003—2010)

Four grants were made in this category. Of those, an early grant to pilot test the use of information technology for vocational and adult education went to the Ministry of Education. A second grant, to the State Council's Development Research Center, supported action research for rural vocational education.

The third grant supported Bainian Vocational School to replicate its model of free vocational education for disadvantaged migrant youth, who otherwise had few options for urban schooling beyond the junior middle school level. Bainian began as a *minban* school in Beijing, using donations to fund students' study and relying in part upon part-time volunteer teachers. It offered two years of vocational education combining classroom and internship work and attuned to market needs, so that graduates could find employment readily. In 2009 it helped establish a new Bainian school in Chengdu. Given the numbers of migrant youth in other major cities across China and the lack of high quality public vocational schools, Bainian aimed, with support from this grant, to assist the development of similar schools in four other cities. Bainian would identify possible partners in those cities, provide training for the local teams, and then continue technical assistance from Bainian. In the process, Bainian was to draw up rules and regulations for its own quality assurance procedures, and make those available to others interested in following its model.

The project went well. New campuses were established in Nanjing, Wuhan, Sanya, and Zhengzhou. To support the schools themselves, Bainian drew on partnerships with the

China Youth Development Foundation, with various other domestic foundations, and with provincial Communist Youth Leagues and Youth Development Foundations in the provinces where the schools were set up. In addition to benefiting from the team training and training materials provided by Bainian, the various schools' management teams held symposia and seminars to stay abreast of the market for skills. By the conclusion of the grant, nearly three hundred students had graduated from the four new schools and found employment, and Bainian had established two more campuses (Dalian and Yinchuan), and was planning a ninth for Yunnan. While Bainian's management handbook set the rules and standards for all the schools, the board secretariat encouraged each school to develop its unique character; management and staff training sessions were also to be rotated among campuses rather than remaining only in Beijing.

The fourth grant supported a large-scale project by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP) at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. CCAP, along with its partners in the Rural Education Action Program (REAP), conducted two impact evaluations in three northwestern provinces: one to determine the effectiveness of alternative measures to encourage poor rural students' continuation to senior middle school (with special emphasis on vocational secondary schools), and the other to assess the value-added of vocational secondary education.

For both of these, REAP used a randomized control trial (RCT) method[49] to test the impact of different interventions. For both trials, the interventions and research sites were chosen according to needs expressed by provincial officials. For the first trial, the voucher method was tested in Shaanxi because officials there were considering how best to use subsidies for secondary education. That trial also incorporated a county education department's suggestion for a a counseling intervention training junior middle school teachers to advise students and parents about further education options. For the second trial, the decision to work on an approach to evaluation of vocational education and training (VET) grew out of a need expressed by Ningxia's PEB. That approach used standardized exams at student entrance and exit at VET schools to derive a "value-added score," and trained the schools' principals to use the value-added scores to improve students' performance.

Although other REAP projects had demonstrated the relative ineffectiveness of vouchers for encouraging students to go on for academic secondary education, this project did demonstrate the effectiveness of voucher intervention in poor rural areas, although the effect appeared greater for academic than for vocational track. Counseling showed little impact on decisions for vocational secondary education. With respect to vocational

[49] This method is explained in detail in the case study on REAP in Chapter 6.

education, one major problem is the uneven quality of VET schools, and the uncertainty of students and parents concerning which schools would provide the best and most appropriate education—which makes the long-term results of the second trial, on value-added of VET, all the more important.

The findings themselves were useful for policy decisions. Direct participation by many officials in the project ensured that the findings could be used for local decisions quite efficiently. National leaders read and approved two policy briefs submitted to them. Of potentially long-term significance was the active involvement of northwest China stakeholders—provincial and local government officials, local policy analysts, and teachers and administrators from the schools—in all parts of the research. Their participation in the evaluation efforts and in annual practitioner training workshops developed an important set of skills for policy evaluation and a keener appreciation of the types of questions that must be asked in evaluating policy options.

The project also generated "intervention packages" available for use by practitioners and researchers to assess and improve VET. These include two sets of materials, one for homeroom teachers' counseling, and a second for assessing value-added. In addition, a package of materials for evaluation courses (including PPT slides, how-to working papers, glossary, case studies, lecture notes, and a dataset with STATA programs) was developed and made available. The REAP team has generated numerous publications based on the research, which have appeared and continue to appear in scholarly publications, both Chinese and foreign; the key research results have also been widely disseminated through Chinese broadcasting and print media. Avid participation in REAP training workshops and requests from other institutions for training in impact evaluation methods suggest that REAP has generated greater interest in rigorous impact evaluation from many stakeholders, and enhanced the environment for evidence-based policy making.

E. Higher education

During the fifteen years of his tenure, He Jin's grantmaking supported major efforts in improving access and success for disadvantaged students, building missing or underdeveloped academic disciplines, and developing community college/vocational higher education. Those categories hold the major grant clusters. A fourth category on key and fundamental issues for higher education covered a wide range of especially timely work, generally with only one to three grants for each issue. Most of the

discussion here will focus on the first three categories, all of which demonstrate coordinated, sustained effort on major issues.

1. Access and success for disadvantaged students (2001–2011)

This category of grants aimed to solve the problems facing students from low-income, primarily rural, households. In dollar terms, this was the largest investment of all during the decade and a half, even though it consisted of only thirteen grants.
The Pathways to Higher Education (PHE) series constituted the largest of these, buttressed by funding from a foundation-wide global initiative. Seven of the thirteen grants were made for PHE programs, including the core PHE efforts to develop sustainable and replicable methods for supporting poor students' social, educational, and psychological needs as well as their longer-range economic needs. In addition, He Jin made grants for a mid-term evaluation of the program, and for networking and exchanges among PHE partners and with global PHE program partners. This was such a key program—and so clearly exemplifies his approach to grantmaking—that it figures as the first detailed case study in Chapter 6. To avoid repetition, we will not go into it more in this chapter.

A grant for the Red Phoenix Program (RPP) was made in 2005 to the Shaanxi Provincial Women's Federation.

Red Phoenix aimed to support disadvantaged young Shaanxi women to attend college, and had already been in operation for nine years. The program had begun using proceeds from the auctioning of a quilt covered with hand-embroidered phoenixes displayed at the 1995 UN World Conference on Women. Initially the women's federation aimed for sustainability by having each alumna pledge to support another student within five years of her own graduation. However, serious problems began to accumulate in fundraising, management, employment problems for women graduates, and general lack of public awareness of gender issues.

He Jin made the grant to provide technical assistance to help RPP solve these problems by building a better fundraising mechanism, a tracking system to better ensure the alumnae support for later students, and outreach methods to train students supported by the program, recruit and train volunteers, and to heighten public consciousness on gender issues.

The project accomplished all of that and more. RPP set up a volunteer association and public-service teams to serve both public needs and the physical and mental health needs of women students, and produced a manual for volunteers. Most of those

participating in the teams were RPP–supported students and alumnae. The volunteer platform extended into colleges, universities, and many communities. RPP volunteers were active in disaster aid in Xi'an, which suffered damage in the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008. The project team constructed a website to assist in outreach to the public and to use data gathered on RPP students and alumnae for resource–sharing. The RPP office provided training to news media for gender sensitization, and also trained student affairs and loan office staff of colleges and universities. A paper written about the RPP experience was accepted at an important annual national seminar on women, and another received a prize from the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee and Provincial People's Government.

As of summer 2016, RPP is still in operation and self–sustaining, and has supported 5044 women university students over the years. Twenty–five schools in Shaanxi have RPP volunteer teams, and RPP has become an attractive research subject for many graduate students' studies. The project has received numerous national and provincial accolades and awards.

Contemporaneous with the PHE program was the International Fellowships Program (IFP), which was funded entirely as an initiative from the New York home office. Unlike PHE, which funded institutions, IFP funded individuals. It provided access to higher (usually postgraduate level) education for candidates from poor and disadvantaged groups who had demonstrated leadership potential and social justice commitments, but lacked the traditional credentials for admission to higher study.

Although fellows could choose to study in their home countries, most elected to study abroad. The vast majority of the Chinese fellows returned to China after receiving their degrees or completing their study programs.[50]

To ensure that returned IFP fellows could continue supporting each other's efforts and their communities and engage more effectively with civil society, He Jin made three grants for follow–up support and networking. Especially noteworthy is a grant made in 2009 to the NPO Development Center to fund IFP alumni in three arenas. One was to provide modest sums to help IFP alumni do internships in organizations in their chosen fields. A second allowed teams of two or more alumni to collaborate in projects at

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[50] While PHE worldwide received $50 million in dedicated funding from the New York headquarters of the foundation, the IFP was supported by $450 million. For China, a total of 343 IFP fellows were supported by the program. Of those, nine studied in China, 243 (71 percent) in the US, and the others studied in the UK, Australia, Thailand, Canada, Japan and the Philippines. Those returning to China numbered 295 (86 percent). Thirty-one others remained abroad to work, while nineteen opted to remain abroad to earn doctoral degrees. Because a small number of the IFP fellows have been outside the communications loop, this tally may be off by five people, but in any case the returnee rate is very high, in sharp contrast to the general return rate for Chinese studying abroad. According to David Zweig (2013), that rate "has remained approximately 30 percent for decades." In fact, the general return rate for those earning advanced degrees may be much lower than that—all the more indication of the success in the IFP approach.

community level. The third, to help build the capacities of alumni who already had grassroots experience with NGO work, provided up to RMB100,000 over time for alumni working with institutional partners.

IFP alumni elected five of their number as a working group to manage the grant under NPO auspices, and to organize monitoring and evaluation of the projects funded. Ultimately this program developed two projects under the rubrics of "innovation fund" and "cooperative fund." Teams of alumni and experts from NGOs and academia provided guidance, not only working together on project selection but also coaching or consulting throughout projects, from planning and proposal writing through implementation and financial management. Alumni who participated in the program considered the "one-stop service" model of NPO Development Center ideally supportive, and found the experience built their capacities in many dimensions.

A final important body of work in this category was funded by two successive grants for creation and development of the China Fellowship Program (CFP), which provided opportunities for advanced study at the School of Social Development and Public Policy at Beijing Normal University, somewhat similar to opportunities the IFP provided earlier for international study. CFP made it possible for students possibly without the traditional credentials but with ample field experience to enter a graduate program. The program provided excellent opportunities for the students recruited; in addition, as the original director of the program noted, changed the school: "the school grew with the program."

The transformation came from the nature of the students. Those in the first entering class were mature and activist, with much experience on the ground; they were not as well prepared academically and needed more effort from the teachers. But they challenged their teachers, and they challenged decisions affecting them. Eventually, the school decided the CFP fellows should govern themselves, and made them responsible for collectively deciding the level of awards, and designed the evaluation system, and implemented it themselves. The faculty were energized, getting new ideas for research topics on issues like poverty and migration because of the CFP students' backgrounds and experiences. The students' interests prompted development of new fields of study: in addition to the field of China Development Studies originally envisioned under the grant, SSDPP created the first State Council-approved field of nonprofit management, and a new program in philanthropy. Many of the students were attracted to study fields like social management, disaster and risk management, and behavioral health. Stemming from CFP student interests, SSDPP also developed a new international master's degree program in development studies, and was the first university in Asia to get certification from European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes. CFP

students took responsibility for publishing the CFP Briefing on the website, organized capacity-building workshops, and conducted salons, seminars, and field trips.

The fellowships program of CFP continued until 2015. As of January 2015, there were a total of twenty MPA students and eight doctoral students; thirty-two MA, two MPA, and two PhD graduates; and another eight delayed graduates—seventy-two fellows in all. Some residual funds were being used for a database and to support alumni or students setting up nonprofits. Although the original internship program had to be discontinued after the first two years of CFP because of institutional issues at the university level, SSDPP does maintain more than sixty "practice bases." The value of the CFP program has been recognized by several other universities, and Northwest Normal University replicated the program in order to train more "leaders in social development" in the northwest. At BNU itself, the future contours of the program are uncertain because of possible institutional changes, but key elements of it have already been integrated into institutional practices. It has left a lasting legacy for the university and for the development field in China.

2. Support of missing or under-developed academic disciplines (2002—2014)

Sixteen grants were made in this category. The vast majority were made from 2001 to 2006 to support the development of Women's and Gender Studies. These supported original work on the field's development at Tianjin Normal University; production of media on gender in folklore and an international conference on localization of gender studies in Asia, by China Women's University; and a curriculum development project for women's studies for higher education, at Capital Normal University. Three grants supported the establishment and curriculum development activities of the Center for Gender Studies at Dalian University. Fudan University received a grant for its Institute for Gender Studies to establish the first doctoral program in gender studies in China; another grant supported Hunan Business College in collaborative efforts to develop women's and gender studies and organize dialogues and other activities on gender issues. Linkages were supported through networks: one grant supported Peking University in setting up an information network on women's studies and conducting research on rural women and folk art, and another funded Zhejiang Academy of Social Sciences to build a national network for the field.

One subset of four grants supported work to integrate gender studies with ethnic minority studies. Northwest Normal University's Center of Ethnic Minority Women's Studies received a grant to develop a program to articulate gender studies with

capacity–building for poverty alleviation among ethnic minority women. Yunnan University for Nationalities used a grant to integrate gender–theory learning with training and practice in gender development in minority areas' communities. A grant to Guizhou Academy of Social Sciences supported a pilot project for ethnic–cultural preservation linked with women's development.

The fourth grant in this subset, which began in 2005 and concluded in 2008, provides a fascinating glimpse of both the combination of gender studies and ethnic studies, and the impact of gender awareness training for government and media. The grant supported Xinjiang University along with partners at Xinjiang Normal University and Xinjiang Changji College in developing gender studies in Xinjiang. Activities covered faculty training, curricular development and research to develop the discipline in the region. But the efforts went well beyond academia; they extended to cooperation with the Women's Federation and local officials to provide gender sensitivity training, and with a major Xinjiang media outlet to promote public discussion of gender issues.

In the training of faculty, the team emphasized young faculty. Some were sent to study at Fudan for doctorates; others attended training of trainers (ToT) on gender sensitization and women's empowerment sponsored by the Sino–Canadian Sustainable Agricultural Development Project (SDAP). Many attended national and international seminars. Graduate students were welcomed to participate in and organize activities. The project originally aimed at building a faculty team of forty; the team grew to fifty within the three years. Of those, fifteen were from national minorities, and five were male.

Cooperation with SDAP later included team members' work in participatory gender sensitivity training for government, agricultural and women's federation leaders in 22 counties with World Bank projects. These experiences and cooperation with SDAP in training in two central China provinces helped develop a seasoned team of participatory gender trainers in Xinjiang.

In faculty research, most of the applications for research funding made by team members were for indigenous studies. Many scholars on the team began specializing in Xinjiang indigenous culture or society. For example, one teacher developed an elective course on Uyghur women's literature, which became the focus of her research as well. Others concentrated on subjects like folk customs or migration of Xinjiang ethnic minorities. The research program yielded over a hundred papers and research reports, and by the end of the grant period five books and an anthology were ready for publication.

Perhaps attracted by the vitality all this activity demonstrated, seven more schools joined the original three universities, covering several subregions of Xinjiang, and multiplying team participants and courses offered.

Beyond academia, the team cooperated closely with party and government. One prefectural party committee incorporated their gender training program into government and party school training plans. Cooperation with Xinjiang Women's Federation led to cooperation in training of women cadres in two cities. It also led to collaborative research on domestic violence and policy input on regulations concerning it. Over all, the team estimated that by the end of the three years they had provided lectures and training reaching twenty thousand people.

The team's collaboration with the media was especially fruitful. A seminar on Xinjiang women jointly hosted with *Xinjiang Economic Daily* drew attendance from radio and TV stations, print and online media, the Women's Federation, and academic and research organizations. A second seminar was jointly organized at a national level, on "Gender Equality and Development of Ethnic Minorities." Series of articles appeared in *Xinjiang Economic Daily* for several days after both meetings; the newspaper also covered other events organized independently by the team.

While in retrospect the grantees regretted that few men were involved in the women's studies program staff, some thirty Xinjiang University graduates—a third of them male—created an alumni gender study group in 2006. The Women's Studies Center assigned two teachers to work with them. Group members participated in many of the Center's activities, and also organized some of their own. Training and other outreach also won support for gender sensitivity and gender issues among men in government and the media. The team also organized an academic salon on male liberation, which attracted an audience composed equally of men and women.

As of 2016, the institutionalized results of the project were clear, with women's studies integrated into curricula in several institutions of higher education and a strong core of faculty, both Han and minority, who worked together smoothly. Team leaders had a keen awareness, too, of the importance of working well with the media and engaging male allies to spread consciousness of gender equality issues.

Aside from women's and gender studies, two grants went for support to the new (for China) field of Development Studies. Since those are related to the CFP program and new field development at BNU which were discussed in the preceding section, we will not examine them further here. One other grant went to develop the field of Experimental Economics in Education at Shaanxi Normal University. That is connected

with some of the discussion in the REAP case study in Chapter 6, and we will not elaborate upon it. Both fields, it should be emphasized, are important and innovative ones for China, so the brevity of mention here should not be taken to detract from the value of the grants or the work done under them.

3. Support for community colleges, vocational and technical colleges (2002—2015)

He Jin's program inherited a commitment for support for community colleges' development. The consultant had made some efforts from 2000 to early 2001to cultivate awareness of community colleges' importance. This helped lay the groundwork for He Jin's grantmaking to pivot towards support for vocational and technical higher education. A total of fourteen grants in this category were included in our evaluation.

The vocational/technical education grants began early in He Jin's tenure with two rounds of three grants each. These were coordinated to support work on vocational higher education at three levels simultaneously: institutional, local, and national.

In the first round, the institutional level included support for the Vocational and Technical Teachers College of Beijing Union University to conduct research on linking vocational education curriculum development to the needs of the local community. The municipal level of work was conducted by Shanghai Jinshan Community College, which used a networking approach to help community colleges share resources and connect better with local government. Finally, for the national level, the China Research Center for Teaching and Learning in Universities and Colleges received a one-year grant for communicating with policy makers concerning the concept of community colleges and their possible roles.

In the second round, Beijing Normal University's School of Education received a grant to provide technical assistance for eight community colleges developing innovative programs appropriate for their communities. Although the work focused on the institutional level, it also generated a network that brought together dozens of community colleges in eight cities to share learning. Hangzhou Community University received a grant for work at the municipal level developing a master plan and framework with four layers: university, institutes, schools, and learning centers. The China Research Center for Teaching and Learning in Universities and Colleges received a second grant in this series, to identify best practices to improve vocational and technical higher education and conduct training to implement those.

The work under these grants included three national workshops, each bringing together leaders from more than 200 colleges. The series represented a major breakthrough, in that the Minister of Education attended all three workshops—a major indication of official interest and support—and spoke at each of them in support of community college development.

Two grants made in 2005 and 2006 focused on vocational education (at both secondary and college level) serving disadvantaged groups affected by rapid urbanization, who were growing by the million every year. The first grant, to East China Normal University, supported research and experimental interventions on vocational education for rural–urban migrants in high–tech zones, primarily in the Shanghai area. A second grant went to Taizhou Community College for development and testing of a training program aimed to help farmers who had lost their land to urban expansion move into nonagricultural employment.

Also in this category, Hunan Radio and TV University received a grant to a distance–learning pilot program aimed at helping Hunan rural residents pursue post–secondary vocational education. The model included not only teaching and self–study but also practice and mentoring.

Another set of five grants concentrated on projects to improve the curricular quality at vocational schools. Of those, three successive grants to Suzhou Industrial Park Institute of Vocational Technology (IVT) focused on improving the vocational education curriculum to mesh with market and enterprise needs. The approaches used included partnerships with local enterprises to improve students' learning and employment prospects, public–private partnerships to improve VET colleges' management, and development of competence–based evaluation to facilitate VET colleges' adaptation to both market and student needs.

While the IVT grants looked towards better integration of curriculum with market needs, another grant (still active at time of writing) supported Nanjing Institute of Technology, in partnership with two other Yangzi Valley schools, for internal institutional improvements testing a new evaluation mechanism for classroom teaching. While NIT is a public four–year university, the partner schools include a private four–year college and a three–year technical college; all, however, educate students in vocational and technical fields. All are piloting a reform of evaluation systems which divide the functions of execution and evaluation of teaching, previously subsumed under one office, into two separate but coordinated offices. At the same time, they seek to refine the evaluation system by broadening the range of indicators to include quality of learning and employment, and by institutionalizing input mechanisms whereby multiple stakeholders from relevant

professions, industries, and third–party evaluation organizations help define indicators. Because this is a relatively recent grant, reports were not yet available at the time of writing, but if successful the project could bring some fundamental change in evaluation of educational quality at higher–education institutions providing technical training.

Finally, one grant in this set addressed the problems for vocational college students' education and employment posed by the national policy barring such schools from offering more than a three–year program. A grant to Shunde Polytechnic helped that school to test new approaches to providing students with a full university–level education, and to educate policy makers about the need for policies permitting "integrated training of flexible duration." The scale of the pilot itself was modest, focusing on two departments and on thirteen students' admission to a local university for two additional years of study towards degrees. But the pilot was coupled with painstaking efforts at institutional reforms that involved local government officials and enterprise managers in a new board of directors and advisory committees. The team's comparative research, publishing, and proactive discussion with visiting notables who could find listeners among policy makers and major policy forums had much broader significance. These set the foundation both locally and nationally for long–term efforts to place vocational and technical higher–education institutions on a more equal footing with their more academically focused counterparts.

4. Grants on key and fundamental issues in higher education (2002–2015)

Twenty–five other grants supported work on specific issues of high and timely significance for Chinese higher education. Some of these related strongly to work supported in other categories, while others stood alone. He Jin selected these for support because of their timeliness and breakthrough potential. The issues the grants addressed could be seen as three types:

a. the most challenging current issues (焦点);

b. difficult problems whose resolution had been delayed because existing mechanisms could not deal with them (难点); and

c. issues that affected solution of challenges foreseen for the future (重点).

In the discussion below, the letters a, b, and c inserted in parentheses show which type of issue primarily characterized projects' emphases.

Two grants supported Huazhong University of Science and Technology (HUST) to conduct research on student loan repayment systems (a), an issue that related to some of the concerns that were incorporated into the PHE program in later phases (see case study in Chapter 6). HUST received a third grant for action research on improving the efficiency of higher education (b).

A series of three grants from 2010 to 2013 supported work addressing the unemployment of college graduates, which had become a growing problem. These included a grant for work on data-based management tools to improve universities' grasp of market demand to improve their programs and thereby also their students' employment prospects (a); Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Beijing MyCos Education Consulting Company, and Changzhou Institute of Engineering Technology all worked in this arena. Another grant to Southwestern University of Finance and Economics funded its Research Center for Educational Outcomes to help non-elite universities improve their admissions processes as they experienced declines in applications (c). Finally, funding provided to the Shanghai Better Education Development Center supported the development and testing of a social entrepreneurship program aimed at encouraging students to consider pursuing careers in poor rural areas (c).

Privately operated *minban* colleges and universities became increasingly important providers of higher education to China's poorest students during the first decade of this century. But both external and internal problems made the quality of education problematic. Improving the quality of *minban* higher education therefore became a pressing issue for educational equity. Several grants approached the issue from different angles.

One grant to Peking University (PKU), which collaborated closely with colleagues at the University of Maryland (UMd), supported some of the earliest work on *minban* higher education. That project began in 2003, when the legal framework for private higher education was as yet rough, and the *minban* schools' own management weak and irregular (b). The project team aimed to muster policy research and NGO involvement and to seek improved management for the sector, using pilot grassroots interventions in two provinces and proactive dissemination of findings. Members of the project team, in addition to generating groundbreaking research, were also instrumental in the formation of the higher education subcouncil of the Association for Private Education set up in 2008. (Approval for the establishment of such an association indicates a major step forward in institutional legitimacy for *minban* education.) Team members provided input as well into the 2010—2020 education plan.

Two later grants turned attention to improving learning and educational success for students in *minban* colleges (b), using action research methods. A second grant to the PKU–UMd team in 2010 supported action research to determine how to improve disadvantaged students' success in *minban* universities in poorer regions of China. Their work focused on fieldwork at three private colleges, with the main emphasis on improving teachers' pedagogical skills (from knowledge of key theories of learning and teaching, to syllabus construction and classroom management) and increasing student participation and interaction in and out of the classroom, so that students could step away from passive learning and start to shape their own education. A subsequent major grant to Guangdong Baiyun University in 2013 supported a program (still underway at time of writing) to promote a shift away from teacher–centered instruction to student–centered learning in *minban* colleges, particularly to improve success rates and employment prospects for poorer students. The project involves partner schools in five cities across the country, providing training to teachers and administrators, translating relevant texts on student–centered learning, and building inter–school exchanges via a website and workshops. Institutional obstacles are a key factor impeding teachers' engagement with efforts to change their teaching approach. Therefore the project aims as well to effect changes in schools' internal systems, including management of teaching and of students, "learning assessment, incentive mechanism, resource allocation, and organizational leadership." For both of these projects, the participating schools are contributing funds and other resources to help support them; the cooperation of the schools' leadership has been enthusiastic.

These two grants represent an overlap of *minban* education student–centered learning. Another grant for work beginning in late 2013 supported Xi'an Jiaotong–Liverpool University (XJLU, a Sino–UK joint venture international university established in 2006) to disseminate its highly esteemed model of student–centered education (c). This model aimed to build Chinese students' self–reliance and responsibility in stages throughout their undergraduate years—essentially, to reorient the narrow emphasis on test scores and employment to cultivation of the whole person. XJLU cooperated with the National Academy of Education Administration to draft a manual for universities seeking to use its student–centered education model (SEM) and its quality assurance system (QAS), conducted training on the model and its adaptation for different schools' circumstances, and worked one–on–one in long–term with three universities that could serve as examples for SEM and QAS appropriate in different types of schools. The project was still in progress at the time of our evaluation, but the one report available indicated good progress and multi–channel methods for disseminating information and analyses.

Another small set of grants had particular relevance for national policies, specifically with respect to evaluation methods in higher education. One grant to Hubei University supported research, training and a pilot project intended to improve comprehensive evaluation as a tool for raising teaching quality (b). Two other grants to Tsinghua University supported seminal work on student–centered evaluation methods (b). That work and its impact are discussed at length in a case study in Chapter 6.

Four grants related to faculty development (b) included two to HUST for research on evaluation systems for college teaching. An additional grant to HUST supported the Chinese part of an international comparative research project on changes in the academic profession. The fourth grant, to Peking University, was made for action research examining the profession's development in both public and private schools of higher education, particularly with respect to faculty development.

Two grants supported projects addressing equity in higher education. The first, made in 2002 to Beijing Institute of Technology, supported a general research project that brought public attention to the issue (b); before that project, equity was not recognized as a problem in higher education. The second, to the University of Hong Kong in 2014, supported research and innovative interventions to improve access for poor and underserved groups to top–notch research universities (a).[51]

Two grants, to Peking University and Changchun University of Technology, supported research, testing and evaluation of methods to combat Internet and computer–game addiction among college students (b).

Other grants supported work on reforms of university management (b) by the National Academy of Education Administration, and on summarizing and analyzing the first ten years (1999–2008) of rapid expansion of Chinese higher education, in order to identify factors impeding further development in the sector (a), by the National University of Singapore.

The discussion in this chapter about the body of work supported by He Jin's grants might seem to call for a conclusion concerning their value and impact. We have highlighted some of the major points related to the significance and impact for specific grants or sets of grants. However, because the next two chapters cover other substantial matters relevant to understanding the overall impact of He Jin's grants and grantmaking, we have elected to reserve the major conclusions on impact for the final chapter of the

[51] A third grant on this topic was made in 2016, also to the University of Hong Kong, to support research to understand the decline of students from low-income families in elite universities, which had fallen from 30 to 40 percent in earlier years, to 10 percent most recently. The four-year study is intended to find out how poor students fare in elite universities. Because our review did not include 2016 grants, this one is not included in our tallies.

report, after the other relevant information has been laid out. We pass, then, first to a discussion in Chapter 5 of He Jin's grantmaking approaches that point to his program's and his own contributions to grantees, to Chinese education, and to the nascent Chinese philanthropic field, and then in Chapter 6 to three in–depth case studies that give a clearer sense of how his strategy and grantmaking approaches have interacted to create significant results (and impact) in three specific instances.

FORDFOUNDATION

V.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PHILANTHROPIC FIELD

In the foregoing chapters, we have seen the evolution of the Education portfolio strategy; the arenas—basic education, higher education, vocational education, field-building, and culture—in which the strategy was pursued; and some of the major achievements of grantees and groups of grants. In this chapter, we look more closely at some of the underlying principles and ways of meeting challenges that could be relevant for any grantmaker's portfolio, regardless of field.

As we found in the discussions with many grantees from academia, nonprofits, and government, He Jin made the underlying principles explicit and demonstrated their importance so well that they have become part of the operational DNA for many of the grantee teams and their partners. This indicates an element of sustainability not easily captured by looking only at the specific work done under the grants: in designing and implementing projects of any sort, past grantees continue to use the principles consciously as a template.

At the same time, in coping with the challenges that confront any grantmaker—the constraints of grantmaking budgets, the right approach to helping people "learn to fish" rather than "giving them fish," and the need to transform stakeholders' mindset—He Jin also developed some basic guidelines for his work that might prove useful to others.

A hallmark of much of his work has been the emphasis on inclusiveness and on learning-by-doing. In the last several years of his tenure, he expanded upon a practice he had occasionally used earlier: convening a donors' roundtable and inviting other donors and some grantees to accompany him on grant negotiations and monitoring visits. Coupled with his seminars and workshops for academic institutions that offer training for Chinese philanthropies, those practices have already had significant impact on the nascent Chinese donor community. A final section in this chapter therefore summarizes that work and its impact as seen by other donors.

A. Grantmaking Approach

Over fifteen years and spanning two significantly different articulations of initiatives, the objectives of He Jin's strategy as program officer have revolved around three key issues:

a. access to education for poor and disadvantaged groups,

b. quality of education for poor and disadvantaged groups, and

c. education for social justice.

Early in his tenure, he stated specific principles that could best help grantees' projects achieve those objectives. These principles have guided grantees and key stakeholders in the process of grant negotiation, implementation and monitoring/evaluation as they learned how to identify, analyze and solve problems. Many of the grantees who spoke with our evaluation team spontaneously offered observations on how helpful they had found the principles, even though initially they sometimes found them difficult.

1. People-centered approach in negotiation

Grantees often noted that the grant negotiation process seemed at first to take an inordinately long time. It was only after they began work on their project that they realized the project negotiation and design process had made it far easier for their work to proceed smoothly, and with more assured impact. Several grantees, when asked about the difference between negotiating grants with the Ford Foundation as compared to other donors, remarked upon that characteristic pattern of longer (and tougher) negotiation ➔ easier implementation. During the protracted negotiations, they learned not only the basic principles He Jin used, but also how to put those principles to work in their projects.

He Jin characterized his approach to negotiation as "people-centered" because of the emphasis on applicants' mindset and motivation, which were crucial to their interaction on an equal footing with him, within the team, and with all stakeholders.

He Jin summarized the principles in the negotiation stage in fifteen characters:

实事求是 (seeking truth from facts)

参与式 (participation)

创新 (innovation)

可持续 (sustainability)

宜推广 (replicability)

We found in our discussions with grantees that all team members, not just the leaders, knew those by heart and referred to them in many contexts, sometimes years after their grants had concluded.

Overarching principle: Seeking truth from facts (实事求是)

Of all the principles, He Jin judged *seeking truth from facts* the most difficult. "This is the bottom line, where you can't cheat yourself." It is also the ideational base on which trust can be built between grantmaker and grantee, grantee and partners or project beneficiaries, and among members of the grantee team.

This principle, at one level, means that grantees must aim to demonstrate truth (conclusions of relevance for solving a problem) through research or testing of facts (discovering, measuring, and analyzing the realities surrounding a problem and attempted solutions). Ideals are important for setting goals, but wishful thinking has no place in an effective project.

At another level, the hardest, grantees also had to be honest with themselves: about their own capabilities, about when and why a project encountered difficulties or failed, and about what could be learned even from failures. For both the grantmaker and the grantee, no one grant is a hundred percent successful, and none is a complete failure. Even with the best project design and execution possible, the grantees' plans may encounter difficulties because the time is not yet right, or because the policies change, or because local officials supporting the project are reassigned. Nonetheless it is both possible and crucial to analyze and understand the reasons for partial success and partial failure.

One case in point concerns a grantee team in Shanghai, who aimed to encourage college graduates to return to rural areas as entrepreneurs. Their project included developing ten case studies on rural entrepreneurs and developing a courseware package that could be used by any interested schools, designing and teaching a course

to encourage and prepare students for rural startups, hosting study tours and a national forum, and arranging summer internships to prepare students for entrepreneurial careers after graduation. Those activities were all conducted, and in addition a website and a WeChat group were created to help disseminate information and provide support to rural student entrepreneurs.

All of these might be seen as indications of success. But the team itself judged that "this project actually brought more failure than achievement…." Despite their efforts to note obstacles in timely fashion and devise solutions, they had ultimately found only a handful of students willing to attempt rural entrepreneurship. A pilot effort to market some of the entrepreneurs' products also fell dismally short. Moreover, some of the entrepreneurs depicted in the case studies had closed their operations by the end of the grant term. Those facts, they considered, had to be noted and entered in the balance.

Nevertheless, the team's clear-eyed assessment of the reasons for the difficulties represented important learning about what young graduates need when choosing the path of rural entrepreneurship: support networks, investment funds, better marketing outlets, continuing education, better coordination with local government, and prior experience to inspire customer and community confidence. As the project neared its close, the State Council announced a new policy for encouraging youth entrepreneurship in the countryside. Lessons learned in the Shanghai project are of great significance for helping achieve the goals of the national policy.

Methodology: participation (参与式)

"Participatory" is often used to describe how activities are conducted. But "participation" in He Jin's grantmaking lexicon preceded the activities themselves. He challenged grantees to ensure that their project included all relevant stakeholders, and that the stakeholders participated in all stages of the work, from project design through implementation to monitoring and assessment.

This required grantees to think carefully from the outset about who should be included or represented in project planning and in the work. They had to determine that for themselves. During grant negotiations, He Jin refrained from telling grantees whom to include, but suggested that they ask themselves, "Without whom would it be impossible for the project to succeed?" That would point them towards the crucial co-participants.

Including all relevant stakeholders was sometimes a time-consuming task, but it reduced the risk of overlooking crucial constituencies' viewpoints and improved projects' design. It increased the ease of project implementation, since cooperation from essential

stakeholders was ensured in advance, and knowledgeable local participants could spot difficulties and help work out good solutions more quickly than could an outsider. The inclusion of local grassroots stakeholders' participation gave them a sense of ownership of the project, thereby improving its sustainability, while the inclusion of government, academic, and media partners heightened the probability of wide dissemination and replicability of innovations. Participation of this nature was the methodological base for building the trust essential for projects' success and sustainability.

An excellent example concerned a project to refine and test educational equity indicators in rural and urban schools. The design of this project showed careful prior consideration of participants who could provide policy resources, professional resources, and experience in methods. It identified government and school participants who were key in testing and reporting on the indicators' use, and pointed towards government and media participants who could help consolidate and disseminate the methodology. The careful thought given to inclusion is reflected in the list of the participants in a project monitoring meeting: one official from the Municipal Bureau of Quality Supervision and another from the Municipal Education Department's Supervision office, several county Education Department officials (from two counties), a municipal Education Department's party secretary, a provincial Education Bureau official, three observers from two foundations in Shanghai and Beijing, four middle school principals, a provincial educational TV station staffer, ten professors and students from three colleges and universities, and three university administrators.

For many projects, stakeholders participated not only in meetings but also in training on new methods or approaches, conducting surveys, and observation or other forms of monitoring and evaluation of practical results. As social media became more popular, many projects also built in e-communications like website-based discussions, WeChat and other methods to allow input and discussion from many quarters. A report from one grantee team who worked with other institutions perhaps best captured the value of using a comprehensive participatory approach in their work:

[T]he sharing of achievements is not in a way of informing the cooperative partner of the accomplished results and let them accept that passively, but inviting them to participate [in] the whole process, get involved in the same journey of thinking, exploring and taking actions—they become active participants rather than passive receivers, which make the sharing of achievements a sustainable process with possibilities of further development.

Criteria: innovation, sustainability, replicability (创新，可持续，宜推广)

The preceding discussion mentions innovation, sustainability, and replication. These three criteria were also fundamental in the grant negotiation stage, and grantees had to consider them carefully in the project design.

Underlying these three criteria is a grantmaking philosophy: that the function of grants is to enable people to solve problems themselves ("learn to fish"), not to provide a handout or to encourage dependence on external funds ("giving them fish"). This means encouraging prospective grantees to approach solving persistent and widespread problems in new ways, with methods that can be continued after grant funding concludes, and that can be scaled up or spread more broadly once they prove workable.

Innovation is important not for its own sake but for solving problems. As He Jin put it in an interview about the Pathways to Higher Education program in 2007, "What I tell my grantees is that you've been taking the same medicine for the same problem for 50 years. Now is the time to think about it again and decide whether or not you need it for another 2 years. If it's the same way then you won't be able to redress the problem." And solving the problem is the point, as one grantee told us a decade after her first grant from He Jin: "The basic goal of innovation is for solving a problem and driving development." Innovation entails risk, because it means learning how to do what you don't know how to do, venturing into the unknown. Whether it entails doing different things, or doing things differently, not every innovation is sure to succeed. But innovators can substantially reduce the risks through careful project design and implementation, and by ensuring that they have secured the participation of all essential stakeholders.

Sustainability as a criterion means considering how an innovative activity or method can be maintained once a grant ends. He Jin explained his insistence on this criterion based on his experience with international organizations. Projects funded by such organizations could show great success while the funding continued, but all too often, once a project's term ended, so did all the work. Therefore at the Ford Foundation he emphasized building sustainability into the project design.

This could mean voluntary, cost-free or low-cost continuation in new approaches—use of procedural manuals developed in the project, for example, or new types of classroom interactions, or modes of participation that engage more stakeholders. Where ongoing costs would be high, it would mean thinking through how to attract funding from government, enterprises, or other donors.

Replicability runs alongside sustainability as a longer-term consideration for project design even for a fairly short-term project. Can the approaches used or the results obtained by the project be accepted and adopted more widely, and if so, how? Sometimes this may mean voluntary adoption by other institutions or localities; sometimes it may mean input into policies and laws in formulation or under revision. Concern for replicability also means paying attention to how the project team can best communicate its work and results, and then building communications and dissemination into the project design and the roster of participants to be included in the project work.

Taken together, these three principles mean striving for the greatest possible results, even from what might appear to be a small project of limited scope. They are all essential parts of the grantmaking philosophy, and when achieved together, they demonstrate that grantee and partners have learned together how to "fish."

2. Issue-focused approach in project design and implementation

Many grantees we interviewed spontaneously mentioned the part of grant negotiations that they found most difficult: He Jin's challenging them to think deeply and systematically about how to identify the problem they wanted to solve, analyze it in order to devise the best possible solution, and align the problem, project goals, and success indicators. Typically, and especially for new grantees, this process took multiple discussions and sometimes stretched out for six to twelve months or more.

When discussing their project ideas with He Jin, a number of grantees noted, they initially thought his challenges meant either that he would reject the project, or that he had some specific notion in mind that they needed to guess. Over time, they realized that his challenges were instead meant to encourage them to think more boldly for themselves. One quoted He Jin as telling him, "The reason I don't even suggest an answer is that I'm afraid you'll think that's what I want you to do, and you'll abandon what you want to do. I give you methods and challenges. But you need to be doing what you're interested in." Several grantees who had received more than one grant observed that the grant negotiation process never got easier. Rather, He Jin's challenges grew

more exacting as grantees matured. But after the first project, they all recognized that meeting the challenges during negotiation generated a project design that was clearer in intent and methods, far easier to implement, and more assured of impact.

The project design process can be broken down into two steps: doing the problem analysis, and designing the problem solution.

Problem analysis methodology: symptoms → disease → causes → source（状，症，因，源，分析问题）

He Jin used a disease metaphor to summarize the key questions for anyone proposing a project. For a physician, identifying symptoms is only a first step; the symptoms are a clue to the disease, but curing it requires locating its cause, and preventing it requires locating its source.[52]

The specifics in this analysis differed across projects, determined by the interests and capacities of the prospective grantee and partners, the locale, the level of focus in the educational system, the degree of public awareness or tenor of public sentiment, and the state of policy and the policy cycle.

The discussions could be long and complicated—especially since, according to the participation principle, many different voices and viewpoints had to be heard and considered. But gradually, grantees learned the value of the process, even if they groaned every time they heard the word "challenge." One grantee provided a humorous illustration of this in a slide show prepared for our interview meetings (see Fig. 5.1).

Fig. 5.1."Okay, so let me challenge you a bit..."

[52] An illustration from the medical world might be *symptoms* that include cough and respiratory distress, a *disease* labeled SARS, a *cause* traced to a previously unknown virus, and a *source* traced to a disease vector of transmission through infected patients' coughs (and in the first instance, to consumption of meat from a rare civet cat species).

Problem-solving methodology: alignment of issue-target-success indicator（三点一线，解决问题）

Once the problem, causes and sources were identified, the design process turned to alignments at three levels: the organization, the strategy, and the project itself. At the organizational level, the purpose, vision, and mission had to align. For the strategic level, the macro objective, the resources, and the rules had to align or be brought into alignment. Together, the organization and its strategy provided the context within which the project would proceed. The project design had to line up the problem focused upon, the concrete goals, and the success indicators.

As with the challenges of problem diagnosis, the problem-solving embodied in the project design was unique to each project team's identification of the problem, its organizational context and culture, and its larger strategy. When the alignment was well done, the project goals flowed from the problem analysis and a realistic assessment of the context, and the success indicators flowed logically from the project goals. The starting point was always the analysis of the problem, *not* the project goals or the indicators.

3. Organizational culture-based approach for team building and sustainable development

Principles that He Jin stressed in the grant negotiation process also informed his approach to implementation and to continual self-monitoring and evaluation by the grant team. That approach included developing a mechanism for organic combination of project implementation, team building, and exploration of new ways of problem-solving; improving some of the basic rules of the game for both the grantee institution and the philanthropic field, and transformation of the organization's culture. Ultimately that transformation would enable teams to cope with more and bigger problems, even systemic ones.

Create a mechanism that integrates implementation, team building and method exploration（做事，练人，摸方法，创机制）

Perhaps the most sophisticated example of a mechanism accomplishing this three-way integration was a project of the Rural Education Action Program (REAP) under a grant to the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). This project focused on the problems of rural secondary and vocational secondary enrollments, which lagged well behind urban

enrollments. The project aimed to test the efficacy of vouchers or counseling in encouraging junior middle school students to go on for more schooling; at the same time, the team intended to help vocational secondary schools measure the value-added of students' learning in their schools, in order to increase it.

The project team included teachers and students from CAS's Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Qinghai Nationalities University, Ningxia University, Northwest University, and Stanford University. They collaborated with provincial government agencies in three northwest China provinces, a provincial association of vocational education and training schools, and a county education department. In its research on the interventions that might affect enrollments or educational quality, the project team also intended to build stakeholders' broader competencies in rigorous impact-evaluation methods. As the grant proposal stated it,

our assessments will be conceived, designed, implemented, evaluated and up-scaled (if successful) jointly with key stakeholders in the process—with participation from those in the line agencies that are being affected (e.g., teachers, principals, parents and students), local officials (with whom we want to have joint ownership—when appropriate) and top policy makers in prefectural, provincial and national government bodies.

The project design included mechanisms towards this end. REAP has long emphasized learning-by-doing in the research process itself as a method for enhancing research and analytical capacities among team members —professors, students, and local government and school partners. Beyond that mode or learning, the project included annual training workshops on impact evaluation and annual practitioner workshops focused on helping practitioners develop assessment proposals; consulting, mentoring, and onsite training by members of the project team; the funding of mini-projects for assessment; and the development of training materials and "intervention packages" for use in teachers' counseling of students and for assessment of vocational education programs' learning results. In addition to the approximately two hundred participants from government, NGOs, schools and research institutions who attended the workshops, REAP team members made presentations in a training workshop for all directors of education in Shaanxi province. Several foundations, NGOs, and research institutions requested their help in training staff on rigorous participatory impact evaluation. The REAP team also developed a package of training materials on impact evaluation. To consolidate the expertise developed well beyond the project team, a China Assessment Network for Development Upscaling (CAN-DU) was set up towards the end of the project.

Improve "rules of the game" (改进规则)

The procedural rules and habitual practices in a team or institution can have an enormous impact on its capacity to cope with new issues or seek innovative solutions. One challenge for grantees is to develop their own rules instead of unthinkingly following traditional ones or imitating Western practices.

The general principles He Jin proposed in the 15-character set are rules that he followed in his grantmaking. But even to follow such rules, grantees need to resolve to follow specific procedures or practices appropriate in their own context. One simple participatory practice in meetings with grantee teams changed a customary practice of introducing only the leaders at a meeting. Instead, He Jin insisted that everyone at a meeting introduce him or herself. This was a small "rule" with big implications: everyone at the meeting was treated as an equal participant, and over a series of meetings, everyone began to grasp that point. Several grantees we interviewed mentioned this practice, remarking that they had come to value it and to use it in all meetings, whether He Jin was present or not, and to extend the practice to meetings beyond their teams. At one level, the rule was "self-introduction by all," but on a deeper level, and one that eventually changed dynamics within and beyond the team, the rule was "everybody is equal," and many grantee teams began to recognize it in just that way.

Encouraging project teams to think about new rules meant encouraging their constant consideration not only of what work they were doing, but also of how they were doing it. That often brought attention around to how team members related to each other, and to those they worked with or on whose behalf they worked.

Where grantees' work entailed building an institutional model, sometimes the rules refined in the course of the work were best sustained and disseminated by putting them in writing. The Bainian School model mentioned in Chapter 4 used this method. When they received the Ford Foundation grant, the Bainian team was already running schools in Beijing and Chengdu to provide secondary vocational education to the children of migrant workers, free of charge. Among its unique features, the Bainian model insisted on equality among administrators and staff of the schools; everyone, for example, was to take turns cleaning the facilities. Teachers generally served part-time, as volunteers. The Ford grant helped Bainian organize expansion to more cities, but the rapidity of the replication forced the team to reckon with the stresses of training new cohorts of teachers and administrators, ensuring that they would comply with the basic model while adapting it to local circumstances. The solution for long-term development and quality assurance was to compile a manual setting down the rules and procedures for the board, for management, and for courses. As of summer 2016, Bainian was using a third edition of the manual, and had expanded to eight campuses.

With or without setting out the rules in writing, a team's conscious adoption and practice of new rules often brings changes in the institutional culture, an essential factor for

keeping the team's work on track and ensuring its long–term and sustainable commitment to social justice.

Refine institutional culture（改善文化）

Work on projects and attention to new ways of doing things may change the institutional culture in many respects. Here we offer just one illustration. The Suzhou Industrial Park Institute of Vocational Technology (IVT) is an institution of vocational higher education in Suzhou. By early in this century, one of its distinctive characteristics was its adoption of several models for cooperating with business enterprises, thereby improving IVT education's fit with the needs of local (largely multinational) enterprises. However, the school displayed many of the top–down and bureaucratic characteristics of traditional institutions, with some overlay of international flavor.

Over the eight years that they worked with He Jin, the IVT team received three grants for different projects. The first was to transfer some of their experience in enterprise/school cooperation to a vocational school in Suqian, a relatively underdeveloped prefecture of northern Jiangsu province where skilled workers for local enterprises were in short supply. The second was to reorient IVT's own vocational education program to strengthen students' core abilities, and to pilot–test a competency–based evaluation system.[53] The focus on students' personal growth mobilized all the teachers. One teacher in political studies took students out into the community to discern community needs and help the community, thereby connecting classroom learning with learning in society. The third project, initiated in mid–2015, aimed to develop public–private partnerships along with several partner schools under different forms of ownership, develop a software–based management training package, evaluate results and produce a policy report.

No report was yet available for the third project when we conducted our documentary review. However, reflections from both of the first two projects' reports and comments volunteered in an interview with several of the team members reinforce He Jin's own conclusion that their work on these projects substantially changed the entire team, and with it the culture of the institution. As a report from the grantee commented, He Jin's 15–character principles

... have made great impacts on our thinking and actions. The patterns, styles, atmosphere, and other details of each seminar and event the team held have undergone changes. Being open, equal, realistic, keeping on searching, changing and developing, all these have become part of the natural thinking and behavior of the team members, which in turn helped them gain more improvement in other aspects of their work and life.

[53] During the first project, team members contributed to a municipal government workshop on regulations for school-enterprise cooperation; one leading team member was invited to participate as an expert in discussion of the revision of the national Vocational Education Law. In 2014, the second project's work received a second-level award in a national competition on teaching results.

The report went on to discuss the team's application of the participatory principle, and concluded with the reflection that concrete participatory practices (like self–introductions by all meeting attendees) "[make] each discussion a new beginning, a beginning that calls for their innovative wisdom. As time passes, this becomes part of their culture."

More local colleges have approached IVT about replicating their model for integrating vocational colleges' education with community and entreprise needs. That interest, while a testimonial to the vitality of the cultural change the IVT approach represents, also suggests that cultural changes within institutions may translate into changes in broader sectoral and even systemic culture.

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Fig. 5.2 presents a schematic view of how the principles and approaches discussed above add up to a strategic process that could be visualized for most grants. For the grantmaker, however, there are also some deeper or larger strategic challenges to consider, and some basic guidelines that other donors might find of use



Fig. 5.2. Schemetic view of strategic process

B. Grantmaking Challenges

Ideally, the body of work that a grantmaker funds in any particular arena becomes greater than the sum of its parts. Unless dealing only with limited and short-term problems, the grantmaker must try to use grant funds selectively to ensure that the work of grantees adds up over time to create workable solutions to complex and often hydra-headed problems.

A grantmaking program of any magnitude requires the grantmaker to develop some notion of how the parts fit together. There are many ways to visualize that process; He Jin provided one such illustration (see Fig. 5.3) that captures the main approaches—often embodied in different projects, or in differing degrees within the same project—that can add up to solutions of even the knottiest problems.



Fig. 5.3. Approaches for solution of complex social issues

A clear notion of the approaches (pilot experiments, research, networking, training, etc.) that s/he thinks can add up to a solution is important for any grantmaker. Depending on the field, the type of donor organization, and other contextual issues, the type and mix of approaches can differ. Clarity on approaches, coupled with a notion of what needs to go first and how the approaches fit together, can help the grantmaker arrive at some judgments on what type of project or grantee is appropriate.

That still leaves some big challenges for the grantmaker. All grantmakers encounter the first challenge: there is never enough money in the grants budget to fund everything they might wish to support. In addition to that challenge, He Jin articulated two others for his work: how to ensure that funding helped grantees become more capable of solving problems without reliance on continued external support, and how to do not only the right thing, but in the right way. Here we discuss how he dealt with all three challenges, with some examples from the grantmaking.

1. Never enough funds: Coping with limited funding, maximizing effectiveness of resources

Not more funds, but improved ways of using funds

One example of a grant cluster serves as a good illustration here. When He Jin took up his post as a program officer in the Ford Foundation Beijing office, the national government was grappling with a lingering problem amidst the otherwise successful universalization of basic education: poor, rural, national minority children's enrollment rates in schools lagged significantly, especially if they were girls, and the more so as they reached junior middle school age. This was a problem the government wanted to solve, and He Jin resolved to work on it.

But where and how to begin? National minorities were only 8.4 percent of China's population in 2000, but that amounted to 106.43 million people.[54] Each had its own culture; almost all had their own languages. Most still lived in poor rural areas.

He Jin reasoned that if good pilot work could demonstrate workable solutions, it could be replicated and might point towards useful policy changes. Impact would be more demonstrable if work was undertaken in the right place, so he chose to concentrate funding on work among several "small national minorities" (populations under 100 thousand) in western China. The first grant, made in 2001 to researchers from Beijing's Central University for Ethnic Minorities, supported just one class of forty–three Lahu

[54] According to 2000 data, from *China Statistical Yearbook 2005,* Table 4-4; www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/indexeh.htm.

girls from very poor families, in Lancang county of Yunnan. The grant covered only textbook and boarding fees, three teachers, and the expenses of the Beijing team. Subsequent grants went to Northwest Normal University, a national and a provincial educational institute, a provincial education bureau, and a primary school. The second grant (2002) funded work with two junior middle school classes of Maonan girls; a third (2003), work in three Gansu townships with Bao'an children; and a fourth (2004), work in four Yunnan counties. Another grant for the Lahu girls' schooling in 2007 focused on helping them complete junior middle school. Ultimately, forty of the original forty–three Lahu girls went on to junior high school, and thirty were admitted to college. The county government well before then had picked up the model and supported two more classes of girls.

Of more far–reaching significance, the work supported by the grant contributed to national policy. When five national bodies (including MoE, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Development and Reform Commission) announced the new poverty alleviation plan for small national minorities, it included features of the pilots that He Jin had funded.

This is an example of efficient impact through policy input. In many other instances, He Jin funded work that achieved impact through improvements in school management that saved the schools money and were easily replicable in other schools.

Participation of key stakeholders: not just a method, but also a solution

Projects' expense estimates often include the costs of buying the services or expertise required for the project work. A participatory approach that includes many different stakeholders from the outset of the work may go much further in securing resources for a project that are hard to reckon in purely monetary terms—and may at the same time ensure better sustainability for the work.

A detailed case in point is the project by the Beijing Academy of Social Sciences (BASS), designed to research the issues affecting Beijing migrant children's ability to take advantage of the policy opening their access to public education. Alongside the research, BASS aimed to train principals and teachers at some target schools to improve their sensitivity to the difficulties faced by migrant children, and to coordinate the efforts of all relevant local government agencies whose work could affect the children's access in some way. This entailed both vertical coordination and horizontal participation.

The vertical coordination came through periodic meetings that brought in participants from the State Council, the Ministry of Education, the municipal and district governments,

neighborhood committees, and the schools. Horizontally, the project team secured cooperation from the local offices of public security, health, urban management, commerce and trade, and the subdistrict.

Some of the fruits of the horizontal participation during this project were discussed in Chapter 4, but we offer another example here, from a story He Jin told an interviewer. In one of the meetings among local participants, the party secretary of a trading company that ran a local market mentioned what a big difference it had made to get the migrant children into school. Most vendors and workers in the market were migrants. Before the children attended the public school, they ran loose in the market while their parents worked, getting into things and creating bedlam. The market managers could do nothing about it. Once the schools took them in, it was a big improvement for the market, and she was happy about that. The party secretary was asked: what could she do to help in return? In the past, when the school had held parents' meetings, migrant parents working in the market could not attend. So she decided to close the market when the school held parents' meetings, so migrant parents could all attend.

This seems a small matter, but it could vastly improve migrant children's smooth integration into urban public schools. And it lends far greater breadth to the inscription that Premier Wen Jiabao was inspired to write after observing a project school: "Under the same blue sky, let's grow up together."

Persistence, tenacity, and a well thought-out plan

Some endeavors for grantmakers are valuable but especially daunting in scope and potential cost. The support for building women's and gender studies was one such endeavor. He Jin inherited this as a commitment for his portfolio, but the efforts were still at an early stage.

Building a new academic discipline in higher education is a huge task. It requires skilled teachers, researchers, courses and degree programs, textbooks and library materials, academic exchanges in conferences and other venues, and channels for academic discussion and public awareness building. This is not something that can be achieved overnight, and it requires much more than a donor's resources to sink strong roots.

Before 2001, the foundation had supported some work related to women's studies leading up to and following from the UN's Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. When He Jin arrived, women's studies programs had started in a handful of universities in large coastal cities, and offered a few MA programs (in history, sociology, education, sex education). But the few women's studies courses were mostly electives, and most of

the textbooks were translations of foreign works.

He Jin's overall goal, to build a field with Chinese characteristics, required cooperation among the institutions funded. No one institution would be funded to do everything. The point was to build a broad, sustainable nationwide infrastructure for women's and gender studies. To do so, the grantmaking proceeded in stages from 2001 to 2006.

Stage 1: Expansion in specialties, disciplines, schools, regions (2001–2003). In this phase, one grant went to Dalian University (previously funded to set up an Interdisciplinary Center for Women's and Gender Studies) to mainstream feminist perspectives into existing courses and to develop practical activities to build upon classroom learning about gender issues. That work was extended to 2005 with a later grant. Tianjin Normal University received grants to work together with Beijing Normal University and the Zhejiang Academy of Social Sciences to build curriculum and research on women's/gender studies more broadly in China, including developing courses, compiling textbooks and training teachers. That work, too, was extended and expanded with a later grant. Capital Normal University took on a grant to develop women's studies in literature (also including development of texts and teacher training), and to pilot integration of courses in literature at both Capital Normal and Shaanxi Normal Universities. China Women's University (affiliated with the All–China Women's Federation) secured a grant to organize an international conference on gender studies in Asia and to create a CD–ROM on gender in folklore and local customs. The Peking University Women's Studies Center received funding to set up a women's studies information network and to conduct research on folk art and rural women. These grants began to broaden the geographic base for women's studies, and work in literature and culture spanned traditional academic fields and folk cultures.

Stage 2: Consolidation and deepening (2003–2004). During this stage the grants emphasized developing teachers, textbooks, courses, and degrees; and turned to supporting new work integrating gender perspectives with work on minority nationalities and practical poverty alleviation efforts. Dalian University's mainstreaming efforts extended to Jilin University, Northeast Normal University, and Yanbian University (in a Korean autonomous prefecture), and Dalian University envisioned its women's studies center serving as a training base for women's studies in other universities, especially in the northeast. Tianjin Normal University continued its previous work on curriculum and training and planned to organize an international conference, as did Dalian University. Yunnan Nationalities University won a grant to integrate students' school–based learning of gender studies with engagement with minority nationality communities in the countryside. Northwest Normal University's Center of Ethnic Minority Women's Studies received funding to create an interdisciplinary program to improve minority women's

capacities for poverty alleviation.

Stage 3: Integration and strengthening (2004–2005). In this phase of the work, the funding emphasized further connections between academic study and practical applications. Although the grants were small in number, they encompassed work with both men and women, with both keypoint and non–keypoint universities and colleges, both inside and outside the classroom, and linking the schools with government and NGOs. They also intensified work in and on national minority areas. As described in detail in Chapter 4, a grant for Xinjiang University and two sister schools helped them to develop gender studies while also raising gender awareness through cadre (both male and female) training programs and media discussions. Guizhou Academy of Social Sciences received funding to work with the Center of Minorities and Women's Development and the Chinese Culture College in Guizhou University, as well as with local government, to conduct cultural–preservation activities among Hmong women in one Guizhou village. Related to the women's studies grants under the *Education* initiative, two of the *Culture* initiative grants also provided new and important resources for women's studies: a grant to Shaanxi Normal University to give the existing Women's Culture Museum the opportunity for new development, and a grant to Hunan Provincial Museum for the preservation and transmission of the *nvshu* women's writing system.

Stage 4: Self–reliance, or women's studies with Chinese characteristics (2005–2006). This final phase saw funding for two important capstone efforts. Fudan University received a grant to create China's first accredited Ph.D. program in women's studies; and Zhejiang Academy of Social Sciences obtained a five–year tie–off grant to maintain a national network on women's and gender studies.[55]

By the concluding year of the effort to establish the new field in women's and gender studies, and largely because of the foundations and momentum provided by He Jin's grants,

a. over one hundred universities had women's and gender studies programs and centers;

b. added to the fields available before 2001, women's studies could be pursued within the fields of anthropology, nationalities studies, law, medicine, international relations, music, culture, art, and literature;

[55] In addition, an offshoot of work from the *nvshu* project gave rise to grants in 2006 and 2008 to Hunan Business College's Women's Studies Center, to develop new courses at undergraduate and graduate level to be taught at several colleges and universities; to organize regional conferences to draw attention from the media, to do arts work with women prisoners, to set up and upgrade its website and publish some output of the *nvshu* project, and to reach out beyond campuses to do gender studies work "in a NGO style."

c. degrees were offered from B.A. level to Ph.D., and courses were available as electives, required courses, and practicums;

d. China had its own indigenous textbooks in women's and gender studies; and

e. an active nationwide network for teachers and scholars of women's studies existed.

The sums expended for building the women's studies field were not negligible, but the phased and cooperative approach that He Jin employed multiplied their effectiveness. Moreover, the careful selection of grantees beyond the eastern seaboard had no doubt accelerated by years, if not decades, the growth of strong bases for women's studies in western China and among minority nationalities.

2. Cultivating self-reliance: Giving fish vs. learning to fish

Many of He Jin's grantees mentioned "learning to fish" through their projects. As anyone familiar with the old Chinese proverb knows, giving a hungry person a fish solves the problem for one meal only. Teaching the person to fish can yield food for a lifetime.

There could be no better metaphor for the importance of sustainability as a grantmaking principle. This applies for the immediate grantee, but also for the grantee's partners and even the beneficiaries of the grantee's work. A crucial standard for funding any project could well be to pose the question that He Jin often asked grant applicants: If we don't fund you, how would you do this? The question nudges the applicant to think about other resources that can be brought to bear upon the problem—so that, if and when funded by a grant, the project's efficiency will be enhanced and the impact magnified, and after the grant ends, the project can live on. Perhaps not surprisingly, in He Jin's toolkit, innovation, participation, and analysis all play important parts in learning to fish. So, however, does the grantmaker's refusal to give the fish away. He summarizes the pedagogy of fishing under five rubrics.

"Be cruel to be kind": Avoid dependency syndrome

Many grantmakers will say that the hardest thing they have to do is to say no. He Jin has innovated in this respect, by saying "No, but"—challenging prospective grantees to think more carefully about what is really needed.

One good example was the negotiation with the Bainian Vocational School for the expansion project mentioned earlier in this chapter. When Bainian first contemplated expanding to other cities, it faced a dilemma. In Beijing it could draw on plenty of

volunteers, but volunteers would not be so plentiful or easily found elsewhere. Moreover, the school's administrators thought the new schools would need more funds for things like boarding facilities or other hardware. He Jin refused to fund those, and instead insisted that they needed to focus on *how* they did the training, management, and teaching—which added up to Bainian's unique approach—and to summarize that in writing so it could be used in replicating their model. This generated the idea of the manuals that Bainian developed, which He Jin did fund, along with some of the training. As for the funds to meet the hardware needs, Bainian has attracted RMB220 million in donations since 2011, and appreciative alumni of its program have already contributed RMB1.2 million.

Replace or complement traditional approaches with innovation

What should the grantmaker do when approached with an urgent need that is time-sensitive? Or with the needs of people who are apparently in a position of extreme vulnerability and unable to help themselves? Sometimes the best response is to require innovative redirection, often with broad cooperative participation.

An outstanding example of this response is the Pathways to Higher Education program. That program, which aimed to make a college education more accessible to students from poor families and to help them complete their degrees successfully, is discussed at length as a case study in Chapter 6, but one feature is noteworthy for our purposes here. Attempts to support poor students' education previously had concentrated primarily on providing the students with financial aid. He Jin was firm in insisting that PHE would not provide financial aid to students; rather, participating institutions were challenged to identify learning needs and psychological problems with which poorer students needed help, and then to devise plans for involving teachers, administrators, and students themselves in new ways of providing that help.

Team building is important for sustainability

Projects need teams, whether large or small, to get the work done. Ambitious projects need large and—whether as regular or occasional participants—diverse teams. An entire team is rarely permanent; sometimes, and especially with educational institutions' student participants, the turnover rate may be quite high. And yet, some efforts originally funded by He Jin's grants have continued long past the grant's conclusion. Others replicated by radiating out from the original setting to new ones.

Often what makes the difference in sustainability and replication is the team building (练人) that forms an important part of project design and implementation. Team building

can be accomplished many different ways. The REAP approach was discussed above. Here, to give a sense of how varied the approaches to team building may be, we offer two more examples of how teams' development can sustain and multiply their impact.

One such example pertains to the Education Salons that have been conducted for ten years, first under the aegis of the 21st Century Education Development Research Institute and then under the CPPCC Daily's *Education Weekly*. The salons were intended from the outset to bring together diverse participants, from government agencies, academia, and civil society sectors, to discuss issues important for China's education development in an open atmosphere.

Salon series have dealt with hot-button and controversial issues. In 2007–2008, the salons concentrated on the question of *minban* education, and to ensure balance, selected two eminent researchers—one an opponent and one a champion of *minban* schools—as co-chairs of the salons. Other topics dealt with in series have included institutional mechanisms (law, policy, interest expression, etc.), science education, and searches for local educational models. Altogether, seventy-one salon sessions were held between August 2003 and September 2016. Ford Foundation grant support concluded in 2008; clearly, the project team has found a good route to sustainability.

The salons attract enthusiastic participants from many universities and think tanks, NGOs, and the media, as well as from government at the national level (ministries, NPC and CPPCC representatives) and below. Possibly one strong draw for the government participants is not only to hear from those in other sectors, but also to meet and discuss across the bureaucratic siloes of government itself.

Organizing and supporting this effort requires a strong team effort. The staff is extremely small; for a long time, it was one person, working part-time. But the salon's director has built an expansive "team" that functions well, in part because it is subdivided to make the best use of everyone's interest and capacities. There is an active board of directors and "membership" who offer suggestions on focal questions; an advisory committee that makes use of the CPPCC platform; and an academic committee that connects the salon to researchers and research organizations, and whose members focus their research on some of the salon's main topics. A salon media team brings input from influential journalists and editors who are passionate about education. For specific salon sessions or series, a specialized team also works on preparations.

The Education Salon now receives diversified funding from many Chinese public–interest organizations, enterprises, and *shiye danwei*.[56] Clearly its reputation as an important venue for discussing issues and policy has helped to attract those funds, but the reputation itself would not have been earned or sustained without the construction and coordination of the teams contributing to the effort.

Another example of an approach to team building is that used by Suzhou Industrial Park's IVT, the vocational college discussed earlier in this chapter. The college builds teams by linking experienced participants with new members. IVT decided that each project should keep "seed" people from previous projects to form the core of new projects. Successive projects then can recruit and cultivate new members, preparing them to move gradually up the echelons in the institution. As one of the leadership observed, "Only if you build a [real] team can a good mechanism form; once a good mechanism is consolidated, then after new people come in, you can quickly integrate them into the team."

Whatever specific measures are used, if team building does not form part of the project effort, sustainability is difficult if not impossible. Participatory methods within both project and team best ensure that all involved feel invested in the work and the values underlying it.

Leverage for impact

Both grantees and donors need to consider how leverage can increase the impact of their work. Leverage means finding ways to attract more partners and resources in order to achieve better replication and sustainability.

Grantees can improve the leverage for their projects by paying careful attention to including the right stakeholders. There are many possible reasons for including a diverse range of stakeholders: bringing local knowledge in to inform the practical design of a project, or getting firm buy–in from those who must do the day–to–day work with only occasional visits from the core project team. An example would be the administration of questionnaires or collection of work diaries, to be handed over eventually to the core team. But careful attention also means considering what the project should ultimately achieve with respect to policy inputs or dissemination of results, and how leverage could be found for such goals.

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[56] There is no satisfactory English translation of this term. *Shiye danwei* have been variously called public service units, professional agencies, and several other terms. None of those terms adequately reflects the fact that these are organizations that have been spun off from government, are still state- or local government-controlled, and perform some public service or quasi-governmental functions, while needing to raise most or all of their resources on their own by charging fees or through other means.

Work under a series of grants intended to develop, test, and popularize an educational equity index for compulsory education provides us with examples of both mistakes and good choices with respect to leverage. The initial grant, to a university in Beijing, supported the development and testing of appropriate educational equity indicators, with the aim of providing a good policy option at a time when the national government was beginning to emphasize "balanced development" of compulsory education. The grantee arranged beforehand to work with officials in Education Supervision departments, only to discover too late that while those officials were interested in the work, they had no role in the policy process.[57]

Shortly after the conclusion of that first grant, Changsha Science and Technology University took up the task. With support from two successive grants for introducing participatory monitoring and evaluation in Hunan province, they started from the set of indicators developed by the Beijing team but adapted the methodology to suit the educational levels in many Hunan villages. Both the quality of the design and the approach to local stakeholders' participation were well thought out. The point with respect to leverage is that the project team began with good contacts in key quarters in Hunan, and in cooperation with the provincial Department of Education. The team also worked hard on cultivating the support of county education bureaux. As they observed in a report on the second grant,

> motivating the passion of policy makers to participate [in] the project is a vital guarantee for implementing the project efficiently. It is a very important part in the project to provide continuous and professional guidance and help to policy makers of county education bureaus on mastering the method of participatory monitoring. Therefore, we provided several ways for communication, such as emails, phone calls, seminars and unofficial interviews. These required them to actively take part in the project and conduct sound communication and interaction.

Thanks to the cooperation this won from county education departments, the team conducted successful tests of the monitoring system in three counties. They quickly wrote up the results, some of which were incorporated in the provincial government's trial document for evaluating balanced development in Hunan's compulsory education.[58] This is leverage: supplying the results of action research on just the right issue at just the right time to meet the needs of policy makers.

Donors themselves may exercise leverage by encouraging co–funding or follow–on

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[57] For other reasons beyond the grantee's control, although a draft set of indicators was prepared, they never were able to get them to the pilot testing phase.
[58] The full name of the document was Approach for Implementation of Supervision and Evaluation on Balanced Development of Compulsory Education in Counties of Hunan Province (On Trial) (No. 61, 2012).

funding by other donors, thereby improving the chances that grantees will be able to secure the funding they need to continue or expand their work. He Jin became aware of the potential for such leverage early on, when an officer from Plan International accompanied him on a grant monitoring visit and decided to add to the funding for the grantee. More about cross–donor leverage will be discussed in section C, Beyond Grantmaking.

Negotiation should focus on issues and goals rather than on funds

Prospective grantees often approach a grantmaker with a notion of something they want to do and the amount of funding they think they need to do it. He Jin's practice was not to discuss the money until well along in the negotiations.

An example of this point is the project "New 1001 Nights" conducted by the NGO Growing Home.[59] Perceiving an urgent and massive need among migrant parents' left–behind children boarding in rural schools, the Growing Home team had a good idea for how to address the need, and they wanted funding for it.

Anyone who has read this far in the chapter can imagine what came next: He Jin challenged them to analyze, like project doctors. Why do you want to do the project, and how do you know exactly what to do? What is the real problem? The cause? The source? How does the project match up with your organization's purpose, mission, and vision?

We discussed the project negotiations with He Jin and the director of Growing Home. The organization's director summarized: "Our starting point was [the kids'] living problems. He Jin helped us figure out where our value was. He encouraged us to think through our organization's strategy, not just to help the schools to develop." He Jin's prodding got them thinking about identifying their ultimate goal for the project, and an answer soon emerged: to get the work done in a way that would convince policy makers to act. Funding ensued.

That was not the end of it, however, because He Jin also encouraged the team to apply for funding from other sources, and as noted earlier, they have since secured significant funding from numerous government, business, and foundation sources.

3. Do the right thing in the right way

All of the foregoing might seem to address the behest to do the right thing in the right way, but in this context the behest has a more specific meaning: to work in a way that

[59] The project's main outlines and achievements were discussed in Chapter 4.

will help change the mindsets of key stakeholders while solving problems. For grantees and grantmakers, a fundamental precondition for lasting change, or for change that does not require unending battles, is to alter the mindsets of many actors. This can mean something as simple as raising awareness of issues previously overlooked, or as complex as changing the frame within which a problem is perceived. But in any case, it means that the grantmaker and many grantees must be ready for the long game. He Jin has formulated a set of guidelines that helped him and may help others change minds, not just things.

Tackle the root cause from different angles

Systemic problems are difficult to change; solutions can take years. But pilot experiments conducted together or sequentially, while testing solutions, can also better illuminate the root causes of a social problem if they come at the problem from different angles.

Many sets of grants made by He Jin fit this description. For example, when the national government decided to step up the development of vocational education, many hurdles stood between that decision and tangible benefits for the lives of young people who might enroll in vocational or technical programs. While schools proliferated and options expanded, too many potential students failed to enroll, too many students were unhappy with the education they got, and too many graduates failed to find employment. To address these problems, He Jin funded work on vocational education in both secondary and higher education, coming at the issue from different sides.

The roster of those grants is lengthy, but a small subset gives some idea of the different tacks taken by pilot measures addressing a very specific problem, post-graduation employment. Southwestern University of Economics and partners piloted a database system tool to help universities gather information on the labor market to tailor their programs to enhance graduates' employment prospects. Shanghai Better Education Development Center devised a program encouraging students to pursue social entrepreneurship in poor rural areas. Shunde Polytechnic responded to market demand for employees with more technology skills by exploring adding a year to its three-year vocational/technical program. Suzhou Industrial Park's IVT designed and tried out a new evaluation system to help itself and other schools adapt teaching and curriculum to rapidly changing labor markets.

Other subsets of grants explored better methods for evaluating teaching, teachers, and learning; methods for improving enrollment rates and/or reducing dropouts; and

vocational education for farmers in rural areas or those who had lost their farms to urbanization.

The approaches from different angles did not necessitate ruling out some causes of the main problem and pointing the finger at others. While some of the attempted solutions worked better than others, all the major factors—teaching, curriculum, management, education costs, students' expectations and knowledge, and shifting market demand—played a role in the vocational education conundrum. The main point was to figure out how to put together solutions that best served the students.

The solutions are a work in continual progress, as local economic conditions and national policies evolve. Those who want to design solutions must appreciate the multidimensional challenges they and their students face. That, in turn, means that those approaching the issues from different angles must communicate with each other and a wider audience. For communications among themselves, He Jin encouraged the grantees to share what they had learned. In some cases he funded workshops or conferences for that purpose (most of them bringing in key stakeholders, like government officials); in other cases the grantees used their own resources to network. That encouragement continued up to the end of his tenure, in a farewell workshop bringing together grantees from all over the country and many different fields.

Forward looking strategy is essential

Action research can be most effective when applied to a narrowly defined problem, but it must be driven by a grasp of strategic needs. One example in this regard can be drawn from a series of grants He Jin made to a team working on development of local universities and vocational colleges in relatively backward areas.

Two long-term development issues, one economic and one personal, were cast in high relief by the difficulties that fairly average schools began to face in these areas. The schools were crucial for local economic development, but many of them were in serious financial straits for lack of students. Young people from these areas, meanwhile, badly needed good education or they would be handicapped for their entire adult lives. Perceiving these problems, the founder of MyCos (an educational research company) and academic partners tackled the issue in a series of projects that, ironically, moved backward through the student career chain while looking forward towards solving the development problems. The team began by addressing post-graduation employment results, working with schools to gather hard data concerning their graduates. It soon became apparent that often schools did offer courses that could have helped many students prepare for the labor market, but information and counseling were deficient.

The team then worked with pilot schools to develop better information channels to help students choose appropriate programs and courses. Eventually, the team found that in the scramble to attract students, many schools were advertising themselves inappropriately, and recruiting far too many students for whom those schools were a poor choice. The team's attention then turned to a project on student recruitment in poor areas' schools.

Strategic constant: Patience wins

China has been undergoing simultaneous major social and economic transformation, in the course of which complex problems can intensify and seemingly defy solution for years or even decades. Ensuring equal educational access for the children of migrant workers is one such problem, and one for which He Jin's grantees have been working towards solution since the beginning of this century. Starting in 2001, he made one grant each year for a project grappling with the educational access and success of migrant and left-behind children.

Neither He Jin nor the grantees expected a quick solution to the problem. They did see progress. When national or regional policies offered a breakthrough, grantees worked hard to find ways to ease the implementation of the policies at the grass roots. The BASS project for improving migrant children's acceptance in public schools, mentioned earlier, is an example of that type of effort. When public school options were unavailable, others explored the potential to provide good education through private schools. When research was necessary to pinpoint bottlenecks or identify best practices, researchers at Beijing Normal University and China Rural Labor Development Institute and the National Institute of Education Sciences stepped up.

During the long years of these efforts, grantees often came together, sometimes convened by He Jin, sometimes in conferences they themselves organized, and sometimes collaborating, but always sharing and learning and gradually expanding public consciousness and increasing their impact. A central-level think tank might help inform policy changes through research. As a seasoned researcher from one such institution told us, "For policy advice, you have to have data or just shut up." But an NGO might also affect policy by producing a compelling example of approaches that highlight the problems children face, while demonstrating a powerful though partial solution that captures the public imagination, as we saw with the Growing Home case. In any case, steady patient work and the cumulative weight of the results help to win minds and build a consensus for change.

Strategic Balance: Playing safe vs. risk taking

Well-established organizations can make tempting grantees, particularly if the grantmaker has previously funded them. They are generally more adept and polished in putting together projects and proposals; their capacities and achievements and staff are known quantities. There may be so many such potential grantees looking for funding that a grantmaker need never go looking for new and untested ones.



Fig. 5.4. "Dr. He's Methodology," from a presentation by a grantee in Chengdu

He Jin set himself the task of continually bringing in new grantees. The director of the Education Salon was only twenty-five and a recent college graduate when she went to He Jin in search of grant support. Most of the women's/gender studies grantees were new ones. At least a dozen NGOs got their first grants from him, including Western Sunshine, China Education Initiative, and Growing Home. Every year he tried to allot half of his grants to teams he had never funded before.[60] He also funded some uncommon or even highly unusual grantees, like the police college team in Hunan so inspired by activities surrounding the *nvshu* project that they proposed an art project in a women's prison. Or Hunan Television University, which conducted a successful

online vocational college program for Hunan farmers.

[60] The exception was in the final two years of his grantmaking, when the grantmaking focused on tying off and wrapping up work.

What is the merit in accepting and even actively looking for new grantees? Most of them spell a higher degree of risk, and certainly more time in negotiation and monitoring, than their more seasoned peers. But they also bring fresh ideas and new connections—and supporting them helps to expand the field of those working for social justice in education. A participatory approach in grantmaking, if one will: bringing a greater diversity of stakeholders into work on the common task.

C. Beyond Grantmaking

China's philanthropic sector did not exist at all until the reform era, and at first consisted only of "public foundations" set up or spun off by government and quasi-government agencies. Seven such foundations were formed in 1981, and their number grew slowly through the beginning of the new millennium. Approximately nine hundred public foundations had the stage to themselves at national and local levels when the State Council adopted the *Regulations on the Management of Foundations*, which took effect in June 2004. After that point, Chinese foundations developed on two separate tracks: "public" foundations (公募基金会), almost entirely those with government connections, and legally permitted to gather donations from the public; and "nonpublic" foundations (非公募基金会，often called "private foundations") which could not solicit donations from the general public but relied primarily upon donations from the wealthy individuals or enterprises that founded them (State Council 2004; Feng 2016).

The Chinese public has shown increasing interest in charitable giving since the turn of the century, and has donated large amounts in cash, clothing, and goods, especially in response to major emergencies. A growing number of the newly wealthy, including entrepreneurs, real estate investors, and performers and athletes, also began looking for ways to give back to society. Many contented themselves with making huge donations to public foundations, universities, and government. But approximately one in four of them created private foundations.[61]

The new private foundations have developed more rapidly than public ones in recent years. In 2010, their numbers were about equal; by 2011 private foundations outnumbered public ones. Their numbers have continued to increase at a more rapid clip, and by 2015 they outnumbered public foundations by more than two to one. (See Table 5.1.) However, as Feng notes, "in terms of the assets and use of charitable contributions, the public foundations still lead." (2015: 136)

[61] Not all donations by the wealthy have been fully voluntary; at times wealthy individuals and enterprises have come under intense pressure from local governments to donate, while at others they apparently considered it useful for their businesses' relations with government to be seen as giving generously. See Feng 2015.

Table 5.1. Growth of Chinese foundations, 2011 to 2015

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Public foundations	1218	1316	1378	1470	1548
Private foundations	1370	1686	2137	2610	3198
Total foundations	2614	3029	3549	4117	4784
Increase (%)	*18.8*	*15.9*	*17.2*	*16.0*	*16.2*
Registered with MoCA	183	199	216	227	202
Total donations from society (billion *yuan*)	21.97	30.57	20.29	37.43	43.93

Source: Minzhengbu (Ministry of Civil Affairs/ MoCA), *Shehui fuwu fazhan tongji baogao* [Statistical report on development of social services], annually 2012 to 2016.

Despite the rapid growth of both foundations and giving, the foundation sector in China could be considered underdeveloped compared to the United States. Approximately 2 percent of the US GDP goes to charitable donations every year; in China, which now has the world's second largest economy, and more billionaires than the US (596 to 537),[62] total donations for 2011 came to less than 0.2 percent and the rate has probably not risen significantly since. Aside from the fact that the US is something of a global outlier in both charitable giving and number of private foundations, observers offer several reasons for the still relatively low development of China's philanthropic sector. These include public distrust of fledgling civil society or nongovernmental organizations (CSOs or NGOs, including those GONGOs that have spun off from government), the state of regulatory infrastructure, lack of tax incentives, and the fallout of some major scandals over misuse of donated funds by public foundations.

Such factors can help explain why the wealthy often prefer to donate through their own foundations, and why those foundations usually function as operating foundations (conducting projects themselves) rather than as grantmaking ones. Again, this is the reverse of the situation in the US. Reinforcing that tendency, wealthy donors are leery of the still low capabilities of most NGOs in China's still nascent civil society sector, and prefer to keep management of projects under close control. Those who are inclined to move into grantmaking have difficulty finding professional staff for it, because so few Chinese professionals as yet have experience or training in this area.

[62] Riley 2015.

In view of the factors impeding more rapid development of China's philanthropic sector, the Ford Foundation's Beijing office around 2000 began supporting exploratory research and meetings on charitable law and administration. By 2005, the foundation began funding grantees working to build better public awareness of philanthropy and to create some initial standards and assessment approaches for corporate and private philanthropy. Around the same time, it also supported national conferences on charity and related activities largely aimed at helping to build the capacities of new Chinese foundations. The office helped several foundations arrange study visits to the United States to learn more about the operations of several US foundations and of the Foundation Center there. Potential foundation founders, and leading staff of some existing Chinese foundations, also approached the office to learn more about how the Ford Foundation did its work in China. Some of the Chinese foundations expressed the aim of becoming "the Chinese Ford Foundation," but for many the main driver may simply have been to understand from the inside how a grantmaking foundation worked. In response to that interest, the Beijing office in 2008 began hosting an annual Open Day for Chinese foundations, with presentations on subjects including program strategies' structure and implementation; negotiation, administration, and monitoring of grants and projects; and financial management of grants. The Open Days began with just one Chinese foundation; the number of foundations attending grew quickly, however, and the interest outstripped the capacity of the office's conference room.

It was in this context that He Jin began a series of activities for Chinese donors (especially, private foundations and corporate social responsibility officers) that have had a significant cumulative impact among both donors and grantees. Two major, related sets of activities are of note here: a practice, begun in 2005, of inviting other donors, NGOs and researchers to accompany him on field visits for grant negotiation and monitoring; and the hosting of an Education Donors' Roundtable which has evolved into a more institutionalized and generalized China Donors' Roundtable. In addition, he responded to invitations from philanthropy programs at universities and other organizations to lecture and conduct workshops on strategic grantmaking. Secretaries–general and other leading staff of many Chinese foundations participated in one or more of these types of activities.

The field visits began when Plan International and some of its local partners in northwest China wanted to learn how to use modest seed funds to mobilize people and resources for greater impact. In 2005, He Jin took some of them along when he visited potential or current grantees. In many other subsequent field visits, other donors and NGO participants accompanied He Jin. They were invited not just as passive observers, but as participants in the proceedings, in order to enhance learning on everyone's part. A side

benefit for grantees was to introduce them to more possible donors. Sometimes joint funding by Ford Foundation and another donor grew out of these visits; in other cases, grantees were able to secure later funding for their work from donors they first encountered with He Jin.

Exact numbers are not available, but at least several dozen Chinese foundations, CSR representatives, and other organizations have participated in these trips. We were fortunate to be able to talk with a handful of those, including two foundations' leaders, who had traveled and participated in several such trips. One had started as early as 2012; another, as late as 2015.[63]

Some of the observations they made fit neatly with the principles and approaches discussed earlier in this chapter. One donor said he especially appreciated He Jin's clear values and his making sure potential grantees understood those.

Donor–observers also considered that He Jin's guidelines were crucial to get people to think through and adjust their plans before they implemented anything. One remarked that this explained the numerous discussions held with each grantee: "Each time is from a different angle. Each person has to objectively figure it out." Another of the donors focused on how grantees learned in the process of repeated negotiations:

Generally people start with a very limited notion of the projects, often not very practical plans. He Jin gets them to think it through again. It's a kind of participation that is educational. Often he's not talking about the grant, but about analyzing the problem…. The [grantee] may rewrite the proposal repeatedly....

Another participant in this discussion remarked on He Jin's unflagging patience in making sure everyone's views are elicited. In a subsequent meeting, the same person remarked, "Dedication, patience, affection—we realize these are essential preconditions for grantees to accept the challenges. You need real trust for partnership."

How did the participant–observation help new donors? As one put it,

His methods aren't necessarily the same as ours, but his principles are…. If you're working this way you would naturally arrive at the principles eventually, but this has accelerated our learning.

By observing He Jin, he added, he realized that the donor–grantee relationship was not an "exchange" (money for project work), but rather a common cause (*gongtong shiye*).

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[63] As much as possible, I took verbatim notes in this meeting, but the wording in the quotations that follow in this section may not be precisely correct.

Another summarized the effect on him:

My impression from watching him in the field—this has affected my notion of impactful projects or work. Now I don't look at whether it's "correct" or "incorrect," but whether it really changes things. A lot of projects for disadvantaged groups really lack this kind of value standpoint, which affects their methods. A lot of projects are just one-sided, emphasizing [only] one interest.

Two others present at this discussion made a point about stakeholders' involvement. One emphasized his conclusion from observing He Jin in discussions with grantees: the funder must understand the logic of the various starting points. It was essential to understand the interests driving the grantee and relevant stakeholders. As that donor noted, everyone has somewhat different values that come from starting points that derive at least in part from their situations. For example, universities may not make students' needs a priority because "colleges don't get money from students; they get it from above." Another noted, "We hadn't realized how important it was to have the input of all stakeholders, rather than just going out to 'help people.'"

These comments came from a very small sample of those who accompanied He Jin on field visits. However, they may provide a fairly representative sampling of what other donors learned from the opportunities he offered, and judging by the numbers who went repeatedly, they judged what they learned significant and valuable for their work.

The Education Donors Roundtable (EDR) that began in 2008 provided a different but useful venue for discussion, sharing, and learning among donors, both foreign and domestic, but mostly domestic. Initially, He Jin launched the EDR to help foundations concentrating on education to improve their own capacities and to interact with NGOs working on education.[64] These were lively and well attended sessions.

In 2013, EDR transitioned into the China Donor Roundtable (CDR) program, implemented by the Effective Philanthropy Research Center of the Social Resources Institute. That center shared the values and objectives of the education program grants under Ford Foundation and five other local foundations. Since then, CDR has gone beyond the field of education, and has begun playing a critical role helping local grantmakers learn and partner with each other. Among its goals:

[64] About eight foundations participated, including three enterprise foundations formed by Xinlang, Sohu, and Xin Dongfang.

the first is to provide training to the leaders and staff of domestic funding foundations so that they can do their job properly; the second is to cultivate a team of professionals who can provide technical assistance to the domestic foundations; and last but also the most important is to come up with a set of rules … for the philanthropic field so that the organizations working in the field can learn, improve and perfect themselves continuously.[65]

Underlying these goals was a determination to help Chinese donor organizations and NGOs identify principles and practices most suited to the Chinese context, reflecting on their own and others' experience.

Until 2015, CDR operated through the joint efforts of several organizations. At the end of 2015, the cofounders and the secretariat team of CDR decided CDR should become an independent organization, with the mission of serving the domestic donor community in exploring effective funding to solve social issues. Since then, CDR has been providing services in three regions: Beijing, the Yangzi River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta, with a cluster of twenty to thirty local foundations and funding agencies in total. CDR's functions include three different kinds of approaches with its partners, depending on their needs:

a. promoting a peer learning community, developing learning objectives and plans relevant to their work;

b. consulting for improvement of grantmaking strategies and plans; and

c. building bridges for further partnership among local grantmakers according to specific needs.

Thus far, CDR has made significant headway in training domestic grantmakers and building the professional team who can fulfill the functions listed.[66] He Jin has supported the CDR team to build its own capacities to provide better service for grantmaking members of the roundtable; he has also provided training and tutorials for new local grantmakers.

These contributions were undertaken as efforts well beyond those expected of a program officer, with an eye towards improving the development of Chinese

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[65] Personal communication, He Jin.
[66] Because of CDR's experience and expertise in this arena, and because many grantees already knew and trusted CDR, members of CDR's staff were selected to conduct or participate in interviews made in preparation of this report, as well as in reviewing some of the documentation.

philanthropic organizations. By supporting the organizational development of CDR as well, he has helped form an institutional resource for nurturing new donor organizations.

The goal of assisting development of donor rules and best practices for Chinese foundations requires a longer–term effort, but the principles and approaches that He Jin formulated for his grantees and shared with many counterparts among domestic donors provide a good starting point for exploration and discussion through CDR and beyond.

This chapter constitutes an effort to contribute to that exploration and discussion by outlining the principles He Jin applied in working with grantees in the field of education. As both he and some of those who accompanied him as participant–observers have emphasized, not all of those principles are necessarily appropriate for all grantmakers or all grantees in China, nor—even if the same principles are applied—would it necessarily be appropriate to apply them in the same way. But they do provide a sound beginning for thinking critically about what makes an effective project, an effective team, and an effective donor.

FORDFOUNDATION

VI.

CASE STUDIES

A. Learning to Fish: Pathways to Higher Education (PHE)

The Ford Foundation started Pathways to Higher Education (PHE) as a ten-year global initiative in 2001. Pathways began at a juncture when higher education in many parts of the developing world was undergoing rapid expansion. The challenge, in that situation, was to "support efforts that transform higher education institutions… to enable greater numbers of poor, minority, or otherwise underrepresented students to obtain a university degree." A $50 million commitment from the foundation's headquarters budget supported the initiative.[67] Grantmakers in the field offices provided additional funds from their own budgets.

Ultimately, Pathways directly funded work in more than 125 colleges and universities. Twenty-one countries had participating programs, including Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Mexico, Russia, and Vietnam (Chang 2008). By 2008, more institutions in China participated in the program than in any other country except Brazil.

The PHE programs in each country were shaped to fit unique national situations and needs. The Brazilian program, for example, especially emphasized programs tailored to Afro-Brazilian and indigenous students. Some programs worked on encouraging students from disadvantaged groups to consider higher education and to prepare them for entrance exams, application processes, and so on, while also supporting them once they entered the university.

Whatever the particular shape each program took, all shared the focus on working with institutions of higher education to help them "transform their policies, classroom practices, missions, curricula, and daily operations so that more students from marginalized groups enter and graduate from universities" (Ford Foundation 2008). Institutions' support for disadvantaged students pointed towards improvements in concrete areas such as admissions, curriculum and courses, faculty training in diversity-sensitive methods, and student support services; and to greater inclusiveness in arenas such as faculty diversity, institutional culture, and awareness that could contribute to "a growing willingness to develop mechanisms to improve opportunities for underrepresented students" (Chang 2008). Such measures were expected to result in higher rates of admission, enrollment, and graduation for disadvantaged students.

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[67] This contrasts with the far higher sum that the Ford Foundation allocated for the International Fellowship Program, which sent fellows abroad from their home countries for graduate study. More detail on that program is provided above in Chapter 4.

Fig. 6.1. What is PHE?

Poster from weibo post, Sichuan Normal University PHE project team.

1. PHE in China: An overview

He Jin represented China on the global team for the PHE initiative, helping to shape its general goals and outlines. In 2002, he made the first of several grants for the Pathways program in China. The final PHE–related grant ended in 2013. This section provides an overview, while those following go into detail on PHE phases.

The social need behind the PHE China program stemmed from the huge expansion in college and university enrollments after 1998. Nationally, student enrollments increased by 165 percent from 1998 to 2002; by 2004 they would increase by 291 percent compared to 1998. The rapid expansion especially stressed local and provincial higher education institutions in China's interior. Those were more poorly funded and had poorer physical plant than those nearer the coast. The increased enrollments brought in a different mix of students, including many from disadvantaged families—rural, poor, national minority. At the same time, students and their families had to bear a large portion of the total cost of college education, which meant financial stress for the less prosperous. Another heavy, though less tangible, burden for students from

disadvantaged backgrounds was their relatively poor preparation, whether academic, psychological, or cultural, for the demands of college life.

The national government had already recognized the need to address the developmental lag of China's western region.[68] Incomes in western China cities and towns were considerably lower than the national average. Rural incomes were even lower. In 2000, for example, rural households in Guizhou reached only 61 percent of the national average per capita income for rural households, and less than a third the level of the prosperous rural areas of coastal Zhejiang province. Many colleges and universities in western China reported that over a third of their students came from poor families, and as many as 10 to 18 percent from extremely poor households. Some institutions estimated that over half their students were poor. For many universities, although some scholarships were available, selection procedures often placed poorer students at a disadvantage. Student loans depended on banks, which frequently discriminated against poor applicants.

The financial challenge for students in western China is thus obvious. Technological conditions in rural western China were also poorly developed. Students there had far less access to mobile phones and computers. In addition, for many students from minority nationalities, Chinese was a second language, and they faced a handicap in using *putonghua* for communication in classes or with classmates.

While students, teachers and university administrators felt the need for solutions, the major national policy for development of the western regions provided a favorable context. The government was pledged to provide more resources to find solutions, and improving poor students' success in college[69] and in finding employment could help them and their families pull out of poverty, while also fueling the development of the region.

These factors all contributed to He Jin's decision to focus the PHE program on western China, seeking to benefit poor students, and particularly women and national minority students. The point, however, was not to alleviate their immediate economic difficulties—to give them fish, as the old Chinese proverb says—but to help them, their teachers, and the school administrators, learn how to solve their problems as they developed their capacities: to learn how to fish.

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[68] The western region, as defined in China's 西部大开发 policy, included ten western provinces or autonomous regions, and the western portions of Hunan and Hubei.
[69] Note that the term "college" in this section sometimes is used as shorthand for both colleges and university. In any case, the educational institutions discussed here should be understood to refer to degree-granting institutions of higher education teaching students at the undergraduate level.

Over the course of the ten years of grantmaking, a total of $7,898,100 went to the PHE China program. That is far beyond the scale of most of the foundation's grants in China, but given the scale of the challenge, the use of the funds had to be designed carefully. The grants were structured to make best use of both top–down and bottom–up approaches, and they progressed through three phases. At their core, all phases revolved around building schools' institutional capacities to serve disadvantaged students; the later phases added further elements as they proved necessary or the conditions for them matured. The basic notion was to launch pilot experiments which, if successful, might be replicated at other institutions or scaled up and institutionalized with government support.

All of the grants went to a single institution, which was responsible for overall planning and supervision, and which made subgrants to colleges and universities through a rigorous application process, and followed up with training, site visits, audits, monitoring, and meetings and conferences to share experiences and expand partnerships.

The Institute for Environment and Development (IED) received the grants for Phases I and II of PHE. Partway through Phase II, IED merged into the Fuping Vocational School; the balance of the Phase II grant was regranted to Fuping, which received the subsequent grants for Phase III as well as for a midterm evaluation by a third party, and for networking meetings with PHE global partners. In what follows, since IED became a part of Fuping, all references will be to Fuping; it should be understood, however, that IED was the grantee of record before Sept. 2006.

Fuping, before beginning each phase and then during its execution, consulted with a National Advisory Board consisting of members from academia, government, journalism, and the nonprofit sector, with a wide range of expertise and experience related to the program. The board's advice resulted in some modifications in the shape of the program and its implementation. Fuping also brought in the services of experts beyond the board, who, along with implementation team members from Fuping, provided training of subgrantees in specific matters such as project design and preparation of applications, psychological health services, and participatory methods. Some academic experts also prepared research papers that assisted PHE efforts (for example, a study of student loan program options).

At the beginning of each phase, Fuping invited applications from institutions meeting the basic criteria for that phase.

For Phases II and III, some of the preparatory work with prospective subgrantees began before conclusion of the previous phase, which allowed smoother transitions between phases. Site visits by the implementation team served several functions: monitoring of the progress of subprojects designed by the subgrantees, on–the–spot feedback, and sometimes, early detection of emerging problems. Table 6.1 shows the participating universities in each phase, by province. Fuping made continuous efforts at improving the monitoring system in order to get regular and timely feedback from the partner universities—sometimes by temporarily increasing the size of its own team. It may never have found the perfect solution, as the following sections illustrate, but its reports discuss in detail the problems caught and solved, indicating that it succeeded in keeping track of an increasingly complex set of activities.

The midterm evaluation of the PHE program was conducted by a team at Beijing Normal University, and included site visits, administration of thousands of questionnaires, in–depth interviews, and review of the written record of documents from partner institutions. From the large number of partners, BNU chose a subset of fifteen project schools and two non–project schools for closer examination. The report, culminating a year's work for the evaluation team, identified many significant achievements of the program, identified some weak areas, and made recommendations for improvement in subsequent stages of work.

In Phase I, MoE and some provincial education bureaux (PEBs) participated informally, and observed the experiments with great interest. Starting with Phase II, the ministry and several PEBs participated formally, and the PEBs received subgrants in recognition of their contributions in convening discussions to share and publicize experiences. Their eager participation formed part of the foundation for the sustainability and replication of the PHE model. Also beginning in Phase I, Hewlett–Packard China provided some auxiliary support with computing and entrepreneurship activities and donations of equipment, which continued into Phase II. By Phase III, H–P pledged equipment valued at approximately US$250,000 to support the project; local governments pledged an additional US$500,000.

In addition to these partnerships, one remarkable feature of the PHE program in China was the proliferation of "extension" partners: schools that received no funding from the program, but were so impressed by PHE's achievements and so attracted by its methods that they generated their own programs and participated in the PHE network meetings. Table 6.2 shows the breakdown, by province, of the extension universities.

Table 6.1. Schools participating in PHE, phases I through III

PROVINCE/ REGION	*PHEI（2002–2005）*	*PHEII（2005–2008）*	*PHEIII（2009–2011）*
Yunnan Province	1. Yunnan Normal University 2. Yunnan Normal Institute		1. Yunnan University of Finance and Economics 2. Chuxiong Normal University
Guizhou Province	3. Guizhou Normal University 4. Guizhou Nationalities College 5. Qiannan Normal College for Nationalities		
Guangxi Zhuang minority Autonomous Region	6. Guangxi Normal University 7. Guangxi Teachers Education University 8. Guangxi University of Nationalities		
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region		1. Ningxia University 2. Ningxia Medical College	3. Ningxia University 4. Ningxia Medical University 5. Ningxia Teachers University
Qinghai Province		3. Qinghai Normal University 4. Qinghai Institute of Nationalities	6. Qinghai Normal University 7. Qinghai University of Nationalities 8. Qinghai Vocational and Technical College of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Science
PROVINCE/ REGION	*PHEI（2002–2005）*	*PHEII（2005–2008）*	*PHEIII（2009–2011）*
Hunan Province		5. Jishou University Shaoyang Institute	9. Jishou University
Sichuan Province		6. Sichuan Normal University 7. Luzhou Medical College	10. Sichuan Normal University
Shaanxi Province		8. Xi'an Institute of Technology 9. Shaanxi University of Technology	
Total	8	10	10

Table 6.2. Extension universities using PHE approaches to assist disadvantaged students

Province/Region	*Number of PHE extension schools*
Yunnan province*	19
Guizhou Province*	17
Guangxi Zhuang Nationality Autonomous Region*	20
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region*	13
Qinghai Province*	3
Hunan Province*	31
Sichuan Province*	31
Gansu Province	2
Chongqing Municipality	1
Total	**137**

* Provinces with formal participants in PHE Phase I or II; the formally participating schools are not included in these totals. The schools in Gansu and Chongqing began participating during Phase III.
NOTE: It is possible that more schools used PHE approaches but were not counted in this tally.

2. PHE I (2002–2005[70])

Phase I of Pathways aimed, in He Jin's words, to "enhance the capacities of institutions of higher learning in supporting disadvantaged students during their undergraduate years to attain higher levels of education." In order to provide sufficient nurturance to early pilots exploring new territory, the program started on a relatively small scale, targeting three of the poorest provinces in the western region: Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi. In all three, the focus was on teacher-training institutions (usually, normal colleges or universities) and national-minorities schools of higher education. Both types of institution had especially high concentrations of poor, rural, and minority students, the population of students most likely to need and to benefit from the PHE program. Eight schools in these provinces were chosen for the first phase.

[70] Phase I was originally planned to last twenty-six months, but was extended because the SARS emergency in 2003 delayed implementation on many campuses.

The major emphasis in this phase was on developing institutional resources—such as teaching skills, curricular materials, and student services and counseling tailored for the needs of disadvantaged students—and on supporting the growth of active, participatory student organizations. The participant universities' proposals outlined a variety of plans that reflected each institution's circumstances.

The first stage of the process was conducted meticulously, with a project planning workshop (aimed at capacity-building) held in Guizhou for representatives from the various schools, and then site visits to each of the eight universities. From the outset, He Jin and the implementation team stressed the importance of designing institutional plans that incorporated participation of all stakeholders—university leadership, teachers, and the students themselves. In an interview several years later, He Jin recalled the discussion process at one school, where at first only student leaders were mustered to talk to the team along with administrators and teachers. He insisted on hearing from ordinary students; but when they did come and spoke, it sounded like it had been scripted: all that anyone said was, "We need computers." In order to get at the real priorities, he used a game in which everyone, from top administrators down to ordinary students, wrote out their wishes on pieces of colored paper: red for their top wishes, yellow for second rank, and green for the third. The red slips showed where most thought most of the funds should go. Computers were not at the top of the list.

Each school had to prepare an action plan meeting a set of requirements connected with serving disadvantaged students, ranging from the provision of teachers qualified to help them, to counseling to help them develop self-confidence, to extracurricular activities that would build their capacities. Schools also needed to plan how to document the results of their activities and identify best practices, and they needed to plan for financial reporting. The implementation teams carefully scrutinized the proposals. Some of the problems spotted in those proposals were discussed with the national advisory board: mismatches between budget and activities, activity plans that were overly ambitious or too loosely conceived, wasteful equipment purchases, or activities not in accordance with Pathways principles. Schools were asked to redraft the proposals on the basis of feedback. Over several months in the fall of 2002, as acceptable proposals arrived, contracts were signed with the schools and they were able to launch their subprojects.

Over the following two years, as school administrations, teachers, and students pursued their schools' plans of action, the implementation team made two more rounds of site visits, conducted a Winter Camp for student leaders from the project schools to develop their participatory abilities and set up an eight-college action network. A meeting midway through the phase brought together project coordinators, administrators, and

teachers from the colleges along with PEBs' officers; a representative from the MoE was also invited. Scholars interested in research on the project were invited as well. This meeting reviewed some of the achievements (and problems) up to that point, and sparked exchange visits among teachers in the program. A closing workshop, held at Yunnan Normal University in December 2004, recognized three universities and sixteen subprojects chosen after an evaluation report by Prof. Kang Xiaoguang of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The three schools honored were Guizhou Normal University, Guangxi Normal University, and Guizhou Nationalities College. All eight universities had sponsored subprojects that won prizes at the workshop, and the list gives a good sense of the wide range of activities conducted:

a. Yunnan Normal University: Rapid Breeding of Flowers and Potatoes; Psychological Health Education; English Course for Poor Students

b. Dali College: Scientific Research Fund for Poor Students

c. Guangxi University for Nationalities: Computer Course for Poor Students; Mandarin Course for Poor Students

d. Guangxi Teachers' Education University: Services for Psychological Health; Family Education Center for Poor Students

e. Guangxi Normal University: Self-development Association; Services for Psychological Health

f. Guizhou Normal University: Poor Students Information Center; Good Heart Association

g. Guizhou Nationalities University: Administration Committee of Sons of the Mountains; Carve Out Activities

h. Qiannan Normal University for Nationalities: Social Service Group; Science and Technology Fans Association

Every school had a somewhat different experience in the program, but it is useful to look at one example in more detail. Guangxi Normal University,[71] one of the three with strongest performance in PHE I, began the project with as many as 45.5 percent of its students classified as poor and 18 percent as extremely poor. The school identified a daunting set of material, psychological, experiential disadvantages among poor students,

[71] This summary is based on Appendix 1 of the evaluation report by Beijing Normal University in 2008, and a case study in the Ford Foundation's 2008 brochure on Pathways I and II (Ford Foundation 2008).

as well as troubling indicators of their poor prospects for success in the job market. Poor students got involved in the project from the beginning, contributing to all stages of planning, from needs assessment to the choice of topics for training. The school's PHE plan called for eight subprojects, including training in English language, in *putonghua*, and in computer skills; partnerships in information and services for poor students to learn and assist each other in various different fields of study; psychological counseling and career counseling; a work–study program; and a management service for associations of poor students.

The last of these was a center run by students for students: offering information resources on work opportunities (full– or part–time, summer, or internships); providing photocopying services at rates poor students could afford and also creating on–campus jobs for some Pathways students. The center bolstered students' employment opportunities with services like training in interviewing, social skills, and career strategies, and organized job fairs on campus to bring students into contact with employers. The center began operation in 2003, and within several years had helped an estimated five thousand students find jobs. Other subprojects upgraded skills useful on the job market: more than seven thousand students had gone through the English training; more than five thousand, in *putonghua*; and two thousand, in computers. Thanks to such services and training, poor students who graduated in 2003 and 2004 found jobs at a rate of 93 to 94 percent—a couple of percentage points higher than the school's average, and far higher than the 60 percent rate for poor students before PHE began.

The psychological health services subproject at the university, which won one of the prizes at the closing workshop, enjoyed some local fame of its own. In addition to providing a counseling center staffed by a mixed team of student services personnel, psychology instructors, and students, the center created a website, ran courses on mental health, and staged an annual play on dealing with stressful social issues (roommate conflicts, for example) that drew audiences from other universities in the area.

The director of the university's Student Office lauded the PHE approach of "involving students from the very beginning of each initiative" as a regular part of the office's design of services, and the pilots were gradually institutionalized as part of the standard student services for the university. Impressed by the successes generated by this program, university and Guangxi local government authorities began to provide matching funds for PHE projects.

All three of the Phase I provinces organized conferences to publicize the PHE projects in their jurisdiction and to spread the word about the PHE method. Guangxi's provincial

government also circulated bulletins about best practices, and sponsored study tours. Publicity of this sort prompted some fifty more schools in the three provinces to adopt the PHE approach on their own campuses. The Ministry of Education decided, on the basis of the Phase I experiences, to partner formally with PHE in the next phases.

3. PHE II (2005—2008) and III (2009–2011)

Phases II and III of the PHE program raised successively higher goals, attracted new partners, moved into more provinces and regions, introduced new project emphases while strengthening older ones, and advanced gradually towards summing up and disseminating the results of the PHE work. Because of substantial continuity between the two, we treat them together here.

The grant for Phase II, which began in mid–2005, moved PHE up a level in three respects:

a. Adding ten schools in five more western China provinces (Sichuan, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, and Hunan) to design and pilot work using the PHE approach;

b. Adding two types of innovation to the previous three emphases: providing technical assistance to improve poor students' access to student aid; and taking a systemic approach reaching beyond higher education itself to other institutions that could play a role in poverty reduction for poor students; and

c. Promoting policy impact of innovations.

Phase III's grant identified three specific areas of effort closely related to those of Phase II. The first was financial: reform of policies regarding student–family loans as a key means of financial support. The second revolved around employment: engaging schools' administrations for curricular reforms oriented to prepare students for jobs or entrepreneurship, and local governments to find ways to encourage employment of poor students once they graduated. A third was to summarize and disseminate the experiences accumulated throughout the program and build a lasting network of faculty members.

In addition to the two major grants earmarked for these two phases, a substantial grant was made to support a comprehensive evaluation beginning midway through Phase II, and also supported two major study tours to institutions abroad and some intensive work on pilot student loan programs. Towards the conclusion of the Phase III grant, an additional grant was provided for an international workshop among global PHE partners,

to exchange what they had learned and explore collaborative possibilities, especially those sustaining PHE best practices. New formal partners moved in at the beginning of Phase III as well: local governments (whose work was essential for the student loan pilots) pledged to contribute US$500,000; and China Hewlett–Packard (HP), which had been collaborating with schools' PHE projects for some time, pledged to provide more equipment worth about US$250,000.

Our interest for the purposes of this case study is primarily on the participatory changes brought to and consolidated at the university level during Phases II and III, but we should first briefly note the work on reform in the student loan system, which deeply affected disadvantaged students but was largely conducted at the bureaucratic level, often off campus. In Phase II, PHE supported Peking University's Institute for Education Finance Research to begin research on educational loans. The institute also designed and conducted capacity building for the loan project team. Discussions ensued with stakeholders, including colleges, PEBs, the China National Development Bank, local banks, and an investment consulting company. The aim was to improve the availability of government–subsidized student loans and risk management for lenders, and to explore provision of student loans in their community of residence (i.e., their "source place") as well as through their colleges. Pilot projects began in Qinghai and Ningxia. Ningxia's PEB, together with the provincial Finance Bureau, set up a credit guarantee fund to help with implementation. MoE tracked the pilots' progress. By 2008, credit information systems were in place in five provinces, and MoE and the National Development Bank encouraged more provinces to consider supporting the source–place loans.[72] Under Phase III, work on student loans intensified, extending into Yunnan as well. The activities included county–based pilots on source–place loans, information systems useful for all stages of the process from identifying poor students to processing loans, and setting up experimental companies for issuing the loans.

During Phases II and III, more open procedures were followed in selecting schools and their projects. The information and proposal preparation process began somewhat before the formal completion of the previous phase. Representatives of PHE had made exploratory contacts with the five new provinces in 2003 and held an introductory seminar in 2004. The Students Department of MoE notified the PEBs and colleges about the PHE program, thereby encouraging their participation. The implementation team held a launch conference in Beijing attended by representatives from thirty colleges and eight PEBs. Experts on the financial aid system made presentations, and the implementation

[72] There are several points favoring the source-place loans, in particular, that the national treasury supports the fund cushioning lenders' risk; and colleges are relieved of the burden of checking student credit or recovering the loans. As with any policy, there are also some points against them. There is a great deal more to this story; those interested might want to consult 沈华，提高高校贫困生能力(PHE)的中国之旅, n.d., n.p.

team introduced the PHE II criteria and application procedures. Later, project planning workshops were held in all five provinces. These usually ran for about five days, covering topics ranging from log frame analysis to team building and project management. A total of sixteen colleges participated and made proposals. Ten of the sixteen were selected for PHE II funding, and after site visits to all ten, fifty-two subprojects at those institutions were approved. The PEBs formally participated in Phase II with policy research and some support for colleges' projects. Many of the same schools and the PEBs continued to participate in Phase III.

Rather than discuss projects topically, here we focus on the development of the PHE program at Sichuan Normal University, which participated in Phases II and III, and which to this day sustains lively projects, activities, and curriculum that grow out of the PHE experience.

At the beginning of Phase II, Sichuan Normal had a complement of poor students smaller than that of many west China colleges, but it was still sizable. The 2008 midterm evaluation report found that 20 percent of its students had less than 120 *yuan* per month for their living expenses. Ten percent had less than 100 *yuan*. Before applying for Phase II, the university interviewed more than a hundred poor students in depth, and chose the emphasis for its projects based on what those interviews revealed.

The four initial projects were:

a. charitable donation center,

b. mental health center,

c. professional skills center, and

d. scientific research and innovation center.

The student-managed charitable donation center collected used items (clothing and other items), books, and some cash donations. The books were sold and the money earned went to support the project. The center helped poor students in several ways: giving students coupons they could use to get donated items, providing work-study opportunities, and—since they managed the donation collections, store operations, and publicity by themselves—giving them opportunities to develop practical skills in management, finances, public contact, and more. In its second year of operation, the donation center set up a computerized management system and collected about twenty-five tons of books and fifty thousand items of clothing. When our evaluation team visited

the university in June 2016 for retrospective meetings about the PHE project experience, one of our team members found a donation center store still active and still identified with PHE (see Fig. 6.2).

The mental health center took a proactive approach on mental health and psychological skills. It arranged training for consultants and teachers, and for disadvantaged students who could team up to provide psychological services and delegate team members to attend conferences. It also arranged for psychological specialists to lecture on campus and provide some personal, group, or online consultations; and it publicized on campus for better understanding of mental health.

Fig. 6.2. Sichuan Normal charitable donations station, June 2016

A hand-written poster in the window says:
PHE PROGRAM IN SICHUAN NORMAL UNIVERSITY—WORDS WE WANT TO SAY

- Hi, everyone. I am Little Mumu. I have joined the big family of Secondhand Clothes Circulation Platform in May 2016. You may wonder why I am here. Let tell you the details then.
- I join here with a mission—to encourage everyone to show a little kindness to others. My owner will organize and clean up here at the end of every month, and will donate all the clean clothes and stationery to the people who really need them.
- We are here not aiming to earn much money, but to share and pass our sincere and genuine love and kindness out to others through this small platform. We want love to keep spreading in the country, all over the world.
- Look forward to every one of YOU joining us.

Photo and translation courtesy of Gao Rui.

The center for professional skills helped students upgrade their skills in language (English or Chinese) or computers; it also offered assistance with teaching methodology and skills for students who aspired to become teachers. The innovation center was set up to support poor students' scientific research. Students' proposals were reviewed and selected by an expert team; experts also held seminars while projects were underway, to help students with scientific research methods.

The BNU evaluation team reported after discussions with students in 2007 that many felt greater self–confidence and self–esteem, and less stigmatized by poverty. Students noted making new friends while working on PHE projects, and being more comfortable working in teams. Some were happy to have improved their skills in *putonghua*, planning, and other important areas.

Underpinning the enhanced support for students were deeper changes in the culture and institutional processes at the university. Instead of teachers handing out work–study opportunities, students came up with their own work plans to submit to the project office, and got involved in generating and assigning work–study jobs. The charity donation center, for example, created 207 such jobs in the second year of the project. Students felt part of a cooperative, equal environment. Teachers involved in the program also felt valued, albeit often overworked. The project leadership was committed to providing frequent training opportunities for both teachers and students on project teams.The university and the government provided substantial institutional support to ensure the sustainability of efforts to improve support for poor students. Various service centers and student organizations inserted provisions for supporting poor students in their rules. The university assigned a space of over 100 square meters for the charitable donation center, and allocated space for other projects as well as an office for the project team. The university secured permission from Sichuan's PEB to allocate 10 percent of its budget "to help poor students." The university's implementation team also made PHE part of their research; by the second year of Phase II they had applied for and received funding from the National Social Sciences Fund for "Strategic Research on Student Poverty and Anti–poverty in Schools of Higher Learning in Western China."

Especially significant for sustainability of the PHE approach, the program at Sichuan Normal moved towards a model of "education, plus environment, plus practice," an approach that would prove particularly useful under PHE III. Some support from international companies by the end of Phase II offered combinations of learning and work opportunities for poor students. One set of supports came from Chengdu Ito–Yokado Co., Ltd. The company established a scholarship at the university for poor students; in addition, it offered one hundred "practice post" jobs for poor students,

dispatched company staff to give lectures for poor students, and held other occasional activities for the students.

Another type of assistance came from a grant Fuping won from China H–P in 2009, which funded "H–P HELP Centers" at several schools participating in PHE II, of which Sichuan Normal was one. These centers provided computers and printer/scanners for students' use; they also informed students about entrepreneurship and sought to build their entrepreneurial enthusiasm.

The university was poised from the beginning of PHE Phase III to move in a somewhat different direction. While maintaining some of the Phase II projects, the university's PHE program put substantial efforts into one of the main priorities of the new phase: "multi–sector cooperation for developing student talent" through curricular reforms. These reforms stood out in two academic majors: economic management, and preschool education.

In the reform of the economic management major, the pedagogical approach changed to incorporate simulation exercises in class. This meant creating different sets of exercises for each year of the major. Using simulations effectively requires training, so six instructors went to technology universities in Beijing and Shanghai to learn how to use a "comprehensive simulation practice platform," and how to design and teach courses using the simulation approach. Others went to two software companies to learn the more technical side of simulation platforms. A number of tours of relevant enterprises were organized and partnerships expanded.

Two projects in the preschool education major used the new curricular approach, both of which began in fall of 2011. One focused on developing better understanding of young children's educational needs through building a "teaching resource bank," familiarizing majors with teaching approaches and giving them internship opportunities. The other aimed at acquainting the majors with the educational philosophy and teaching practices of the Waldorf School.

Two other new projects encouraged students to learn about and engage in entrepreneurship. One project was an entrepreneurship support project set up by the university's Youth League Committee, which rolled out a fairly comprehensive set of tools: courses in entrepreneurship, for learning both general skills and cases in certain sectors; a support center for poor students to help muster resources and policies from across the university to assist them with entrepreneurial efforts; entrepreneurial services that included internships and follow–up; contests for entrepreneurship in several milieux (students going back to their home areas, community entrepreneurship plans, and

entrepreneurship "challenges" for students on campus and for graduates in the province). In addition, a fund was set up at the university level to help students starting their own businesses. The second major project, on "green entrepreneurship," targeted entrepreneurship for "ecological agriculture." Students could learn and practice through a student green entrepreneurship club. A multidisciplinary group of teachers constituted a tutor team and offered elective courses combining standard entrepreneurship texts with study of Sichuan's eco-agriculture. The project also invited five mentors from appropriate enterprises to work with students one-on-one.

At the same time, the university contributed significantly to the work on improving student loan systems. Sichuan's PEB committed to developing systems for information management for the loans, and the university executed the work. After a project survey, the team defined the system as a "poor-student information management system" to collect relevant information on poor students, their applications for financial aid, approvals from departments and university level; and for management, analysis, and reporting of data. The university team designed the system, trained those using it and provided documentation. The system, launched in 2010, was used province-wide, and by the end of Phase III had gone to ninety-two colleges.

Not surprisingly, Fuping's final report at the conclusion of Phase III identified Sichuan Normal as one of four program teams at participating schools who were "devoted to continuously promoting the innovations in higher education…."

Upon our team's visit to Sichuan Normal in June 2016, the PHE project and university leaders had found a route to sustainability as well. Several years after the Ford Foundation funding for PHE ended, PHE-identified projects remained active on the university's two campuses. Although these did not all have the same configurations as the earlier projects, their emphases and their methods were similar: they aimed at developing professional skills and social skills, maintaining the charity donation center, and participating in the H-P entrepreneurship learning (HELP) programs. In addition, several projects emphasized providing services for public welfare: tutoring and teaching off campus during vacations and weekends, making charitable donations, and conducting activities in concert with the China Poverty Alleviation Foundation. The more experienced students and alumni can mentor new students, either face to face or (a new feature) using QQ groups.

Students were at the heart of all these projects, and we heard from many of them at our meeting. The campus counted an active core of about 120 students, but many others benefited from the projects they ran. They emphasized what they had gained from the projects—self-confidence, teamwork skills, expressive abilities, general capacities to

connect better, and a network that might last them a lifetime—but they also displayed a strong sense of social responsibility. One spoke of enjoying the opportunity to connect with more organizations working for the public welfare. Another emphasized that when publicizing a project, it was better not just to publicize one's own project but rather to emphasize and publicize the PHE *approach*.

Teacher representatives at the meeting affirmed that PHE's approach still forms the core of the projects. Trainings, said one, shouldn't allow teachers to lecture more than about 10 percent of the time; the rest should be participation. Another underlined the point of the projects and of students' responsibility for them: "I don't care about 'results;' even if it fails, it still has educational value!" One teacher observed that on the whole, poor students who had participated in PHE were more self-confident and better self-starters than students from more privileged backgrounds.

4. Assessment

Those who participated in or encountered PHE during the ten years of Ford Foundation support, or in the time since then, will have different perspectives and hence different judgments depending on where they sat; the view will also differ because of different institutional circumstances. With such a long-lived, complex, and rapidly changing program, it is hard to imagine one generalization about the program's impact that everyone could agree with except, perhaps, this one: it depends.

The midterm evaluation conducted by the Beijing Normal University team provides us with the most comprehensive and rigorous assessment. That work took a year, a large team, thousands of survey questionnaires, dozens of interviews, and review of a hill, if not a mountain, of documents. Our team's charge was different, the resources and time far more limited, and we had to review many other programs and projects, so for those who want depth, it would be best to refer to that BNU report. We revisit some parts of that report to illustrate just how ambitious the PHE program was, and how many points it touched.

From a macro perspective, even by 2008 it was evident that the program had made an impact at many levels. Figure 6.3 provides a schematic diagram used by the 2008 evaluation team to show those levels and some of the desired impacts. Some of those, as should be clear from the body of this case study, were already well along by the time of the midterm evaluation, and others followed—including some not expressly intended when the program began. The redesign of student loan systems, for example, came to the fore as an issue only after the PHE program was well underway. But the positive

effects of the program in addressing student poverty, which university officials and government officials from MoE down to the PEBs observed by 2006, made it possible for the PHE framework to pivot to address the policy needs. Business organizations with a social responsibility inclination—major actors still largely latent in the mixbefore



Fig. 6.3. Main PHE stakeholders and developments (ca. 2007)

Source: PHE Evaluation Team, Pathways to Higher Education II (PHE II) in China: Midterm Evaluation Report (Beijing Normal University, January 2008).

2006—could be attracted in part because of the success of the program at the university level, and in part because of its effectiveness in building a broad range of partnerships.

Some of the changes at the university level were evident in the 2008 team's summary of survey responses on PHE impact on both institutions and institutional culture, with respect to poor and disadvantaged students. Those are shown in Table 6.3, to provide a flavor of the kinds of changes already in motion.Not everything worked well in every institution, even while the foundation's funding continued. Numerous plans for subprojects had to be redesigned, or scrapped completely, when they were reviewed by the implementation team or the advisory board, or when site visits revealed problems.

Table 6.3. PHE impact on institution and culture of universities

Changes Effected	*% of respondents*
Paid more attention to poor students	66.9
Changed perception of working with poor students	66.1
Improved work methods	59.4
Issued new policies to support poor students	23.5
Increased support for works of helping poor students	39.0
Increased beneficiary coverage	45.0
Expanded channels for poor students to access resources	51.4
Established new office to help the poor students	22.3
Increased new staff to handle poor students' affairs	27.5
Identified direction and focus of poor students' support	37.5

Source: PHE Evaluation Team, PHE in China: Evaluation (Presentation by ISDPP, Beijing Normal University, 13 Nov. 2007). The presentation states that these are preliminary figures, but we found no later revision of them.

During Phase II, one university had to be dropped from the program after its problems in complying with guidelines (particularly with financial reporting) proved too difficult to

resolve.[73] The Fuping implementation team had to put a great deal of effort, probably much more than anticipated, into guiding schools through the design and application process, and then through monitoring and reporting.

Of course, as anyone who has managed a project probably knows, *something* is almost always bound to go wrong. Sometimes it can stem from a seemingly minor problem. For example, a persistent roof leak over Sichuan Normal's simulation center laboratory delayed implementation of the new economic management curriculum by several months. Sometimes, the hitch can be considerably more costly. The instability of university teams proved problematic: in Phase I, five of the university vice-presidents responsible for PHE moved from their positions after their schools' acceptance to the program, and it took time to familiarize their successors with the program and its importance before their universities got the projects moving. The implementation team itself underwent some significant and sudden changes (including a change in leadership) as Phase II began, and that, too, affected the progress of the work. After the conclusion of the foundation funding, changes in the top leadership of a university, or even of a department, might undermine the quality of reforms that had seemed well institutionalized.

Might things have gone better? Even in 2007, many of the teacher participants in the program felt at a disadvantage because they put so much time and effort into tasks for which the university's evaluation system gave them no credit. Some reminded us of that disadvantage in 2016. Can new curricular and teaching approaches be institutionalized solidly when there is no reward for building them? Questions also arose early in the program, and persisted, concerning the wisdom of singling out poor students as the sole beneficiaries of the PHE-supported projects. Did this stigmatize poor students even further? Or arouse animosities from better-off students? But would throwing open the projects to all students dilute the already scanty resources available for poor students, while placing them at a disadvantage when among their wealthier peers, before they had gained their own self-confidence?

Ultimately, questions like these may have to be perennially revisited. Nonetheless, the achievements of the program are enormous: in helping to shape more effective national policies, in making the plight of poor students more visible and potential remedies more feasible, in building public awareness of the many facets of poverty, in fostering a spirit of cooperation and equality and participation among students and teachers, and in contributing a large cohort of young people who now approach problems in an entirely new way. Because of the painstaking efforts that went into shaping the program,

[73] This was one of the weaker institutions, which had been included initially in the hope of raising its capacities; experience however showed that a basic minimum of institutional capacity was necessary if schools were to meet the PHE program expectations.

because of the commitment to solving the problems of poor students that can be seen among participants ranging from national officials on down to teachers in the classroom, because of well–conceived integration of research and action, experimentation and dissemination, because of networking among campuses, government at many levels, and enterprises, and because students themselves did indeed learn to fish, PHE ultimately contributed to a wide range of sustained change.

B. Seeking truth from facts: Rural Education Action Project (REAP)

Where should one start in building the foundations for equal access to education? The deficits in access for poor rural children are very clear. A poor rural child has only one–eighth the chance an urban child has of getting into any college; one–thirteenth the chance of getting into a four–year college, and 1/21 the chance of entering an elite college. In 2013, about 90 percent of children in large cities went to secondary (senior middle) school; in poor rural areas, only 37 percent. Many drop out in junior high; between grades 7 and 9, as many as 30 percent of poor rural children drop out of school.

The Rural Education Action Program (REAP) has grown out of the desire to close this gap. The reason that poor rural areas lag behind, as the REAP partners emphasize, is not lack of investment, or poor teaching, or poor curriculum, or low demand. Much of the problem stems from poor rural students' lower cognitive development from the time of elementary school, or even before. A large part of that problem may in turn be traced to poor nutrition (L. Zhang 2016). If it is possible to prove the effect of poor child nutrition, demonstrate the most effective ways to remedy it, and show the difference that better nutrition makes for children's chances in school, then better policies could ensure that children's access to schooling leads them to success in learning.[74]

This is a simple proposition, but getting to the point of being able to act on it is a considerable challenge. REAP provides us with a case for understanding not only a new approach to policy research, but also the steps that necessary to build a team that can make that approach work in a complex environment.

[74] Nutritional deficits are not the only obstacle to poor rural children's success in school, and REAP has also addressed other health and developmental issues using methods similar to those discussed in this case study.

1. Randomized control trials and the team conducting them

Laboratory science has set the standards for rigorous research: to prove or disprove a hypothesis through an experiment, the researcher must ensure that all conditions are carefully measured and controlled, and that only one condition is changed before results are measured. Only then can solid conclusions be drawn about causation.

Policy researchers face a challenge the laboratory scientist never has to confront. In policy research, it is impossible to ensure laboratory conditions. The policy researcher cannot simply make a change and then measure the difference: in the real world, many different factors are changing simultaneously, sometimes in different directions. Certainly, if she takes the route of measuring the baseline, changing one practice or resource, and measuring the difference, she can at least demonstrate that a change has occurred. But she cannot be sure the change resulted from the intervention, unless she can prove that things did not change, or not as much, in places not making the intervention. For policy research, without a *control* group in which no intervention occurs, we lack scientific proof that the intervention is what made the difference (rather than, say, rising incomes or improved living conditions).

The policy researcher must also take care in choosing the sample for intervention and control groups. Is that sample (school, community, group of people) representative and typical? Is the control group essentially identical to the experimental group? If not, the differences between the samples, rather than the intervention itself, may be what affected the outcome. So the researcher must be careful to do a *random* selection of the members of the control group and the intervention group. Then he may run the *trial* experiments that can show whether, and how much, a particular policy intervention may affect the problem in question.

The methodology that takes all of these conditions into account is called ***randomized control trials (RCT)***.

RCT, to be effective for policy research, places high demands on the researchers. They must, of course, go through the steps that researchers ordinarily follow: define the problem for study, shape hypotheses, define the intervention, select the samples, make baseline measurements, conduct the intervention, make post–intervention measurements on both experimental and control group samples, and analyze the results. To do all of that, they must have expert skills. But to do this in a situation where many people with different interests, knowledge, and concerns must cooperate with the researchers if there is to be any experiment at all—*that* is a major challenge. It requires patient groundwork and close coordination with many outside the research team who do not

share the expertise or the goals of the researchers; and sometimes it also requires rapid adjustments to unexpected events (including new policies). A second challenge is to communicate the results clearly in a form that is understandable and persuasive for decision makers who have many competing problems to cope with.

The REAP team has pioneered the introduction of the RCT method in research on educational issues in poor rural areas of China, particularly in the northwest. The Education portfolio supported a series of projects conducted by the REAP team in Gansu, Shaanxi, Ningxia, and Qinghai. The team brought together researchers from universities in five northwestern provinces working together with scholars and students from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and from Stanford University. Their research, using RCT methodology, has tested different means for improving poor rural children's access to school and ability to succeed in school, across a spectrum including computer–assisted learning, improving eyesight, finding the best incentives for children to complete basic education, and much work on child health and nutrition.

Early in this century, most policy research on northwest China was conducted by scholars from China's coastal areas. Scholars from the universities of the northwest sometimes were retained to administer questionnaires or do other tasks on contract under those projects, but they generally did not function as full partners, and found it difficult to secure national–level funding for their own projects on northwestern issues.

In 2004, a group of scholars from several northwestern universities decided to begin efforts to build their own capacities for research and policy inputs, under the motto of "Northwest people solving Northwest problems." University leaders and scholars at two schools in Shaanxi and one school in each of the other four provinces in the northwest decided to create a network, the Northwest Socioeconomic Development Research Center (NSDRC), to pool knowledge and resources and to upgrade expertise. The original institutional base was at Northwest University in Xi'an.

Over the next several years, NSDRC steadily built up capacities in project design, research and data analysis among many teachers and students at its member universities. To do so, it worked closely with the China Center for Agricultural Policy (CCAP) at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which helped organize and teach specialized training workshops, hosted visiting scholars from NSDRC, provided graduate students and young scholars to stay at northwestern universities to work with and build the expertise of NSDRC partners, and provided consultations by phone and email to help solve specific research problems.[75] NSDRC also provided small grants for members'

[75] Additional capacity-building assistance came from Beijing Normal University.

group or independent research projects. Much, though not all, of this capacity-building work was originally supported by a series of grants from Ford Foundation's Governance and Public Policy portfolio.

However, once they had acquired a certain level of skills, NSDRC members felt that they needed to learn by doing: to engage together in a large-scale project in which they could be researching and learning alongside CCAP and other colleagues, and building their own independent research capacities. From the outset, although the collaboration with CCAP scholars was crucial, it was clear that the NSDRC scholars and their students had strengths that were essential for projects' success. They knew the area and its problems intimately; they already had good connections with provincial and local officials and could form others more easily, especially when they could offer high quality research to help solve local problems; they understood distinctive local cultures (some of them national minority cultures) and, among their group, understood local dialects and minority languages.

Because many of the members had a strong interest in education in poor rural areas, they proposed to focus in this arena for a group project. At this point, they approached He Jin for support from the Education portfolio, and received their first grant from him in 2007. Subsequent grants by the Education portfolio were made to NSDRC in 2009, 2011, and 2013, and a grant for related work was made to CCAP in 2010. Both NSDRC and CCAP became partners in the Rural Education Action Program that began at Stanford University but involves many partners at other institutions throughout China as well as in the US.[76] REAP collectively and its partner institutions have proven extremely effective—in large part because of the rigorous quality of their research—in attracting funding from many different sources: government, academic institutions, and foundations, and also from corporations whose in-kind donations have made some larger-scale projects feasible.

2. Seeking facts: Nutrition and school success

NSDRC chose to work on rural school children's nutrition for good reason: a pressing social need had grown to major proportions, and it was basic to solution of other problems.

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[76] REAP's website states: "REAP's core members within China include the Northwest Socioeconomic Development Research Center (NSDRC; including Shaanxi Normal University, Northwest University, Ningxia University, Lanzhou University, Qinghai Nationalities University and Xi'an Jiaotong University), Sichuan University, Henan University, Sun Yat-sen University, Renmin University, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Beijing Normal University, and the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP) at the Chinese Academy of Sciences." http://www.reapchina.org.

The need grew out of a school merger policy the Ministry of Education (MoE) began implementing in 1999. There were sound reasons for the policy. The number of school-age children in rural areas had begun to drop rapidly because of the one-child policy. Improving the quality of schools and teaching would therefore be difficult if not impossible if students continued to attend small, scattered rural schools. Therefore, just before the turn of the century, many schools, especially in small, remote villages, started to close, and the children were assigned to "central" schools farther away from their homes. The ministry reported that from 2001 to 2005, the number of rural elementary schools had dropped by nearly a quarter ("Malnutrition," REAP Brief #106). In Shaanxi, NSDRC found in a field survey that elementary schools in the province declined by even more than that: compared to thirty-two thousand schools in 2002, in 2006 there were only eighteen thousand.

Because of the distances between home and school and potential safety problems for children walking to school, many students began staying as boarders at the central schools during the week. MoE found that thirty million students in the basic-education age cohort were boarding in 2008. When the REAP team did a survey of sample schools in Shaanxi in 2007, they found a slight increase in the percentage of boarding students among the total student population (from 13 percent in 2003, to 15 percent in 2007), but a very high proportion in the schools that took boarders: 41 percent.[77] Students living in the dormitories tended to have worse nutrition, poorer health, and worse performance in schools that those living at home. Even after considerable investment went into building better dormitories and dining halls, the problems persisted. By some indications, they even worsened.

But not only students living away from home suffered from nutritional problems. The poor areas of rural northwest China had relatively poor nutrition, in part because of longstanding poverty, but in part also because of local traditions of only two meals a day—which did not include breakfast. Children coming to school from home often started the school day as hungry as their boarding classmates.

The first major project conducted by the NSDRC team aimed at improving young students' physical and psychological health, particularly for those in boarding schools.[78] The core of the project was conducted in two Shaanxi counties. Interventions centered on improving parent-teacher communication through parent-teacher associations, setting up a better system for managing boarding schools, and creating school-district

[77] These were mostly in schools that had become "merger-hosts," but also in some schools that had not experienced mergers (Luo et al. 2009).

[78] Information here comes primarily from internal documents, including grant proposal and reports.

councils with representation from parents, teachers, school administrators and local officials, who could jointly discuss problems and options and recommend plans of action.

Health monitoring and healthier practices formed important components in the boarding management intervention. In a baseline survey done in 144 schools randomly selected from across the province, and in a second more intensive baseline survey in ten of those schools, the team was able to gather good information on the students' condition. In the course of the interventions, they discovered that most of the sample schools had not previously done physical checkups on students. Results from the study's checkups on 2250 students in ten schools showed that children's physical measurements were worse than those measured among rural Shaanxi primary school students two years earlier. The interventions piloted in this project did indicate some positive improvements through managerial innovations, and local governments and provincial policy makers were especially receptive to the suggestions on boarding school management. However, a more significant consequence over the longer run was that the project experience alerted the team to the need to pay more attention to specific nutritional issues.

This brought the team to an important series of studies on school children's nutrition.[79] The first set concentrated specifically on anemia. The scholarly literature on health and nutrition in developing countries shows that among nutritional deficits, iron-deficiency anemia has especially pronounced negative impacts on children's energy levels, retards cognitive development, and affects both behavior and physical development (Luo et al.2012). Although there were some indications that anemia was a widespread problem in rural China, very little had been done to study it, and the public knew virtually nothing about it.

The REAP team began its anemia studies in Shaanxi in 2008, working in eight impoverished counties, with a sample of fourth-grade students in sixty-six schools. In the baseline survey work, they recorded the children's hemoglobin levels and—to provide a basic indicator of academic performance—scores on a standardized math test. Data on the hemoglobin levels showed some serious nutritional deficiencies: 38 percent of the children were anemic; in some schools, the proportion was as high as 70 percent. Boarding students on average had higher rates of anemia. At the time, education officials considered this an issue for the health authorities, not for themselves. By its conclusion, the project would convince them otherwise.

The interventions designed for the next step in the RCT trial were simple. The sixty-six schools were randomly assigned to three groups. For the twenty-four schools in group 1,

[79] Sources for the following discussion include numerous presentations by NSDRC and REAP participants between 2008 and 2016; grant proposals and reports; Kleiman-Weiner et al. 2013; Sylvia et al. 2013; Luo et al. 2012.

the team provided each fourth–grade classroom with enough multivitamins with iron for every student to take one vitamin daily.[80] For group 2, twelve schools altogether, the sole intervention was to send parents a letter describing their child's hemoglobin reading and what it meant, outlining what anemia is, what effects it has, and what parents can do to remedy or prevent anemia. No followup or further intervention was made with that group. For the control group 3, no intervention was made. Five months after the interventions began, the children's hemoglobin levels were tested again, and they took another standardized math test. The results for group 2 were mixed: children living at home showed slight decreases in anemia, but no significant difference in test scores. Group 2 students in boarding schools stayed the same or even deteriorated. For group 3, the control group, hemoglobin levels rose slightly, but by only about one–third the amount seen in group 1. For group 1, the results for both health and performance were clear. Improvements in hemoglobin levels equated with "a reduction in anemia of more than 10 percentage points." As for school performance, "our results demonstrate that when students are given multivitamins with mineral supplements, not only do their anemia rates decline but their test scores also rise…."(Luo et al. 2012:759)

The results were reported through various channels both public and internal. Since the experiments were conducted in Shaanxi, and with considerable interaction with provincial government during the process, it would be natural to expect a fairly quick policy response there. There was, but not quite the one expected: the provincial government decided to institute a free breakfast program, providing one egg and one serving of milk per day to every school child in Shaanxi.

This prompted new questions: would eggs have any effect on anemia? Or on general nutrition levels? And would they have any effect on school performance?

The issues prompted two responses in REAP research. One was a new RCT project conducted in Gansu to compare the effects of eggs and vitamins (one per day in either case), along with a control group receiving neither. Surveys testing hemoglobin levels were conducted before and after the trials, and the results were unambiguous. The eggs had virtually no effect on anemia levels; the vitamins had a clear impact. The eggs had no impact on test scores; vitamins had a significant impact.

The second response was a course correction in another RCT project already underway for Shaanxi, Ningxia, and Qinghai. This ambitious project attempted to test mechanisms for a more general nutritional improvement for schoolchildren, as well as the results of

[80] For those who recognize that making pills available and making sure they are taken regularly and appropriately, Luo et al. (2012) provide detailed description of the procedures and monitoring methods. It is clear that the design averted the most likely pitfalls.

better nutrition. The project centered on methods for introducing balanced breakfasts into children's daily meals. In this project, the original design called for conducting the same types of trials in all three provinces, with a sample of ninety schools.

Three types of interventions were planned for the project:

a. Intervention #1 was to adjust schools' schedules to allow time for both boarding students and those living at home to have breakfast before the start of the school day. (Many schools began at 6:30 a.m., which left no time for breakfast.)

b. Intervention #2 was "nutrition training," which required prior preparation of training packages, including locally appropriate menu suggestions and explanations of the importance of breakfast for child development. The training would be given to students and their parents and to the teachers and principals in the sample schools.

c. Intervention #3 was "free breakfast for boarding students." These were to be provided for the boarding schools' canteens, with training of their staff. The basis for the meals was packaged VitaMeals, donated by its manufacturer, Nu Skin.81

d. Unlike previous interventions, which were made in separate sample groups, the interventions in this project were planned for a pyramiding intervention approach. The first sample group of twenty schools would have only Intervention #1. Twenty more schools would have Interventions #1 and #2, while another twenty would have all three. A control group of thirty schools would have no intervention at all.

As with other RCTs, the project called for baseline surveys. These were more comprehensive than the other RCT projects discussed above; they included cognitive testing for both math and Chinese language, psychological tests, basic anthropometric records, behavioral records (provided by teachers), tests for attention deficits, 24–hour food intake records, and survey forms to be completed for students, their households, teachers, and the schools. Similar surveys were to be conducted at midterm and after completion of the interventions. Many different kinds of stakeholders would participate in the various interventions.

The surprise for the researchers was that after the baseline surveys were done and just before the interventions were to begin, the Shaanxi provincial government instituted its

[81] VitaMeals are packaged dried ingredients that provide a good balance of nutrients. Nu Skin manufactures them in the USA, Malawi, and China. The US-made product is based on rice and lentils; Malawi's is based on maize and soybeans. The full list of ingredients in these can be found via a link on the Nu Skin website: https://www.nuskin.com/en_US/community/nourish_the_children.html.The site provides no information on the ingredients in the Chinese-manufactured product.

free breakfast program. This required adjustment in the RCT design, which added an evaluation of the egg–and–milk project to the Shaanxi work and made some adjustments to the school schedule interventions in Ningxia and Qinghai.

The final findings were not provided in detail by the time of the final grant report, but based on the midterm surveys and preliminary findings from the final surveys, the interventions had shown significant improvements compared to the baselines. The average hemoglobin count had risen by four units; students had grown an average of 2cm in height and their weight had increased by an average of 0.2kg. Their scores on standardized tests were up more than two points, and according to behavior records, their concentration levels had shown a 15 percent improvement. The team had also provided a written report to the office of Shaanxi's PEB responsible for the egg–and–milk project, and on the strength of that report, the PEB asked NSDRC to "take charge of the evaluation" for that project.

3. Assessment

In the space of approximately one decade, the REAP partners at NSDRC have made huge strides in building independent policy research capacities and in generating research results to assist evidence–based policy making. In 2014 the network made a further stride, moving from Northwest University to Shaanxi Normal University, where they have founded a new Center for Experimental Economics in Education (CEEE).[82] Along with the rest of the REAP core group, they have participated in over thirty international projects in collaboration with foreign and domestic institutes and agencies. The REAP research teams have generated high levels of academic results, both quantitatively and qualitatively considered. Over four–fifths of published impact evaluations related to education in China have come from REAP work, and three of the Chinese team members are among the world's highest publishing development economists. The new CEEE at Shaanxi Normal was the northwest's top publishing economics program in 2015/2016.

Their work has fed into numerous policy briefs for provincial governments in the northwest, and scholars involved in the NSDRC/CEEE are often called upon by their own provincial government agencies for expert input. Their research projects, results, and analyses have been featured since 2009 in at least a dozen (often quite lengthy) articles in *China Education News* (中国教育报), the newspaper of the Ministry of Education.

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[82] That center is "a research institute … committed to studies on the rural basic education, social equality and ethnic minorities, women's equality and development in the social transitional process in northwest China." http://english.snnu.edu.cn/newshow.php?id=4066.

The nutrition research was reported to the central government in five policy briefs, at least one of which was read and approved by the premier and two vice-premiers. This work fed into the decision by central leaders in 2011 to launch a "rural schools nutrition improvement plan." In 2012, MoE and fourteen other central agencies, ranging from the Ministry of Finance to the Communist Youth League Central Committee, issued detailed implementation rules for that plan, first for adoption by pilot counties and schools and gradually extending more broadly.[83] By 2016, after five years' operation of the plan, *People's Daily* reported that a total of 159.1 billion yuan had been provided for the plan from central finances, and that the plan had been implemented in 137 thousand schools in twenty-nine provinces, benefiting 33.6 million students (Wu Dan and Yang Tong 2016).

Clearly all of these factors indicate a substantial degree of success for REAP's northwestern team. From reading through the documents about the projects, or talking with members of the REAP/NSDRC/CEEE network about their methods and their projects, additional and equally valuable results of their work are evident.

One is the participatory approach in all the projects, beginning with the professors and administrators, but including graduate and undergraduate students; and extending to hundreds of different institutional partners and collaborators—local officials, school principals, parents, students, teachers, companies both local and international, social workers and social work students, doctors and nurses, farmers. Many of these people have been crucial in implementing the interventions, monitoring compliance or performance, conducting trainings, providing crucial openings, raising questions and criticisms, answering questions and filling out questionnaires, cooperating to build a better future for the children of rural China.

A second feature, equally impressive, is the drive not only to find the best answers, but to pose the best questions—the challenging ones that can reveal the roots of the problems that need to be solved—and to probe every possible solution thoroughly, so that by the time it is offered publicly, the public can be sure it has been rigorously tested.

These are habits of method and mind that help ensure that the search for facts can lead to truth.

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[83] Efforts at around the same time by China Development Research Foundation undoubtedly also played an important role in that major decision. As CDRF's website summarized: "In 2007, CDRF launched the Program of Nutrition Improvement Program for Rural Compulsory Education Students. In 2008, Premier Wen made important instruction on CDRF's Research Report for this program required relevant government departments to strive to improve nutrition status of rural poor students. In 2010, Chinese government allocated over 10 billion yuan for living subsidies of rural boarding students." (CDRF, Nutrition Improvement Program for Rural Compulsory Education, http://cdrf.org.cn/plus/view.php?aid=637) However, the 2011 Plan's guidelines for the content of food to be provided to children bore a strong resemblance to the REAP school breakfast project's efforts to develop menus appropriate to each locality's available foods.

C. Grasp concrete things with great matters in mind: Evaluation to Improve Educational Quality

You need to shake up old notions of evaluation and examine what it could be like. The old evaluation system is a bottleneck for the whole Chinese education system. But you don't change it totally; instead, you insert some new, multidimensional, longer–term notions of effects. The traditional approach is only 智; the new one is 德智体美劳. (He Jin, June 2016)

As noted earlier, the number of students in colleges and universities expanded massively and rapidly from 1999 onwards, with the highest proportional increase concentrated in 1999 to 2005. The absolute increases continue, given the national government's goal of reaching 40 percent enrollment of the age cohort in higher education. Those increases affected campuses from the most elite (985 and 211 Project research universities) to the smallest and most obscure colleges, and brought others into existence to meet the demand. Faculties had to cope with ever larger numbers of students; established universities created outlying campuses (especially for undergraduates) and expected faculty to commute between campuses. By 2005, it was evident that overall quality had declined.

National authorities responded by setting a new priority emphasizing quality improvements in higher education.[84] Comparative evaluations of educational quality, whether conducted by the MoE or by the media, began putting pressure on university administrators to do something about quality. But while those evaluations might have helped universities stake claims for more resources, they could not answer key questions concerning how well higher education was serving students, and therefore did little to help the institutions figure out how to improve the quality of students' educational experience. They needed a rigorous internal quality assurance system, but one that, by allowing comparisons with other institutions, would help them identify just what they were doing well and where improvement was needed.

By early in this century, quality assurance was an important issue for higher education institutions worldwide. Among scholars of educational quality abroad, consensus had grown that student engagement in the learning process lay at the heart of student learning and educational quality. Institutional researchers had attempted various methods for assessing student engagement. The method that gained especially good traction in

[84] MoE's Document No. 1 of 2005 first signaled this shift; the State Council confirmed the priority in spring 2006.

the US and Canada was the National Survey of Student Engagement (NSSE), based at the University of Indiana.[85]

Scholars at Tsinghua University's Institute of Education Research learned about NSSE and decided to adapt and apply it for Chinese colleges and universities. From 2008 through 2016, part of that work has been supported by two grants from the Education portfolio. In this case study, we examine this work on creating a mechanism—with Chinese characteristics—for student-centered evaluations of learning. In the following, we first present an overview of the objectives, content, and progress of the projects funded. We go on to look in more depth at refinements that made the survey into multiple instruments more suited to Chinese institutions and students, and then provide a brief look at the impact the projects have had and could have at both institutional and policy levels.

1. The projects[86]

Phase 1: NSSE/China, December 2008 to June 2011

Before negotiating the first grant with He Jin,[87] the Tsinghua team had done a pilot test in a handful of Chinese universities in Beijing, using the unmodified NSSE survey questions, and had attracted attention from potential university collaborators when they reported on the survey at a research conference (Hennock 2010). Those experiences helped to shape the original project design.

The objectives for the phase 1 grant were to build modifications for NSSE/China by developing a set of indicators appropriate for Chinese institutions; to begin building a national database on students' learning experiences in higher education; and to form a national network to build expertise in using the surveys for institutional improvement.

Refining the NSSE model required field visits and interviews at the seven institutions that had agreed to participate in a 2009 round of the survey.[88] Each of those campuses formed a small team to conduct the interviews. The information gathered was then discussed with an expert panel, and following that discussion the essential preparatory work—creating the framework, deciding how to do sampling, designing the questionnaire,

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[85] More can be learned about NSSE from the website, http://nsse.indiana.edu/. A facsimile of the 2016 questionnaire (for US institutions) is at http://nsse.indiana.edu/pdf/survey_instruments/2016/NSSE_2016-US_English.pdf. In 2016, more than 300 thousand students at 557 institutions in the US and Canada completed the survey.
[86] This and the sections that follow rely upon information in the internal grant documents and in publications based on the research, particularly Shi et al. 2014, and Ross et al. 2014.
[87] Tsinghua University also provided some funds for the project.
[88] The schools initially selected were: Tsinghua University, Northwest Normal University, Inner Mongolia University of Science and Technology, Shenyang Institute of Aeronautical Engineering, National University of Defense Technology (Hunan), Shanghai Finance University, and Guangxi University.

producing a handbook for survey teams and training them—took several months. The first survey was conducted at the end of the spring semester in 2009.

To allow participating institutions eventually to generate reports from their own and others' data, the database's structure and interface required careful planning. Training, important throughout the project, also helped in building the network of project institutions. Schools participating in the survey had to receive training before the questionnaires were distributed; at a midterm workshop in spring 2010 participants were trained on how to use the data for institutional reports to help support decisions on improved teaching and services. Two workshops were held in 2011: one in May, conducted jointly with Tsinghua's Economic and Social Data Center (清华大学中国经济社会数据中心); another was planned for December 2011, after completion of the grant period.

The project elicited far more interest than anticipated when the work was about to begin; this was evident even within the first several months. In the first year, twenty-seven schools participated in the survey. By 2011, there were fifty-seven. The original benchmarks had aimed at collecting no fewer than twenty thousand questionnaires; that goal was surpassed in the first year and increased apace with the increasing number of schools. (See table 6.4)

Table 6.4. NSSE/China-CCSS participant schools and data collection

Year	*Number of schools (network participants)*	*Number of valid questionnaires*
2009	27	24,252
2010	47	54,627
2011	57	77,795
2012	59	71,698
2013	73—80+	n.a.

Source: Ross et al. 2014; "中国大学生学习与发展追踪研究 2013 年度项目启动会召开" (2013-05-16); http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/ioe/5332/2013/20130516161907254303306/20130516161907254303306_.html. There are small variations in numbers across sources.

The increase was driven in part by the researchers' desire to make the survey more scientific, with samples that could be analyzed by region and by type of institution. Some schools were eager and enthusiastic, while others were reluctant. This seems to have been the case throughout. Even at a meeting in April 2007 to discuss the NSSE-China idea, one participant from Chongqing University recalled, "other participating universities

attended … with doubts and concerns"—a sharp contrast with his own university's stance: "we brought with us a university grant" (Ross et al. 2014, 98). Later, as one of the Tsinghua University team observed, "Most schools weren't willing to do anything [if] they didn't have pressure from above."

At least in this first phase, the cost was not grounds for complaint: the questionnaires and the data analysis were free. Other factors might have made participation more attractive. First, the Tsinghua team pledged to sustain equal cooperative relations with teams at all participating universities, and set the basic principle of sharing results and best practices. Second, the cases reported on at the regular conferences and workshops probably did much to build enthusiasm among prospective partners. Third, as survey results accumulated year by year, revealing more about how students' needs changed in the course of their education, the value of the survey may have become more apparent. Add to this the prolific publications that grew out of the project, and the growing prestige and credibility of the survey may have added to the appeal of participation.

The surveys continued into 2012 and 2013 after the conclusion of the first Ford Foundation grant, and before the second grant began; and the number of participating institutions continued to increase.

Phase 2: CCSS, November 2013 to October 2016

The project proposed for the second grant aimed at further refinement of the survey but also at making the survey more useful for both intra-institutional improvement and policy. The objectives included:

a. developing some new surveys for vocational and private colleges,

b. helping participating institutions find solutions for problems the survey identified,

c. helping students better understand their learning needs and how to meet them with school resources, and

d. helping policymakers use the findings for policies, building quality-assurance systems that worked both from the top down and from the bottom up.

In fact, the work done also continued efforts begun in the earlier phase, and went well beyond these four objectives in some respects.

The annual surveys have continued, but with significant refinements. The need for survey instruments designed specifically for vocational and technical schools and private colleges (mostly institutions granting only two-year associate degrees) had been clear in the interviews conducted on various campuses early in phase 1. In phase 2 the team developed that specially tailored survey, called the "yellow questionnaire," to distinguish it from the "green questionnaire" for students at ordinary institutions of higher education. The yellow questionnaire was pilot-tested in twelve vocational colleges in 2013. A questionnaire rainbow grew, with the addition of the "blue questionnaire" to follow four-year students after graduation and into their early working career, and the "purple questionnaires" (for the high-level research universities) that emphasized different specific issues for each year of a student's college career. An online survey, piloted with mixed results in the first phase, came into wider use and yielded good results.

In addition to the annual surveys, the Tsinghua team and its partners continued the training workshops and symposia. At least one has been cohosted; the January 2015 training workshop in Nanjing, which discussed 2011 survey results, was jointly sponsored by Tsinghua, Southeast University, and Nanjing University of Post and Telecommunications. Cases demonstrating effective use of the survey data were presented by representatives from the three cosponsors and from Nanjing University of Science and Technology and Chongqing University.[89] The project team sees such cases as an important vehicle for helping other schools devise ways to use the survey for their own institutional reforms, and showcases them at the workshops and symposia.

The Tsinghua team has put considerable effort, during the second phase, into networking with government officials at provincial and central levels, in part by organizing policy seminars. They also began issuing an annual newsletter for pilot institutions. Publications by team members and collaborators help to demonstrate the important uses of some of the data. A quick Google search using the terms 中国大学生学习与发展追踪研究 or 中国大学生学习性投入调查 also shows many news reports in national media such as *People's Daily* online and *Guangming ribao* that explain the survey and help to publicize it.

2. From NSSE/China to CCSS: Evolution and impact

Both the English and the Chinese names for the survey project have changed over time. The change in the English name—from "NSSE/China" to "China College Student Survey (CCSS)"—reflects the sinicization of the survey. It has not been merely translated; it has

[89] "中国大学生学习与发展追踪研究" 2015 年度数据分析培训会议在南京召开, 2016-01-13, http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/ioe/5332/2016/20160113171547910794175/20160113171547910794175_.html.

been gradually adapted to the nature and needs of Chinese institutions of higher education and Chinese college students, while maintaining a core of questions that still allow international comparisons. The change in the Chinese name, from 中国大学生学习性投入调查 to 中国大学生学习与发展追踪研究, is an indication of the more complex set of purposes to which the survey can be applied.

The core of the NSSE is questions that help to gauge the quality of learning at an institution without asking students to make judgments about the learning. Rather, by asking them about what they have done in their time in college (for example, whether they have spoken up in class, discussed specific kinds of things with a faculty member, rewritten a paper before submitting it, used numbers to arrive at a conclusion, etc.), the survey constructs a picture that can be organized around five benchmark elements:

a. level of academic challenge,

b. active and collaborative learning,

c. student–faculty interaction,

d. enriching educational experience, and

e. supportive campus environment.

When using the same questions for Chinese students at Chinese institutions, the NSSE/China survey revealed systematic differences compared to similar institutions in the US: higher on some of the benchmarks, lower on others. But the Tsinghua team found that many questions were related to system (*tizhi*) assumptions that were inappropriate for China. At the same time, they found that issues connected to livelihood and career loomed much larger for Chinese students. In addition, the team felt that the NSSE produced basically an evaluation of the learning situation for an entire school, but for the sake of education reforms in China, they tried to devise indicators that could yield more detail about the educational process, and support diagnostics on learning processes and learning strategies.

The NSSE itself allows for customization by US and Canadian institutions, within certain limits. But customization by the Tsinghua team, in order to meet goals like those mentioned above, moved far enough to warrant changing the English name to CCSS. Major new components were added to the basic survey: psychological variables (questions related to emotional, motivational, and cognitive/perceptive engagement), and socioeconomic background (including family socioeconomic status and pre–college

education). The revisions, during the second phase of the project, also meant doing more student interviews in order to devise questions appropriate for the different types of institutions: the comprehensive research universities (211 and 985 Project), provincial universities, privately run colleges, and vocational/technical training schools.

Another innovation was to develop four constructs to help schools pinpoint areas for work to improve educational quality. These included identification of the cognitive goals of courses (on a continuum from memorization to synthesis), the rigor of demands in courses (for example, difficulty of exams, or number of writing assignments), student engagement in class, and their engagement outside the classroom. Upgrades in the online survey offered an individual diagnostic to students (with suggestions for improvement) when they finished the questionnaire. Their universities could also get simple diagnostic reports online, once all the student questionnaires were done.

But how can all the data collected through these surveys help with educational reform? While many might look to cross-institution comparisons as an incentive to try harder, the lesson from the CCSS seems to be that neatly targeted responses to specific types of problems may offer the best use. We look at one such example here. With the huge expansion in college enrollments, many students were "first-generation"—those who had no parent with a degree in higher education. Among those surveyed in the project, about three-quarters were in that category. One factor the survey attempted to measure was students' engagement in "high impact educational practices" (HIPS), which a substantial body of educational research has found to have major impact on students' learning *outcomes*, even if they do not have an appreciable effect on *performance* (i.e., grades). HIPS are activities, either academic or social, that engage students more individually and intensively: participation in student activity associations, working with a faculty member on a research project, doing an internship or a senior thesis project. First-generation students steered away from these activities. The survey found that they tended to be "good" students in the traditional sense, but that their brand of "good" handicapped them in getting the most out of their education:

> [T]hey try hard to be good students in terms of classroom learning, but do not invest much energy in higher order learning activities. They participate in fewer extracurricular activities with others and protect themselves by staying in their comfort zone, playing online games or watching television. They hardly communicate with important people on campus and prefer to ask for help from their peers. First-generation students are a group who are easily overlooked. Compared with the non-first-generation college students, they make less efficient use of resources provided by the college. (Shi et al. 2014, 151)

Such a finding points to an issue that different institutions might handle in different ways. But making the schools (and the students) aware of the pattern invites measures that are better targeted, more effective, less costly for the institution, and far more satisfying for the students.

Analysis of the survey data can also yield insights into factors that are better dealt with by government policy or by cross-institution action. One example of such a finding is that the single most important factor affecting a student's learning at university and on the learning outcomes is *pre-college* experience:

> Good learning habits and positive learning experience gained in the pre-college period will greatly benefit … college learning. Therefore the efforts in improving learning in [higher education] should not be limited to the college level—it should include high school education. If we want to increase the quality of college education, we need to work closely with educators from the basic education sector. (Shi et al. 2014, 154–55)

Cases constructed from the experience of some institutions in the CCSS network provide good examples of the targeting principle.[90] Chongqing University was one of the first twenty-seven universities in the survey network, with consistently strong support from the university administration. The annual summary reports reached the top administrators throughout the university, and at least the 2009 report was discussed in the Joint Conference of Party and Administration, the highest ranking conference for colleges and universities in the country. The findings did not have to be momentous to support administration action, as one case demonstrated. Like many schools throughout the country, Chongqing University had constructed a suburban campus (Huxi) to which undergraduates were consigned, and the level of student-faculty interaction fell. Around the same time that the NSSE/CCSS project began at the university, the administration introduced seminars for first-year students, and a Valuing Freshmen Project that brought lectures by senior faculty and discussions with junior faculty. The 2009 report compared benchmarks against US research universities, revealing the largest gap lay in student-faculty interaction. That finding helped to justify the administration's approach, and later years' survey results were closely watched for evidence on whether the approach had achieved its purposes.

A more general approach to using the survey data came from Guizhou University, whose Quality Evaluation Center (QEC) joined the network in 2009. The university had crafted an internal quality assurance system called the "4 + 1 System." This involved evaluations on four major aspects of undergraduate education: courses; senior theses or design

[90] This part of the discussion draws on the chapter by Ross et al. (2014).

projects; practicums; and faculty teaching. The "one" was an annual evaluation of each college within the university to assess its "overall competence" and "contribution to the university." Before the CCSS survey came to the campus, teaching quality had been evaluated through a combination of review of teaching materials (syllabi, exams, etc.) and student evaluations completed online. Not unreasonably, many at the university feared that the student evaluations would be skewed by grade inflation and dumbing-down of requirements by instructors. The QEC researchers included CCSS results in their 4 + 1 reports. The student–faculty interaction scores were integrated into the university's evaluation of colleges' overall competence. At the time when QEC reported this case, Guizhou's provincial education department had provided a grant for more work on the system, and the QEC team hoped to explore more ways to knit CCSS into the 4 + 1 System.

3. Assessment

In less than ten years, the Tsinghua CCSS team and its network partners have transformed an American import into a thoroughly Chinese instrument for improving educational quality by starting from a student learning engagement perspective. They have adapted it to capture students' experiences of learning in many different types of institutions. They have also, with hard work especially by Tsinghua's Institute of Education Research and its Economic and Social Data Center, built data analysis and report-writing capacities at many partner institutions. They have advanced clearer understandings—among institutions of higher education, government policy makers and administrators, the media, students, and the general public—of the factors involved in improving educational quality. The surveys have made significant contributions to bettering the educational experiences of students from disadvantaged groups.

Several universities (Tsinghua included) have launched reforms in their educational systems because of survey findings. And the underlying concept of student learning-centered evaluation became central in the next stages of educational evaluations in colleges and universities. In July 2011, MoE's Department of Higher Education began requiring that 985 Project schools provide annual reports on the "quality of undergraduate teaching and learning," a requirement subsequently extended to all 211 Project schools as well. The benefits to the Tsinghua team itself have been considerable, in terms of learning, contacts with others in the field, and the ability to attract young researchers.

While justifiably proud of the achievements of a project that has produced the largest scale and most rigorous study of student learning processes and educational quality in

Chinese higher education, the Tsinghua team are the first to point out that the CCSS must clear more hurdles to ensure sustainability. The model used is a challenging one: they consider the survey's independence and scholarly quality essential to its value, and therefore, while happy to coordinate with administrative agencies, they insist that it must not become an "administrative" (行政性) program. But CCSS's spread to more schools has meant ever more time and effort by the Tsinghua team going into partners' training to ensure the quality of the survey data and the analyses. Since 2014, the project has tried a cost–sharing method to carry some of the burden; participating schools are asked to pay (based on the number of questionnaires) for printing, data entry, data cleaning costs, and the research platform, but there are differences in schools' willingness or ability to pay. Costs may be kept down as more schools use the online survey, but poorer or inland institutions do not enjoy the network access the wealthier coastal institutions have.

All of this is to say that more challenges lie ahead. But the breadth and depth of the CCSS network and the conviction of the survey's value on the part of many of the network member institutions, all give hope that the route to long–term sustainability will soon be found.

FORDFOUNDATION

VII.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. About Impact

In the final analysis, we are concerned with the impact of the Education portfolio, and with how that impact was achieved. Our general assessment is that the portfolio had major and ongoing impact over the years of the program officer's tenure, and that the impact will be lasting in many arenas in the years ahead. The impact may be traced to the PO's strategic approach and to his methods of working with grantees.

The strategy, explained at length in chapter 3, was underpinned by two major goals that resonated strongly with the Beijing office strategy outlined in 2008/2009 but was also presaged by principal themes in earlier years: achieving improvements for disadvantaged groups, and seeking those improvements system–wide. As program officer, He Jin maintained a consistent emphasis on educational opportunity for girls and young women, poor rural students, and minority nationalities. As migration accelerated and the numbers of migrant and left–behind children mounted into the tens of millions, he added those children to the priority groups. He supported significant work related to all of these groups. The systemic improvements sought derived from his careful identification of national/policy, institutional, and grantee needs, and of key social problems. The improvements might include refinements or changes of policy at national or provincial level, more effective methods for implementing educational policies or reaching policy goals, improvements in administrative or institutional arrangements (including the integration of new types of institutions, such as *minban* schools), or better communications channels and better evidence bases for defining and assessing policy issues. Given the fifteen–year span involved, the priorities inevitably changed over time. The active priorities at any given point depended upon a keen sense of timing, for the moment ripe for a particular problem to be appreciated and for new solutions to be tried.

As discussed in detail in chapter 5, the program officer pursued the strategy at the grantmaking level using a clearly stated set of principles and methods, with which all grantees became familiar and which they absorbed into their own practices. The principles emphasized innovation to solve tough problems in new ways, participation to engage the ideas and energy of all relevant stakeholders, and the sustainability and replicability of the project or its products. Methodologically, He Jin insisted on rigorous analysis to identify problems clearly and design possible solutions targeting those problems. He made appropriately high demands of grantees, whether they were inexperienced young NGOs or well–seasoned state think tanks. The process of grant negotiation was grueling enough to winnow out those not genuinely committed to solving social problems, and to elicit better efforts from committed teams. He saw, and treated,

both grant negotiation and monitoring as opportunities for capacity building of grantees: teaching methods for strategically approaching problems; building teams, partnerships, and networks; thinking of building mechanisms for the future while dealing with present problem–solving.

The portfolio's grants concentrated in two main areas: basic/compulsory and secondary education (through senior middle school), and higher education.

In the first area, ***basic and secondary education,*** the grantmaking emphasis began with elementary and junior middle school education, then, as enrollment rates at those levels of schooling rose, turned increasingly to junior and senior middle schools, both academic–track and vocational. Major clusters of funding went to improving access for minority nationalities, poor rural, migrant and left–behind children (and keeping them in school); improving quality of education for poor rural and migrant children (arts, English, music) and their ability to succeed in school (e.g., emphasis on nutrition, boarding schools); administrative approaches (financial, evaluation, etc.), teacher training and supply, and the "software" of education.

Major achievements included:

a. methods for increasing access to schooling incorporated into national policy for small minority nationalities' development and poverty alleviation; similar methods eventually incorporated into national policy for all compulsory education;

b. better funding methods in rural schools (moving school funding up to county level, nationwide) and in many large municipalities (funding for actual student numbers, to accommodate migrant children);

c. improvements in educational quality through arts and music education, and routes defined for making access to arts and music education more equitable;

d. better evaluation methods emphasizing student–centered learning, applicable both for internal school administrative use and for government agencies' evaluation of progress;

e. innovations in teacher training, scaled up in some cases to provincial level; and research prompting reconsideration of national policy on substitute teachers;

f. new approaches in secondary vocational education and practical skills training, promoting integration of community and economic development needs with

educational system (adopted in many localities and considered by national policy makers);

g. testing of approaches to schooling for migrant and left-behind children that have been widely adopted and helped build awareness and consensus on needed policy changes.

In ***higher education***, emphasis was placed on poor students' access and participation (including explorations in private and vocational higher education); student-centered learning and evaluation methods; building fields directly or indirectly related to disadvantaged groups; and searching for breakthroughs at institutional levels to generate systemic change.

Significant achievements included:

a. innovations in curriculum and management to improve disadvantaged students' access to high quality education through self-sustaining programs (Pathways to Higher Education, Red Phoenix), and through a model replicated beyond the original institution (China Fellowship Program);

b. a set of student-centered evaluation instruments, sensitive to varying needs of students from different backgrounds, adopted by numerous universities;

c. exploration and testing of methods to improve teaching and learning in minban and technical/vocational colleges and universities;

d. community and vocational/technical colleges' potential contribution to local economic development illuminated, and acknowledged with policy support;

e. full-fledged development of a nationwide field in women's and gender studies, from grassroots research to policy inputs at provincial and national levels; initial development of new fields in experimental economics and in development studies.

Some of the achievements listed pertain to incremental improvements in practice; others relate to contributions to policy change. The practical improvements may be gauged quite directly, for example, measuring their adoption by numbers of schools or provinces. Numerous instances have been cited in chapters 4 through 6.

Policy impact is a more complex issue. The policy process in China includes input from many different levels of the system and from many quarters, and it is rare that any one input can be claimed as *the* decisive one. However, it is clear that grantees in the Education arenas became adept, in the course of their project work, at getting their work into media and policy channels. We reviewed numerous indications that their project demonstrations, stakeholders' direct involvement, and policy reports or briefs fed into the policy process. The impact may be seen most clearly, perhaps, in the portfolio's contributions to bringing to light the many complex issues surrounding educational opportunities for migrant and left-behind children and testing potential solutions, while keeping the spotlight trained on the fundamental challenge of the need for education policy reforms to ensure these children's equal educational access. That impact may be seen in high relief because migrant and left-behind children's needs were at first so inadequately met. An overlapping need, for access to quality education in poor rural areas, was also vitally important. The portfolio's support for work addressing that educational need from many angles—often in pursuit of best practices for implementing government policies—showed many signal improvements. Elements of the Ministry of Education's long-term plan for 2010 to 2020, especially those related to education for migrant, left-behind, and poor rural children, and those pertaining to *minban* schools and to vocational education, incorporated themes and approaches from the work of many Education portfolio grantees.

The portfolio also helped to create mechanisms to engage grantees and their partners in policy discussions at both local and national levels: in the Education Innovation Awardsand in the Education Salons, for example. The larger picture here, however, pertains to the ways in which the grant support and associated activities (including intensive discussions and participation by the program officer) helped ensure the replication and sustainability of innovations that proved effective in solving problems. From the written documentation and from interviews with grantees, it is clear that the program officer's insistence on integrating replicability and sustainability into project design and implementation was key.

Grantees used a remarkable variety of methods, depending on the problem, their approach to solution, their own capabilities, and the partners they were able to involve. In developing new educational or teacher-training methods, for example, grantees might use new media (websites, *weibo*, and others) and old (print) to deliver textbooks, courseware, or audiovisual materials and to ensure their wider availability and ease of adoption. They might use publicity concerning their own projects via new or old media to spark broader public awareness, as for example did the grantee who persuaded *China Business Times* to run a vocational education column to follow reforms in that arena.

Grantees' partnerships—often sustained well beyond the end of the grant term—multiplied participants and raised awareness in numerous fields, ranging from integrating education with community development, to shaping a distinctly Chinese field of women's studies. And sustainability might be seen not only in the long-term viability of an institutional effort (e.g., the Education Innovation Awards program) that managed to attract new sources of funding, but also in the adoption of similar efforts by other (often government or state-related) actors. However difficult they may be to quantify or track, formal and informal networks of many different stakeholders working on education issues are another vital legacy of the Education program, ensuring the continued flow of information and ideas among a group of committed participants.

The portfolio's and program officer's contributions to the broader Education and philanthropic field must also be noted. The care taken in selecting grantees and in the negotiation and monitoring stages helped build much stronger research teams (for example, REAP and RCT research), more effective NGOs, and robust government-academic-civil society partnerships at local, provincial, and national levels. By encouraging networking and better linkages among all grantees, the program officer encouraged codevelopment of capacities. Many of the grantees we met with spoke eloquently about how the work under a grant from the Education portfolio helped build their analytical capacities and their ability to find and work with partners, as it also strengthened them as a team and enhanced their appreciation of the importance and, indeed, the very nature of teamwork.

B. Reflections for Domestic Philanthropy

As discussed in chapter 5, He Jin has made major contributions to the development of China's nascent philanthropic community. Recognition of that contribution is apparent from the China Donor Roundtable efforts and his numerous invitations to speak and lecture on the topic of grantmaking and philanthropic institutions. It is also well documented in some reports by leading scholars of Chinese philanthropy and civil society, detailing his approach and his contributions (for example, Kang 2015).

Every donor organization is different. Grantmaking foundations in China, as elsewhere, vary tremendously in their scale, their missions and major goals, the fields in which they work, and the kinds of issues and populations of most concern to them. It therefore seems inappropriate to recommend specific issues or arenas for grantmaking; variations among donor organizations themselves and changes in the context over time would make such recommendations inapposite in too many instances. Nor do we believe that

all donors should do things in exactly the way the Ford Foundation or any individual Ford Foundation program officer has done.

However, we think that close examination of the Education portfolio at the Ford Foundation's Beijing office provides lessons that could be of use to donors and foundation grantmakers who are relatively new to philanthropy. These lessons are of greatest relevance to those interested in *strategic grantmaking*. Non-strategic types of philanthropy are valuable and essential. One example would be disaster relief; another might be routine support of organizations that provide crucial services. In strategic grantmaking, however, the donor aims to achieve impact in some chosen arena not simply by relieving a pressing need, but by solving a problem in some fundamental way.[91]

How does a new grantmaking organization or grantmaker go about strategic grantmaking? From the detailed review of the Education portfolio's fifteen years of experience under one program officer, we can derive some basic pointers. In what follows, "grantmaker" should be understood to mean either a grantmaking foundation or an individual grantmaker.

It is essential that the grantmaker's core values and principles be clear and consistent from the outset. These are crucial in guiding grantees; they also help the grantmaker make the often difficult choices about what to fund. For a grantmaking foundation, those values and principles should be closely aligned with the field or fields in which it chooses to work.

Once the values and principles are clear, certain steps are essential in determining the grantmaker's overall strategy. The first is to analyze the context for grantmaking, which includes the grantmaking institution itself (its mission, goals, resources, and capacities) and the economic, social, cultural and organizational context of the field chosen for grantmaking. The larger context will probably present the grantmaker with many problems that could be addressed, but only one or a handful can be chosen at any given time. If the donor organization is small or has a very particular area of expertise, it is perfectly

reasonable for a grantmaker to specialize in one fairly small arena, or on one approach (for example, policy research).

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[91] Notions of strategic grantmaking differ beyond that basic point. Many have written about the divide between "old philanthropy" and "new philanthropy" as different models, with new philanthropy deriving many of its goals and approaches from the business sector. Space limitations preclude our going into these differences in detail, but any donor contemplating strategic grantmaking should be aware of them, and of the implications particular choices pose for design and implementation of grantmaking programs.

Choices depend to some extent on the grantmaker's own experience and areas of interest. They should also be based on what many grantmakers call a *theory of change*: the understanding of how change occurs, and how beneficial changes might accelerate. Often that requires looking for an *entry point*, which may be a part of a general problem the grantmaker aims to solve, or a specific example of the problem whose solution could serve as a model. In He Jin's grantmaking, we see different entry points through which change was pursued either from the bottom up (e.g., through participatory approaches) or from the top down (e.g., evidence-based pilots demonstrating best practices that could be replicated in policies implemented top-down). But the specific types of work supported and the approaches used depend as well upon the ultimate end sought. Is the goal to find a better way to organize or accomplish tasks? Or to promote a policy change or policy refinement? What, in other words, would success look like? How many different approaches and pieces of the solution need to be worked on to reach that success? How long term an effort is needed, and with input from what kinds of groups or institutions? In examining these questions, the grantmaker should be consulting and observing as widely as possible, not just sitting behind a desk. And the consultations should help the grantmaker think about the appropriate partners—not just grantees, but other potential donors who might collaborate or work out a division of labor.

With that exploration and analysis done, the grantmaker can begin identifying projects and grantees appropriate for support. As we noted in several contexts in earlier chapters, the Ford Foundation emphasizes projects that originate with the grantees themselves. This does not, however, mean that the grantmaker plays a passive role in shaping projects. Like other grantmakers in the Beijing office, He Jin attended many meetings and conferences in his field, read widely about developments in the field, and made many field visits. In all such contexts, a grantmaker may encounter people with good ideas—even if they themselves do not realize that those ideas could become projects until they are nudged to think about them in that way. A grantmaker who aims to solve a specific set of problems can also convene formal or informal discussions involving experts (researchers, practitioners, policy makers) to help clarify the problem and identify the potential solutions. In order to elicit a broad range of proposals and fresh ideas, the grantmaker can issue a call for proposals (CFP) for projects addressing the targeted problem, and select several grantees with good projects. The CFP is often used when a grantmaker is just beginning work, or when a new field is opened; the projects are often exploratory and small in scale.

If projects originate with grantees rather than being predefined and put out for bids, negotiating the grant is a critically important stage in grantmaking. It may absorb the lion's share of the grantmaker's time. The reasons for that should be apparent from the

discussion in chapter 5, which provides a set of principles and guidelines based on He Jin's practice. What we would underline here is the importance of treating the negotiation process as an opportunity for capacity building and learning for everyone: grantmaker, potential grantees, and their partners. The process will help grantees think more strategically about their goals and activities, and about how they can evaluate progress towards their goals. At the same time, this exercise can help the grantmaker refine the overall grantmaking strategy as well.

Monitoring is multi-faceted, and should involve all participants. The grantmaker has the responsibility of ensuring that the project is conducted, and the grant funds used, in accordance with the proposal. But grantees and their partners should also regularly monitor their own progress. Periodic written and financial reports are an essential but not necessarily the only vehicle for that type of self-monitoring. Some grantees, for example, may hold periodic work meetings to hear and discuss reports from staff members about their work and the progress on the grant activities. Others collect participant evaluation forms after each activity, and review the comments and suggestions carefully. As numerous grantees of He Jin's observed, the refinement of the grant proposal during the negotiation process can make both the activities and their monitoring much easier to accomplish. Other grantmakers may not negotiate in the same way or on exactly the same points, but the more carefully the negotiation is conducted with an eye to aligning goals with activities and activities with indicators, the more likely it is that monitoring will be smooth and perceived as reasonable by all participants.

Aside from the monitoring of individual grants, for a cluster of grants or a long-term corpus of work on a particular issue, the grantmaker or donor organization may find it useful to conduct evaluations to assess progress and consider whether adjustments in the strategy or its components are advisable. We mentioned two types of evaluation in this review. One was the program officer reflection memo (discussed in chapter 3), prepared annually by the program officer to reflect on progress on the strategy and steps to be taken in the following year. The other was the midterm review of particular programs, such as PHE and the grantmaking on community colleges. In the Ford Foundation such reviews are generally undertaken by consultants, in part to reduce the demands on the grantmaker's time, and in part to provide a third-party perspective. At times, conferences or meetings in which a group of grantees present and discuss their work, problems encountered and achievements made, also provided a ready way to combine monitoring, self-monitoring, and overall program evaluation. Any grantmaker should consider what would be the appropriate types of evaluation of a cluster or program of grants to keep the strategic perspective clear.

As we consider evaluation and strategic adjustments, it is important to keep in mind three points that emerge from the review of the Education program. The first is that "success," if defined as doing exactly what was projected in the proposal and achieving exactly what was expected, can be a chimera. If a project is simple and addresses only a simple and straightforward problem, that kind of predefined "success" may be reached. However, with complex social problems and innovative solutions, a degree of uncertainty is inevitable, and the level of risk matches the uncertainty. Conditions affecting the workability of the original plans may change, requiring sometimes major adjustments: changes in work location, in timing or scale or nature of activities, and in occasional cases, changes in key partners or even in the grantee. Project planners may anticipate possible risks and mitigate them with better design, but anyone conducting an innovative project addressing high–stakes problems has to learn to expect the unexpected. As should the grantmaker—which requires good lines of communication with grantees and a willingness to work flexibly with them to ensure that a project's core goals can be pursued through appropriate adjustments. Many grantees told us that this adjustment was hard to make in projects funded by other established donors. In this area, China's new domestic donors may break new philanthropic ground by combining flexibility with rigorous standards.

The second point concerning evaluation and adjustment is that impact is not just about numbers, and it is often not immediate. We interviewed numerous past grantees who could identify types of impact of their projects (policy changes, development of networks of people and institutions, building of teams and expertise, sustainability of improvements brought by their work) that were apparent only well after the grants had concluded. Projects that initially brought direct benefits to a fairly small number of people, but demonstrated an effective model for solution of problems, might eventually form a basis for an entire province's practice, or for adoption of a nationwide policy. This suggests that any grantmaker or donor organization needs to consider impact in many different respects. There may be layers of impact: central policies or regulations; local practices or regulations; organizational or societal; and team or individual. Impact can be differentiated by population, and therefore it is crucial for the grantmaker to identify the target beneficiary population and try to calibrate grantmaking to meet their needs. There is impact in discovering and mapping a heretofore ignored or misunderstood social problem, and impact in solving known problems. There is impact within time frames ranging from nearly immediate to decades long. In determining evaluation criteria for any grant or program, the grantmaker needs to be aware of these different frames for impact, and to choose the ones that are most appropriate for best use of the donor organization's limited funds.

Finally, and harking back to the point about risk, every grantmaker should be aware that sometimes even the best designed projects, conducted by the most committed and able grantees, will meet with failure. That failure may consist in the impossibility of completing the project; or it may be that the project is completed but fails to reach the goals for which it was conceived. It should not be concluded that this was a failure by the grantee or the grantmaker. If the project work is undertaken conscientiously, then any "failure" is a learning opportunity. When well analyzed, it can tell the particular grantee, other grantees, and the grantmaker a great deal about the context in which they are working and the routes for pursuing solutions to problems, and sometimes leads to better understanding of what to do next, how, and why, than would an easy sprint to success.

As our concluding thought, we would emphasize that we believe that China's philanthropic community has before it tremendous potential for growth and for effective strategic grantmaking in China. As the sector grows and matures, we hope that its members will find many ways to cooperate with and learn from each other and from grantees. We think the lessons learned will have much to contribute to the development of philanthropy throughout the world.

FORDFOUNDATION

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

As noted in chapter 1, the team conducting this program review included Kate Hartford, an independent consultant, and Dr. Li Zhiyan, Ms. Gao Rui and Ms. Zhang Fan of the Secretariat of the China Donors Roundtable (CDR). Kate bore the primary responsibility for drafting the report itself, but the CDR participants played important roles in interviewing many grantees, and Gao Rui collected and organized much of the documentation used in the report, as well as preparing the chronology provided in Appendix 3.

The information used in preparation of the report came from numerous sources, including:

a. Interviews and/or meetings with past and current grantees, sometimes individually and sometimes in a group;
b. Internal Ford Foundation documents (strategy documents prepared by field office/ program area/ program officer, reflection memos, presentations at internal meetings, grant proposals, grant recommendations, grant reports, and reviews by previous consultants);
c. Discussions with He Jin and transcripts of interviews with him conducted by others;
d. Publications, presentations and other products prepared by grantees or resulting from their projects;
e. Media reports and scholarly articles reporting on grantees and/or their projects;
f. Chinese government documents, particularly statistical reports, speeches and official reports by CCP leaders, the State Council, and relevant ministries, and texts of laws and regulations on government websites;
g. Scholarly sources providing analytical background and/or data concerning the field of Chinese education or the broader socioeconomic context.

The principal publicly available sources used are listed in Appendix 2, and are cited in the text of the report as relevant.

The interviews and meetings with grantees were conducted in China from mid-April through mid-July 2016. In all, members of the team held intensive discussions with people from fifty-nine organizations, most of them Ford Foundation grantee institutions (and other team members) but a handful from other donors or expert observers. In a particularly intensive series of meetings from June 10 to 27 while Kate Hartford was in China, she along with members of the CDR team and sometimes (but not always) He Jin met for extended discussions with people from thirty different donor and grantee organizations. A few of those meetings were small in scale, with only a responsible person from the project team meeting with Kate and Gao Rui; most included large teams and/or representatives from several grantee organizations, along with participant-observers from other institutions.

Reflecting the geographic spread of He Jin's grantees, meetings were held in Shanghai, Suzhou, Nanjing, Changsha, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Xi'an, Chengdu, Kunming, Guiyang, and Beijing. One interview was conducted via Skype, and another via WeChat.

Before the meetings or interviews, the CDR team distributed general questions for all grantees (see the outline below). We began each session by explaining the purpose of the program review, emphasizing the importance of hearing about negative as well as positive views or experiences in order to point towards areas for improvement in future. The outline of questions was followed during the meetings and interviews, but grantees were encouraged to introduce other questions or points they considered relevant for the review.

Although He Jin was present in many of these meetings (and provided useful explanations, as well as prodding participants to speak frankly about problems they may have encountered), the review team felt that his presence presented no obstacle to grantees' frankness in wrestling with issues under discussion—in itself, we think, an indication of the kind of open and candid discussions he had cultivated in the years of his work with them.

访谈提纲/ Interview Outline

回顾目的：为福特基金会以及中国资助者总结经验和教训，因此需要了解哪些有用，以及哪些需要改进。	**Purpose of the review:** To sum up experience and lessons for the Ford Foundation and Chinese donors, it is necessary to understand what is useful and what needs to be improved.
保密条款：我们不会将您的反馈直接告诉福特基金会或者何进本人，而会综合成整体报告，所有发言不会影响您与福特的合作关系，因此请您放心坦率和我们分享您的观点。	**Confidentiality:** We will not provide your feedback directly to the Ford Foundation or to He Jin [meetings in which he was not present], but will be integrating it into the final report; none of what you say will affect your cooperation with the Ford Foundation, so please rest assured that you can be frank in sharing your views with us.
问题提纲：	**Outline of questions for discussion:**
1. 您是在什么时候开始和何老师的合作，大致合作的内容是什么？ 2. 目前，您和何老师的合作还在继续吗？如果在继续，目前是什么样的状况？如果已结束，贵机构在这方面的工作是彻底结束了，还是还在和其他资助方合作，继续开展？ 3. 在执行过程中，与福特所合作的项目有无发生变化（包括目标的调整，项目执行的调整等），主要是什么原因引起了这种变化？ 4. 截止目前，项目的成效如何：1）项目短期目标的实现情况，2）项目对主要目标人群的影响，3）项目对相关议题/该领域的影响，4）项目对相关政策的影响？ 5. 在项目执行过程中，以及之后（适用于已结束的项目），对贵机构及项目团队有怎样的影响？包括但不限于如下方面，请以具体案例说明产生了何种影响： ✧ 对议题的理解 ✧ 做事情的方式 ✧ 团队能力 ✧ 外部资源 ✧ 合作关系	1. When did you begin your cooperation with Mr. He, and what was the general content of the cooperation? 2. At present, are you still cooperating with Mr. He? If so, what are the current circumstances? If it has already concluded, has your organization's work in this area completely concluded, or are you continuing to develop it with other donors? 3. If there were any changes in the course of the implementation of the project with Ford Foundation (including adjustment of the targets, adjustment in the project implementation, etc.), what were the major reasons for the change/s? 4. Up to now, what are the project's achievements in terms of a) the project's short-term goals; b) the project's impact on the main target population; c) the impact on the relevant issues/ areas; d) impact on the relevant policies? 5. What has been the impact on your organization and the project team during implementation of the project and after (if it is a completed project)? Including but not limited to the following; please illustrate the impact using concrete examples: ✧ understanding of the issue ✧ methods of work ✧ team capacities ✧ external resources ✧ cooperative relations
6、以下问题将主要了解您对资助关系的反馈和评价： • 在与资助官员何进的合作过程中，让您最为印象的过程/事件是什么？为什么让你印象深刻？ • 在与资助官员何进的合作过程中，遇到了哪些挑战？您及您的团队是如何看待的？您对资助官员的工作方式有何建议？ • 在与资助官员何进的合作过程中，您的主要收获是什么？请以具体案例说明。 • 如果请您用一个词形容与资助官员何进的合作，您会选用哪个词？请以具体案例说明。 • 您是否与福特的其他资助官员合作过？您认为何进与他们的最大不同是什么？您如何看待这种差别？与您合作过的其他资助方相	6. The following questions are primarily to understand your feedback and evaluation of the relationship with the donor: • In the course of cooperating with He Jin as program officer, what process or event most impressed you, and why? • In the course of cooperating with He Jin as program officer, what challenges did you encounter? How did you and your team view this? What advice would you offer concerning the way he works? • In the course of cooperating with He Jin as program officer, what is your main achievement? Please explain with specific example/s. • If you had to describe your cooperation with He Jin in one word, what would that word be? Please explain with a specific example.

比，包括但不限于基金会、企业、政府、国际机构，您认为何进与他们的最大不同是什么？您如何看待这种差别？	• Have you cooperated with other Ford Foundation program officers? What would you consider the biggest difference between them? How do you view this difference? What is the biggest difference between He Jin and other donors you have cooperated with, including but not limited to foundations, enterprises, government, international organizations? How do you view this difference?
补充性问题：是否有相关的报告、报道或出版物等资料，可以帮助我们更好地理解贵机构和福特所合作的项目，及其效果？	**Supplementary question:** Are there any materials such as reports or publications that can help us better understand the projects that your organization cooperated on with Ford Foundation, and their results?

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APPENDIX 3. CHRONOLOGY OF CHINESE EDUCATION

Prepared by Gao Rui[92]

Contents

一、中央重要文件 & 关注重点（从教育部网站中筛选出）

发布时间	发布部委	文件名称	重点内容
1982 年 12 月 4 日	第五届全国人民代表大会第五次会议	新修订的《中华人民共和国宪法》	第四十六条规定，“中华人民共和国公民有受教育的权利和义务”；第十九条规定，“国家举办各种学校，普及初等义务教育”。这是新中国成立以来我国第一次以国家根本大法的形式对普及义务教育作出的明确规定。
1985 年 5 月 27 日	中共中央	《中共中央关于教育体制改革的决定》[93]	“义务教育，即依法律规定适龄儿童和青少年都必须接受，国家、社会、家庭必须予以保证的国民教育”，要“有步骤地实行九年制义务教育”。这是中央文件中首次提出实行九年义务教育。

[92] Note: This appendix is provided for reference only. Many passages, even those appearing without quotation marks, may be directly quoted from the text of laws or regulations. Readers wishing to cite or quote should check the originals.
[93] http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_177/200407/2482.html.

1986 年 4 月 12 日	第六届全国人民代表大会第四次会议	《中华人民共和国义务教育法》	以国家立法的形式正式确立我国实施九年制义务教育
1992 年 10 月 12 日	党的十四大		确定两基目标：“到本世纪末，基本普及九年义务教育，基本扫除青壮年文盲”
1993 年	中共中央、国务院	《中国教育改革和发展纲要》	提出各级各类教育发展目标： • 全面基本普及九年义务教育 • 高中阶段职业技术学校在校学生人数有较大幅度的增加 • 高等学校培养的专门人才适应经济、科技和社会发展的需求，集中力量办好一批重点大学和重点学科 • 全国基本扫除青壮年文盲，使青壮年中的文盲率降到百分之五以下
1998 年 12 月 24 日	教育部	面向 21 世纪教育振兴行动计划 [94]	《面向 21 世纪教育振兴行动计划》，是在贯彻落实《教育法》及《中国教育改革和发展纲要》的基础上提出的跨世纪教育改革和发展的施工蓝图。主要目标是： 到 2000 年： • 全国基本普及九年义务教育，基本扫除青壮年文盲，大力推进素质教育； • 完善职业教育培训和继续教育制度 • 积极稳步发展高等教育，高等教育入学率达到 11%左右；瞄准国家创新体系的目标，培养造就一批高水平的具有创新能力的人才 到 2010 年： • 在全面实现“两基”目标的基础上，城市和经济发达地区有步骤地普及高中阶段教育，全国人口受教育年限达到发展中国家的先进水平 • 高等教育规模有较大扩展，入学率接近 15%，若干所高校和一批重点学科进入或接近世界一流水平
1999 年	中共中央	《中共中央国务院关于深化教育改革全面推进素质教育的决定》 [95]	• 全面推进素质教育，培养适应二十一世纪现代化建设需要的社会主义新人： 实施素质教育，就是全面贯彻党的教育方针，以提高国民素质为根本宗旨，以培养学生的创新精神和实践能力为重点 • 深化教育改革，为实施素质教育创造条件 a 地方各级人民政府要继续将＂两基＂作为教育工作的＂重中之重＂，确保 2000 年＂两基＂目标的实现和达标后的巩固与提高。 b 2000 年后，要继续实施“国家贫困地区义务教育工程” c 调整现有教育体系结构，扩大高中阶段教育和高等教育的规模，拓宽人才成长的道路，减缓升学压力。通过多种形式积极发展高等教育，到 2010 年，我国同龄人口的高等教育入学率要从现在的百分之九提高到百分之十五左右。 • 优化结构，建设全面推进素质教育的高质量的教师队伍 a 2010 年前后，具备条件的地区力争使小学和初中阶段教育的专任教师的学历分别提升到专科和本科层次，经济发达地区高中阶段教育的专任教师和校长中获硕士学位者应达到一定比例。提高高等学校教师中具有博士学位教师的比例。 • 加强领导，全党、全社会共同努力开创素质教育的新局面 a 各级人民政府必须按照《中华人民共和国教育法》的规定，确保教育经费有较大增长。中央决定，自 1998 年起至 2002 年的 5 年中，提高中央

[94] http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s6986/200407/2487.html.
[95] http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_177/200407/2478.html.

			本级财政支出中教育经费所占的比例，每年提高 1 个百分点。
2001 年 5 月 29 日	国务院	《国务院关于基础教育改革与发展的决定》[96]	以贯彻十五发展规划，明确： • 确立基础教育在社会主义现代化建设中的战略地位，坚持基础教育优先发展 • 完善管理体制，保障经费投入，推进农村义务教育持续健康发展 • 深化教育教学改革，扎实推进素质教育 • 完善教师教育体系，深化人事制度改革，大力加强中小学教师队伍建设 • 推进办学体制改革，促进社会力量办学健康发展 • 加强领导，动员全社会关心支持，保障基础教育改革与发展的顺利进行
2003 年 9 月 17 日	国务院	《国务院关于进一步加强农村教育工作的决定》[97]	• 到 2007 年，西部地区普及九年义务教育(以下简称“普九”)人口覆盖率要达到 85%以上，青壮年文盲率降到 5%以下 • 力争 2010 年在全国实现全面普及九年义务教育和全面提高义务教育质量的目标 • 加大城市对农村教育的支持和服务,促进城市和农村教育协调发展……城市职业学校要扩大面向农村的招生规模，到 2007 年争取年招生规模达到 350 万人 • 到 2007 年，争取全国农村义务教育阶段家庭经济困难学生都能享受到“两免一补”(免杂费、免书本费、补助寄宿生生活费)，努力做到不让学生因家庭经济困难而失学
2004 年 2 月 10 日	教育部	《2003-2007 年教育振兴行动计划》[98]	• 重点推进农村教育发展与改革 a 实施国家西部地区“两基”攻坚计划。到 2007 年底，力争使西部地区普及九年义务教育人口覆盖率达到 85%以上，青壮年文盲率下降到 5%以下。以实施“农村寄宿制学校建设工程”为突破口，加强西部农村初中、小学建设。西部各省、自治区、直辖市及新疆生产建设兵团要分别实现各自的“两基”目标。要将“两基”攻坚作为西部大开发的一项重要任务，精心组织实施。 b 到 2007 年，争取全国农村义务教育阶段家庭经济困难学生都能享受到“两免一补”(免杂费、免书本费、补助寄宿生生活费)，努力做到不让学生因家庭经济困难而失学。 • 重点推进高水平大学和重点学科建设 a 继续实施“985 工程”，努力建设若干所世界一流大学和一批国际知名的高水平研究型大学 b 继续实施“211 工程”，进一步以学科建设为核心，凝炼学科方向，汇聚学科队伍，构筑学科基地 • 实施“新世纪素质教育工程”：以培养德智体美等全面发展的一代新人为根本宗旨，以培养学生的创新精神和实践能力为重点 • 实施“职业教育与培训创新工程” • 实施“高等学校教学质量与教学改革工程” • 实施“促进毕业生就业工程” • 实施“高素质教师和管理队伍建设工程”
2006 年 6 月	全国人大常委会	新修订的《中华人民共和国义务教育法》	第六条首次以法律的形式提出“促进义务教育均衡发展”。这是我国法律中第一次提到“义务教育均衡发展”。

[96] http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/201412/t20141217_181775.html.
[97] http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/tnull_27725.html.
[98] http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/tnull_27717.html.

2007 年 10 月 15 日	胡锦涛总书记在中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上的报告中提出		“促进社会公平正义，努力使全体人民学有所教”，“教育是民族振兴的基石，教育公平是社会公平的重要基础”，“促进义务教育均衡发展”。这是党的政治报告中第一次提出“义务教育均衡发展”的思想。
2008	国务院	《国务院关于做好免除城市义务教育阶段学生学杂费工作的通知》[99]	• 全面免除城市义务教育阶段学生学杂费 – 从 2008 年秋季学期开始，全部免除城市义务教育阶段公办学校学生学杂费 • 切实解决好进城务工人员随迁子女就学问题 – 进城务工人员随迁子女接受义务教育要以流入地为主、公办学校为主解决 – 对符合当地政府规定接收条件的进城务工人员随迁子女，要按照相对就近入学的原则统筹安排在公办学校就读，免除学杂费，不收借读费
2009	中央编办、教育部、财政部	关于进一步落实《国务院办公厅转发中央编办、教育部、财政部关于制定中小学教职工编制标准意见的通知》有关问题的通知	• 进一步改进农村中小学教职工编制核定工作。按照中央关于推进基本公共服务均等化的要求，为适应义务教育实行“以县为主”管理体制的需要，解决部分农村地区中小学教职工编制偏紧的问题 • 满足教育教学基本需要出发，对内地民族班中小学，举办民族班的城镇普通中学和开设双语教学课程的班级，寄宿制中小学，乡镇中心小学，安排教师脱产进修、现代化教学设备达到一定规模的学校，承担示范和实验任务的学校，山区、湖区、海岛、牧区和教学点较多地区的中小学，按照从严从紧的原则适当增加编制
2010 年	党中央、国务院召开第四次全国教育工作会议	《国家中长期教育改革和发展规划纲要（2010-2020 年）	提出了今后 10 年我国义务教育改革发展的目标、任务和举措，重点在于促进义务教育的均衡发展和提高教育质量
2010 年		国家中长期人才发展规划纲要(2010—2020 年）[100]	战略目标： 到 2020 年，我国人才发展的总体目标是：培养和造就规模宏大、结构优化、布局合理、素质优良的人才队伍，确立国家人才竞争比较优势，进入世界人才强国行列，为在本世纪中叶基本实现社会主义现代化奠定人才基础
2012 年 10 月 1 日起实施	国务院	《教育督导条例》[101]	国务院 成立教育督导委员会，独立行使督导职能，包括督政督学、 监测评估
2015 年 6 月 1 日	国务院	《关于印发农村教师支持计划（2015-2020 年）》[102]	总目标： 到 2017 年，力争使乡村学校优质教师来源得到多渠道扩充，乡村教师资源配置得到改善，教育教学能力水平稳步提升，各方面合理待遇依法得到较好保障，职业吸引力明显增强，逐步形成“下得去、留得住、教得好”的局面。到 2020 年，努力造就一支素质优良、甘于奉献、扎根乡村的教师队伍，为基本实现教育现代化提供坚强有力的师资保障。
2016. 6. 15	国务院	国务院办公厅关于加快中西部教育发展的指导意见[103]	总体目标：到 2020 年，中西部地区各级各类学校办学条件显著改善，教育普及程度明显提高，教育结构趋于合理，教育质量不断提升，教育保障水平进一步提高，人民群众接受良好教育的机会显著增加，支撑中西部经济社会发展的能力切实增强，中西部地区教育水平与东部发达地区差距进一步缩小，教育现代化取得重要进展。

[99] http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/tnull_38125.html.
[100] http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-06/06/content_1621777.htm.
[101] http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-09/17/content_2226290.htm.
[102] http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/201506/t20150612_190354.html.
[103] http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/201606/t20160615_268538.html.

民办教育相关			
2004 年 4 月 1 日起实施	2004 年 2 月 25 日国务院第 41 次常务会议通过	中华人民共和国民办教育促进法实施条例 [104]	
高校贫困生相关政策			
1999 年	教育部、财政部	《关于进一步加强高校资助经济困难学生工作的通知》	
2004 年 6 月	国务院	国务院办公厅转发教育部财政部人民银行银监会关于进一步完善国家助学贷款工作若干意见的通知	
	人民银行&银监会	《关于认真落实国家助学贷款新政策保证高校贫困生顺利入学的通知》	
	国务院办公厅	国务院办公厅关于切实解决高校贫困家庭学生困难问题的通知[105]	• 从 2004 年秋季开学起，中央财政将大幅度增加对全国普通高校中品学兼优的贫困家庭本专科学生的助学奖励经费，以帮助和激励更多的贫困家庭学生勤奋学习、努力进取。 • 各省级人民政府也应结合本地区实际，设立面向品学兼优的贫困家庭学生的政府助学奖学金，加大经费投入，完善奖励办法。 • 各高校每年必须从本校有关收入中提取一定比例的经费，用于对贫困家庭学生进行资助。 • 各高校要根据《通知》要求，设置独立的学生资助办公室，尽快在现有编制内调剂配备专职工作人员，归口管理全校的学生资助工作。

二、教育公平

1. 基本概念&在中国首次提出

- OECD 对教育公平的界定，包括如下四个方面（*quote from “中国教育发展与政策 30 年”，by 张秀兰*）：
  - a 机会均等：是否所有的个体或群体都有相同的机会进入教育系统的某个特定学习阶段？
  - b 学习环境公平/手段公平：是否所有的个体都能在相同的学习环境中学习？
  - c 成果公平或成就平等：是否所有学生都掌握了专门的知识和技能？尤其是，来自不同社区背景的个体是否可以取得相同的学习结果？
  - d 使用教育成果的公平：离开教育系统，个体或群体在工作中，或在更广泛的社区生活中，拥有相同的机会来使用他们所获得的知识和技能。
- 教育公平首次在中央文件中被提出是在 2006 年的十六届六中全会公报中。2007 年，胡锦涛在十七大报告中再次强调，“教育公平是社会公平的重要基础”。

2. Significant Discussions related to Equity in Education

- 2006 年，*北京大学*出版社出版《中国教育公平与现实》[106]（*链接可看目录及全文*），by 杨东平。

[104] http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A02/zfs_left/s5911/moe_620/tnull_3183.html.
[105] http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A02/zfs_left/s5911/moe_620/tnull_3183.html.
[106] http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/68294/72286/index.html.

其中对中国教育公平发展轨迹的描述如下：

a 文革前的“十七年教育”：计划经济时代，制度特征是其主要的制度特征是突出政治、阶级路线政策、城乡二元格局、优先发展高教、重点学校制度等，主要体现精英主义的价值和路线。

b 文革时期：教育的重心下移至农村，重在普及教育，是一种低重心、公平优先和“平均主义”的发展模式。这一时期教育公平的特征是： 权利不平等，教育面向大多数人，低水平的教育机会均衡。

c 1980s 的教育：对文革拨乱反正，教育重新蹈入体现国家主义目标的精英路线。教育公平问题主要表现为制度性原因造成的城乡差距、地区差距、学校差距等。这一时期教育公平的特征是： 权利平等，能力主义取向的分数面前的平等，面向少数人的精英型教育。

d 1990s 中期之后的教育：由于市场经济和教育市场化的发展，单一公立学校的格局被打破，入学机会的单一分数标准也被打破。教育在规模、数量上的大发展，使其具有全民教育的价值。但旧有的制度性障碍在市场环境中的演化，产生转型社会特殊的教育问题：教育机会扩大、教育差距扩大，即“不公平的增长”。

- 2012 年 11 月 13，十八大新闻中心举行主题为“中国的教育公平”网络访谈（全文见：*访谈*文字实录[107]），邀请教育部部长、党组书记袁贵仁，山东大学党委书记李守信，广西壮族自治区平果县希望小学校长周标亮，甘肃省嘉峪关市酒钢三中教师闫桂珍等人参与。

  四大关键举措（by 袁贵仁）：1）健全资助体系，2）努力缩小区域差距，3）加快缩小城乡差距，4）切实缩小校际差距。

  党的十八大（2012 年）报告对大力促进教育公平提出明确要求：主要包括四方面内容：一是合理配置教育资源，重点向农村、边远、贫困、民族地区倾斜；二是加强薄弱环节，支持特殊教育、民族教育；三是扶持困难群体，提高家庭经济困难学生资助水平，积极推动农民工子女平等接受教育；四是大力发展民办教育，为学生提供更多的选择。

  并将“推进基本公共教育服务均等化”作为发展目标。

三、两基：基本普及九年义务教育，基本扫除青壮年文盲

3. 首次提出

- 1992 年，十四大确定两基目标：“到本世纪末，基本普及九年义务教育，基本扫除青壮年文盲”

4. 发展阶段

- 2003 年，实施国家西部地区“两基”攻坚计划

四、义务教育

5. 关键节点

- 1982 年 12 月 4 日，第五届全国人民代表大会第五次会议通过的新修订的《中华人民共和国宪法》第四十六条规定，“中华人民共和国公民有受教育的权利和义务”；第十九条规定，“国家举办各种学校，普及初等义务教育”。这是新中国成立以来我国第一次以国家根本大法的形式对普及义务教育作出的明确规定。
- 1985 年，中共中央*颁布*《关于教育梯须知改革的决定》，提出要实施九年义务教育制度。
- 1986 年，发布《*中华人民共和国*义务教育法》，将义务教育以法律形式确定下来。
- 2005 年 11 月 11 日，教育部发布《中国全民教育国家报告》，提出到 2010 年，全国农村地区全部实行免费义务教育，到 2015 年在全国普遍实行免费义务教育。这是中央第一次明确提出实施免费义务教育的时间表。
- 2006 年，修订《*中华人民共和国*义务教育法》，回归了义务教育免费的本质，对义务教育经费保障作了法律规定：
- 2007 年，全面推行农村义务教育免除学杂费政策
- 2008 年，国务院下发《国务院关于做好免除城市义务教育阶段学生学杂费工作的通知》，形成城乡统一的义务教育普惠制。
- 2012 年，为落实《中长期发展纲要》，国务院下发《国务院关于深入推进义务教育均衡发展的意

[107] http://www.china.com.cn/zhibo/zhuanti/18da/2012-11/13/content_27080157.htm

见》[108]，推进义务教育均衡发展的基本目标是：

a 每一所学校符合国家办学标准，办学经费得到保障。
b 教育资源满足学校教育教学需要，开齐国家规定课程。
c 教师配置更加合理，提高教师整体素质。
d 学校班额符合国家规定标准，消除“大班额”现象。
e 率先在县域内实现义务教育基本均衡发展，县域内学校之间差距明显缩小。
f 到 2015 年，全国义务教育巩固率达到 93%，实现基本均衡的县（市、区）比例达到 65%；到 2020 年，全国义务教育巩固率达到 95%，实现基本均衡的县（市、区）比例达到 95%。

6. 国家重要工程及项目

- 国家贫困地区义务教育工程
- 全国中小学危房改造工程
- 农村寄宿制学校建设工程
- 两免一补政策：指国家向农村义务教育阶段的贫困家庭学生免费提供教科书、免除杂费，并给寄宿生补助一定生活费。
  a 开始时间：
  b 2005 年 2 月，财政部、教育部发布《关于加快国家扶贫开发工作重点县“两免一补”实施不发有关工作的意见》
  c 2005 年底，出台《国务院关于深化农村义务教育经费保障机制改革的通知》，列出了面向全国农民义务教育阶段学生的全面资助计划时间表（如下），括了大政策所覆盖的目标群体。
- 农村中小学现代远程教育工程

7. 关键数据

- 义务教育普及率（数据来源：国家统计局）

	学龄儿童净入学率	小学升初中
1980	93.9%	75.5%
1990	97.8%	74.6%
1995	98.5%	90.8%
2000	99.1%	94.9%
2005	99.2%	98.4%

五、农村教育&西部教育（薄弱地区教育）

8. 关键政策&重要会议/讲话

- 2003 年 9 月：国务院-《国务院关于进 一步加强农村教育工作的决定》
- 再一次明确农村教育的重中之重的地位,要求加快推进“两基”攻坚,深化农村教育改革,大力发展职业教育和成人教育;落实义务教育“以县为主”的管理体制,加大教育经费投入,完善经费保障机制;建立资助家庭经济困难学生就学制度。建立城镇中小学教师到乡村任教服务期制度。为减轻农民的负担、遏止乱收费，决定从 2004 年起对农村义务教育全面推行“一费制”。根据《决定》,争取到 2007 年全国农村义务教育阶段家庭经济困难学生都能享受“两免一补”（免杂费、书本费,补助寄宿生活费).
- 2003 年 12 月，《国家西部地区“两基”攻坚计划（2004-2007 年）》
- 2004 年 3 月，温家宝在十届全国人大的《政府工作报告》中宣告，“2004 年要启动西部地区两基攻坚计划，到 2007 年使西部地区基本普及九年义务教育，基本扫除青壮年文盲，中央财政将为此投入 100 亿。”在这个攻坚计划框架下，主要采取了如下三个措施：
  a 寄宿制学校建设工程→“进得来”
  b 两免一补→“留得住”
  c 农村中小学现代远程教育工程→学得好
- 2005 年 3 月，温家宝在全国人大所作的《政府工作报告》中宣布，“从今年起，免除国家扶贫开发工作重点县农村及义务教育阶段贫困家庭学生的书本费、杂费，并不住寄宿学生生活费（即两免一补）。”

[108] http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/201209/t20120907_141773.html.

- 2005-2007，三年内，全部落实“两免一补”政策，国家财政共安排 227 亿元资金。
- 2005 年 12 月 23 日，国务院发出《关于深化农村义务教育经费保障机制改革的通知》[109]，明确提出：从 2006 年开始，全部免除西部地区农村义务教育阶段学生学杂费，2007 年扩大到中部和东部地区；对贫困家庭学生免费提供教科书并补助寄宿生生活费。
- 2014 年，全面改善贫困地区义务教育薄弱学校基本办学条件工作启动
  2014 年 4 月 23 日，教育部办公厅、国家发展改革委办公厅、财政部办公厅印发《关于制定全面改善贫困地区义务教育薄弱学校基本办学条件实施方案的通知》
  7 月 18 日，三部委办公厅印发了《全面改善贫困地区义务教育薄弱学校基本办学条件底线要求》，共计 20 项，要求将其作为优先保障的项目、必须完成的建设内容予以优先落实。
  11 月 1 日，财政部、教育部发出通知，将营养改善计划国家试点地区营养膳食补助标准从每生每天 3 元提高至 4 元。
  2014 年，中央共投入“全面改薄”资金 492.4 亿元。其中，薄改计划 310 亿元，初中工程 50 亿元，中小学校舍维修改造长效机制经费 132.4 亿元。
- 2014 年 12 月，国务院办公厅，《国务院办公厅关于印发国家贫困地区儿童发展规划（2014—2020 年）的通知》[110]
  实施范围。集中连片特殊困难地区 680 个县从出生到义务教育阶段结束的农村儿童。
  总体目标：到 2020 年，集中连片特殊困难地区儿童发展整体水平基本达到或接近全国平均水平
  a 保障儿童教育：学前三年毛入园率达到 75%。义务教育巩固率达到 93%，教育总体质量、均衡发展水平显著提高。视力、听力、智力残疾儿童少年义务教育入学率达到 90%。

9. 大背景：西部大开发战略（补充）

何老师提醒，国家对于西部地区教育的支持是在“西部大开发”战略框架下开展的。何老师称，这也是为什么 PHE 项目的合作学校主要在西北地区。

- 2000 年 1 月，国务院成立了西部地区开发领导小组。由时任国务院总理朱镕基担任组长，时任国务院副总理温家宝担任副组长，已落实党中央作出的实施西部大开发、加快中西部地区发展的重大战略决策。
  经过全国人民代表大会审议通过之后，国务院西部开发办于 2000 年 3 月正式开始运作。
- 2006 年 12 月 8 日，国务院常务会议审议并原则通过《西部大开发“十一五”规划》[111]。并在第八项“着力改善基本公共服务”中，明确提出“优先发展教育：
  a 建立健全农村义务教育经费保障机制，落实对农村义务教育阶段学生的“两免一补”政策，全部免除学杂费，扩大对贫困家庭学生免费提供教科书覆盖面，提高寄宿生生活补助标准。
  b 普及九年义务教育，降低初中阶段辍学率，加大扫盲工作力度，确保西部地区“两基”攻坚任务如期完成并巩固成果。
  c 继续实施农村寄宿制学校建设工程，启动实施中西部农村初中改造工程。
  d 大力发展职业教育特别是中等职业教育，加快建立城乡职业教育和培训网络，加快推进职业教育基础能力建设。
  e 支持西部地区高等学校办好一批重点专业和学科，继续实施“对口支援西部高等学校计划”，鼓励和支持东中西部地区之间开展教育对口支援和联合办学、联合研究等交流与合作，加快西部地区教师队伍建设。
  f 实施成人继续教育和再就业培训工程，加强对应届中学毕业生的就业前职业技能培训，提高在职职工、中学毕业生和城镇失业人员的就业能力、工作能力、职业转换能力和创业能力。
  g 健全教育资助制度和助学体系，着力推进教育公平。
- 2012 年 2 月 20 日，国务院批复《西部大开发“十二五”规划》[112]，奋斗目标包括：主要包括：区域经济增速和城乡居民收入增速“双高于”全国平均水平，新增铁路营业里程 1.5 万公里，森林覆盖率力争达到 19%左右，单位地区生产总值能源消耗下降 15%左右，单位工业增加值用水量降低 30%，九年义务教育巩固率达到 90%以上，城镇化率超过 45%等等。并提出教育发展重点工程：
  a 教育信息化：支持农村学校信息基础设施建设，使农村中小学 75%以上的班级配备多媒体远程教学设备。农村地区有计算机教室的中小学达到 50%以上，促进国家优质教育资源共享。
  b 农村义务教育阶段学校教师特设岗位计划：公开招募高校毕业生到国家级扶贫开发工作重点县、原“两基”攻坚县、边境县、民族自治县县以下农村义务教育阶段学校任教。

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[109] http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/tnull_27721.html.
[110] http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/201501/t20150116_183064.html.
[111] http://news.sina.com.cn/green/2010-12-02/113521571334_6.shtml.
[112] http://www.agri.cn/cszy/BJ/whsh/ncwh/201202/t20120221_2486222.htm.

c 民族教育发展计划：支持一批民族地区教育基础薄弱县普通高中建设，扩大培养能力。加强民族地区双语教师培训，支持民族院校建设。
d 西部高等教育振兴计划：支持地方高校建设，重点加强实验室、图书馆等办学设施建设，着力提高教育质量。加大东部高校对口支持西部高校计划实施力度。
e 教育扶贫：支持大中城市职业学校定向招收集中连片特殊困难地区学生接受教育并优先推荐就业。先行在广西、甘肃、宁夏等省区开展试点。
f 边境地区学校建设：支持边境地区重点口岸所在县及乡镇建设义务教育学校、普通高中和中等职业学校。
g 农村学前教育：支持农村地区充分利用中小学富余校舍和社会资源，改扩建或新建乡村幼儿园，对农村幼儿园园长和教师进行培训。

- 2016 年 5 月，国家发展改革委在四川成都召开《西部大开发“十三五”规划》（以下简称《规划》）编制工作西部地区座谈会。
  并说明在西部大开发十三五规划中，要实现“六大突破”。一要深化改革扩大开放，构建公平有序的市场体系。二要加强创新引领支撑，提升创新驱动的增长动力。三要推进绿色永续发展，筑牢支撑发展的生态屏障。四要立足资源禀赋条件，发展有竞争力的特色优势产业。五要瞄准畅通网络提升密度，建设健全高效的基础设施体系。六要促进成果协调共享，努力实现脱贫攻坚决定性胜利和公共服务全方位提升

10. 现阶段发展重点&相关政策

- 2016 年 6 月 15 日，《国务院办公厅关于加快中西部教育发展的指导意见[113]》，在意见中指出下一阶段西部教育发展的目标和重点：
  总体目标：到 2020 年，中西部地区各级各类学校办学条件显著改善，教育普及程度明显提高，教育结构趋于合理，教育质量不断提升，教育保障水平进一步提高，人民群众接受良好教育的机会显著增加，支撑中西部经济社会发展的能力切实增强，中西部地区教育水平与东部发达地区差距进一步缩小，教育现代化取得重要进展。

六、随迁子女/流动儿童教育

11. 关键发展节点

- 2000 年前，政策导向以限制为主，“流出地政府必须严格控制义务教育阶段适龄儿童外流。”
- 2001 年—分界点：对流动人口教育政策由限制转为支持
  《国务院关于基础教育改革与发展的决定》出台，提出要重视解决流动耳扣子女接受义务教育的问题，将流出地政府的责任为住改变为流入地政府管理为主。
- 2003 年 9 月，教育部六部委联合出台《关于进一步做好进城务工就业农民子女义务教育工作的意见》，提出农民工子女义务教育的政策框架：
  a 农民工子女上学以流入地公办中小学为主;
  b 农民工子 女九年义务教育普及率要达到当地水平;
  c 农民工子女义务教育要纳 入城市社会事业发展计划;农民工子女上学收费与当地学生一视同仁 ;
  d 农民工子女转学返学禁收任何费用;
  e 设 立 民 办 “民工子女学校” 条件酌情放宽等。2003 年 9 月 1 日,北京明圆学校被海淀教委批 准颁发办学许可证,成为北京市第一个获得合法身份的打工子弟学校.
- 2006 年，《国务院关于解决农民工问题的若干意见》中，又进一步指出：保障农民工子女平等接受义务教育。输入地政府要承担起弄农民工同住子女义务教育的责任，将农民工子女义务教育纳入当地教育发展规划，列入教育经费预算，以全日制公办中小学为主接收农民工子女入学，并按照实际在校人数拨付学校公用经费。
- 2008 年 8 月 12 日，国务院下发《国务院关于做好免除城市义务教育阶段学生学杂费工作通知》，提出对进程务工人员随迁子女要免除学杂费、不收借读费。
- 2012 年 8 月，教育部 发展改革委 公安部 人力资源社会保障部等四部委联合， 《关于做好进城务工人员随迁子女接受义务教育后在当地参加升学考试工作的意见》[114]
  a 落实“以流入地政府为主，以全日制公办中小学为主”政策

[113] http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/201606/t20160615_268538.html.
[114] http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/201208/t20120831_141376.html.

b 因地制宜制定随迁子女升学考试具体政策…各省、自治区、直辖市有关随迁子女升学考试的方案原则上应于 2012 年年底前出台

- 2016 年，《教育部关于做好 2016 年普通高校招生工作的通知》中规定：
  a 畅通农村和贫困地区学生纵向流动的渠道： 继续实施国家、地方、高校三个定向招生专项计划[115]（自 2012 年起），国家专项计划从 5 万人增加到 6 万人。
  b 落实和完善随迁子女在流入地升学政策。各地要进一步细化和落实政策措施，确保符合条件的进城务工人员及其他非户籍就业人员随迁子女都能在流入地参加高考。

七、留守儿童

12. 重要政策/文件

- 2016 年 6 月 4 日，国务院办公厅关于同意建立农村留守儿童关爱保护工作部际联席会议制度的函。由此建立农村留守儿童关爱保护工作联席会议制度，“在国务院领导下，统筹协调全国农村留守儿童关爱保护工作。研究拟订农村留守儿童关爱保护工作政策措施和年度工作计划，向国务院提出建议……”

八、职业教育

13. 关键政策

- 2002 年 12 月：全国人大常委会通过《民办教育促进法》
  确认了民办学校可 以 获 得 “合理回报”而被视为有利于民办教育发展的重大突破》
- 2002 年，国务院，《关于大力推进职业教育改革与发展的决定》
- 2004 年，国务院七部委，《关于进一步加强职业教育工作的若干意见》
- 2005 年，国务院，《关于大力发展职业教育的决定》[116]
  a 到 2010 年，中等职业教育招生规模达到 800 万人，与普通高中招生规模大体相当；高等职业教育招生规模占高等教育招生规模的一半以上。“十一五”期间，为社会输送 2500 多万名中等职业学校毕业生，1100 多万名高等职业院校毕业生。
  b 职业教育要“以服务社会主义现代化建设为宗旨，培养数以亿计的高素质劳动者和数以千万计的高技能专门人才”
  c 重点建设高水平的培养高素质技能型人才的 1000 所示范性中等职业学校和 100 所示范性高等职业院校。
  d 从 2006 年起，城市教育费附加安排用于职业教育的比例，一般地区不低于 20%，已经普及九年义务教育的地区不低于 30%。
- 2006 年，财政部&教育部，《完善中等职业教育贫困家庭学生资助体系的若干意见》
- 2007 年，国务院，《国务院关于建立健全普通本科高校、高等职业学校和中等职业学校家庭经济困难学生资助政策体系的意见》，规定对于中等职业学校，“国家助学金资助所有全日制在校农村学生和城市家庭经济困难学生，资助标准为每生每年 1500 元。”
- 2014 年，国务院，《国务院关于加快发展现代职业教育的决定》[117]
  目标任务：到 2020 年，形成适应发展需求、产教深度融合、中职高职衔接、职业教育与普通教育相互沟通，体现终身教育理念，具有中国特色、世界水平的现代职业教育体系。
  a 结构规模更加合理：高等职业教育规模占高等教育的一半以上，到 2020 年，中等职业教育在校生达到 2350 万人，专科层次职业教育在校生达到 1480 万人，接受本科层次职业教育的学生达到一定规模。从业人员继续教育达到 3.5 亿人次。
  b 院校布局和专业设置更加适应经济社会需求：重点提升面向现代农业、先进制造业、现代服务业、战略性新兴产业和社会管理、生态文明建设等领域的人才培养能力。
  c 职业院校办学水平普遍提高：专兼结合的“双师型”教师队伍建设进展显著。建成一批世界一流的职业院校和骨干专业，形成具有国际竞争力的人才培养高地。
  d 发展环境更加优化：现代职业教育制度基本建立，政策法规更加健全，相关标准更加科学规范，监管机制更加完善。引导和鼓励社会力量参与的政策更加健全。

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[115] http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/A15_zcwj/201204/xxgk_134392.html.
[116] http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/tnull_27730.html.
[117] http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/201406/t20140622_170691.html.

14. 现阶段发展目标&发展策略

- 2014 年，国务院发布《关于加快发展现代职业教育的决定》，以及教育部等六部门编制《现代职业教育体系建设规划（2014-2020）》[118]

  总体目标是：牢固确立职业教育在国家人才培养体系中的重要位置，到 2020 年，形成适应发展需求、产教深度融合、中职高职衔接、职业教育与普通教育相互沟通，体现终身教育理念，具有中国特色、世界水平的现代职业教育体系，建立人才培养立交桥，形成合理教育结构，推动现代教育体系基本建立、教育现代化基本实现。

  具体分两步走：

  a 2015 年，初步形成现代职业教育体系框架。

  b 2020 年，基本建成中国特色现代职业教育体系。

  基本原则：

  a 坚持政府统筹规划

  b 坚持市场需求导向

  c 坚持产教融合发展

  d 坚持各级各类教育协调发展

九、高等教育

15. 阶段性发展

- 1993 年，中共中央、国务院联合颁布的《中国教育改革和发展纲要》中，对高等教育提出的目标是：高等学校培养的专门人才适应经济、科技和社会发展的需求，集中力量办好一批重点大学和重点学科，高层次专门人才的培养要立足于国内，教育质量、科学技术水平和办学效益有明显提高。
- 1990s，教育进入“教育产业化”的发展道路。促进了高校规模的扩大，但教育的独立性以及人的发展需求，在很大程度上被模糊和忽视。（引自：张秀兰“中国教育发展与政策 30 年）
- 2003 年 5 月，教育部下发《关于规范并加强普通高校以新的机 制和模式试办独立学院管理的若干意见》，但该意见意见引起社会各界的极大争议：

  支持的意见认为，发展独立学院有利于迅速扩大优质教育资源，更大程度地满足社会 需求，具有很大的合理性。此举的积极意义，标志着高等本科教育 向民间资本的开放，有利于通过吸纳民间资本，扩大高等教育资源， 提高教育效率。

  批评和反驳的论点主要是：政府的职能是制 定规则，维护公平竞争的市场环境。公立学校拿国家的投入和过去 几十年靠政府资源形成的品牌与民办学校竞争，没有任何公平性可 言，进一步加剧了民办和公办学校之间的不公平竞争，使民办学校 的发展空间受到打压。政府理应退出竞争性领域，把公共竞争中所 获的利益和责任还给社会，还给学校。
- 2004 年，教育部高调批评教育“产业化”思路， 教育部长周济在新闻发布会上明确提出“政府在发展教育事业上，始终负有主要责任。教育是一项崇高的社会公益事业，绝不能产业化。”（引自：张秀兰“中国教育发展与政策 30 年）
- 2004 年，《2003-2007 年教育振兴行动计划》[119]，建设世界一流大学和高水平大学是党和国家的重大决策：

  a 提出继续实施“985 工程”，努力建设若干所世界一流大学和一批国际知名的高水平研究型大学。

  b 继续实施“211 工程”：使一批重点学科尽快达到国际先进水平

  c 以“长江学者奖励计划”和“高等学校创新团队计划”为重点，实施“高层次创造性人才计划”，扶持创新团队的建设，加大对中青年学科带头人和学术骨干的培养力度，鼓励和支持优秀人才和优秀群体健康成长、建功立业。要善于利用国际国内两种人才资源，特别要面向世界积极引进优秀拔尖人才。

  d 推进“研究生教育创新计划”：鼓励并资助研究生科研创新，促进研究生教育与生产劳动和社会实践紧密结合，提高研究生培养质量，促使拔尖创新人才脱颖而出。

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[118] http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=sxa5lputKb8CXN5lR93Oyn9dSIu1Z-eqXJj9PAckEiAJlrmxyQSzQOaKXrq-TZgns7E0hAQqyqayRdUfRE5oRv5zGkWXsavMvU3BMsaaS1H_sGF7bKK5ZCpYGLiT_TlnmTynxTlVj4-df3-uc3GKobbeSM0_qYsQ-t07obTx2SnMSQ1vAqat3bj2qr6zDLMSYp0wKR1TgI9_FSEPczeom_.

[119] http://baike.baidu.com/item/2003-2007%E5%B9%B4%E6%95%99%E8%82%B2%E6%8C%AF%E5%85%B4%E8%A1%8C%E5%8A%A8%E8%AE%A1%E5%88%92?fr=aladdin.

e 实施“高等学校哲学社会科学繁荣计划”（2003 年起）：是教育部、财政部贯彻落实中央精神，推进高等学校哲学社会科学繁荣发展的重大举措

f 实施“高等学校教学质量与教学改革工程”：改善高等学校基础课程教学，建设精品课程，改造和充实基础课教学实验室，进一步建设全国高等学校数字图书文献保障体系(CALIS)和全国高等学校实验设备与优质资源共享系统。、

- 2009 年，国务院办公厅下发《关于加强普通高等学校毕业生就业工作的通知》[120]
  a 鼓励到基层工作：中央有关部门继续组织实施“选聘高校毕业生到村任职”、“三支一扶”（支教、支农、支医和扶贫）、“大学生志愿服务西部计划”、“农村义务教育阶段学校教师特设岗位计划”等项目，各地也要因地制宜开展地方项目，鼓励和引导更多的高校毕业生报名参加
  b 鼓励高校毕业生到中小企业和非公有制企业就业：劳动密集型小企业招用登记失业高校毕业生等城镇登记失业人员达到规定比例的，可按规定享受最高为 200 万元的小额担保贷款扶持
  c 鼓励骨干企业和科研项目单位积极吸纳和稳定高校毕业生就业：对符合条件的困难企业可按规定在 2009 年内给予 6 个月以内的社会保险补贴或岗位补贴，由失业保险基金支付；
  d 鼓励和支持高校毕业生自主创业：对高校毕业生从事个体经营符合条件的，免收行政事业性收费，落实鼓励残疾人就业、下岗失业人员再就业以及中小企业、高新技术企业发展等现行税收优惠政策和创业经营场所安排等扶持政策。在当地公共就业服务机构登记失业的自主创业高校毕业生，自筹资金不足的，可申请不超过 5 万元的小额担保贷款；对合伙经营和组织起来就业的，可按规定适当扩大贷款规模；从事当地政府规定微利项目的，可按规定享受贴息扶持。有创业意愿的高校毕业生参加创业培训的，按规定给予职业培训补贴。
- 2011 年 12 月，教育部发布教育部令 《高等学校章程制定暂行办法》（第 31 号）和 《学校教职工代表大会规定》（第 32 号），推动所有高校以章程 明确界定政府与学校的关系，实现政校分开，保障学校的办学自主权，保障师生员工的知情权、参与权、表达权和监督权。
- 2013 年 5 月 22 日，由教育部、国家发改委、财政部联合印发的《中西部高等教育振兴计划（2012—2020 年）》[121]

- 2014 年，《教育部关于做好 2015 年全国普通高等学校毕业生就业创业工作的通知》[122]
  a 推进创新创业教育和自主创业工作
  b 大力引导高校毕业生到基层就业
  c 强化就业指导服务

[120] http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-01/23/content_1213491.htm.
[121] http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2013-05/22/content_2408927.htm.
[122] http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s3265/201412/180810.html.

16. 重要项目/计划等

- 211 工程，1995 年-2016 年失效
  “211 工程”，即面向 21 世纪、重点建设 100 所左右的高等学校和一批重点学科的建设工程，于 1995 年 11 月经国务院批准后正式启动。
  “211 工程”是新中国成立以来由国家立项在高等教育领域进行的规模最大、层次最高的重点建设工作，是中国政府实施“科教兴国”战略的重大举措、是发展高等教育的重大决策。
  “211 工程”建设的主要内容包括学校整体条件、重点学科和高等教育公共服务体系建设三大部分。
  a 1995 年 11 月，经国务院批准，原国家计委、原国家教委和财政部联合下发了《“211 工程”总体建设规划》，“211 工程”正式启动。
  b 2002 年 9 月，经国务院批准，原国家计委、教育部和财政部联合下发了《关于“十五”期间加强“211 工程”项目建设的若干意见》。
  c 2011 年 12 月 30 日，教育部部长袁贵仁在十一届全国人大常委会第二十四次会议时表示，“211”工程和“985”工程的规模已经稳定，不再新设这两个工程的学校，同时为了注重学科导向，引入竞争机制，实施了“特色重点学科项目”对非“211”学校的国家重点学科予以支持。
  d 2016 年 6 月，教育部官网发布了“关于宣布失效一批规范性文件的通知”[123]，宣布《“211 工程”建设实施管理办法》等一批规范性文件失效。
- 985 工程，1998 年-2016 年失效
  1998 年 5 月 4 日，江泽民同志在庆祝北大建校 100 周年大会上向全社会宣告：“为了实现现代化，我国要有若干所具有世界先进水平的一流大学。”此后，教育部决定在实施“面向 21 世纪教育振兴行动计划”中，重点支持部分高校创建世界一流大学和高水平大学，简称“985 工程”
  a 一期：2003 年 12 月 31 日，教育部公布了列入“985 工程”的 34 所高校
  b 二期：2006 年，新增 4 所，累计 38 所
  c 三期：增加 5 所，累计 43 所
- 卓越工程师教育培养计划，2010 年
  2010 年 7 月，教育部正式启动 “卓越工程师教育培养计划” ，批准清华大学等 61 所高校为第一批实施高校。
  培养通用标准：
  http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s7915/201312/160923.html
- “长江学者奖励计划”，2011
  是中华人民共和国教育部与香港李嘉诚基金会为提高中国高等学校学术地位，振兴中国高等教育，于 1998 年共同筹资设立的专项高层次人才计划，该计划包括实行特聘教授岗位制度和长江学者成就奖两项内容。为贯彻落实《国家中长期教育改革和发展规划纲要（2010-2020 年）》和《国家中长期人才发展规划纲要（2010-2020 年）》，教育部从 2011 年起实施新的“长江学者奖励计划”。

十、关于教育经费的重要政策

- 1993 年，《中国教育改革和发展纲要》中规定国家财政性教育经费支出占 GDP 比例要达到 4%
- 2001 年，《国务院关于基础教育改革与发展的决定》规定，农村义务教育经费投入责任由中央、省、市、县等各级财政分级负担，以县为主（*但在当时实施难以实施，尤其是中西部地区*）
- 2013 年 4 月 15 日，教育部印发了《关于开展“教育经费管理年”活动 进一步用好管好教育经费的通知》[124]
  参考：开展“教育经费管理年”活动答记者问[125]，回答了为什么，重要重点等问题。
  为什么要开展教育经费管理年
  2012 年，国家财政性教育经费占 GDP 的比例首次实现了 4%的目标，这是我国教育史上的重要里程碑。随着财政教育投入的大幅增加，用好管好教育经费的任务更突出，要求更迫切，社会关注度更高。
  当前，教育经费使用管理存在着不少突出问题，如：各级各类教育发展不平衡，城乡间、区域间投入水平差距明显，困难群体、特殊群体受教育权利需进一步保障;各领域、各环节不同程度地

[123] http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A02/s5911/moe_621/201606/t20160622_269365.html.
[124] http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_696/201305/151571.html.
[125] http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xwfb/s271/201305/t20130520_152117.html.

存在着经费使用管理不规范现象，一些地方义务教育学校虚报人数、部分中职学校冒领补助资金、个别高校科研人员贪污科研经费等，严重损害了教育形象，影响了事业发展。进一步优化投入结构，加强经费监管，用好管好每一分钱，让人民群众放心，让广大师生受益，成为当前一个阶段非常紧迫的任务。

APPENDIX 4. GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

This appendix is intended to provide a quick reference source for acronyms used in the text of the report, and for definitions of key terms.

Term	Definition
CAS	Chinese Academy of Sciences
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CCAP	Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, within CAS
CCPCC	Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
compulsory education	For China, a nine-year standard, comprising elementary and junior middle school
dependency ratio	The dependency ratio is a measure that divides the total number of children and elderly by the total number of working-age population, and multiplies the result by 100. Child dependency ratios and elderly dependency ratios can be similarly calculated (e.g., number of children, divided by number of working-age population, and then multiplied by 100).
GDP	Gross domestic product. A standard definition offered by the International Monetary Fund: "GDP measures the monetary value of final goods and services—that is, those that are bought by the final user—produced in a country in a given period of time (say a quarter or a year). It counts all of the output generated within the borders of a country. GDP is composed of goods and services produced for sale in the market and also includes some nonmarket production, such as defense or education services provided by the government." (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/gdp.htm)
Gini index	The Gini index or Gini coefficient is an international standard indicator of the degree of inequality of net income distribution among a population. Coefficients may range between 0 and 1, with 0 representing perfect equality of distribution, and 1 representing maximum inequality. The lower the coefficient, the greater the degree of income equality.
gross enrollment ratio	Total enrollments as percentage of children in standard age cohort (may include children younger or older than cohort, and therefore may exceed 100%)
IPLE	Institute of Population and Labor Economics, within CASS
minban	"Popularly managed" institution, indicating non-public or non-state. May be managed by profit or nonprofit company or organization.
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
net enrollment ratio	Enrolled students as percentage of children in standard age cohort for that level of education
NPC	National People's Congress, China's national legislative body.
NSB	National Statistical Bureau
PEB	Provincial education bureau. This abbreviation has been used for convenience in the text; official titles of the bureaux would include names of the provinces. E.g., Ningxia Autonomous Region Education Bureau.

PPP	"Purchasing power parity," a measure for international comparisons usually expressed in $, but corrected for variations in exchange rates of national currencies in order to represent the actual purchasing power of national or per capita incomes. PPP may also be corrected for inflation across time, in which case the standard year for PPP is indicated. E.g., PPP (2010) would mean that PPP values are stated in constant 2010 values, not in current ones.
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal, This method, first systematically described by Robert Chambers at the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Sussex, "describes a ... family of approaches and methods to enable local people to share, enhance and analyse their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act.... [I]n PRA [information] is ... shared and owned by local people. The behaviour and attitudes of outsider facilitators are crucial.... Modes of investigation, sharing and analysis are open-ended, and often visual, by groups, and through comparisons." (Chambers, "Rural appraisal: Rapid, relaxed, and participatory," IDS Discussion Paper 311, 1992). Many international organizations now use variants of PRA but the exact definitions often vary by organization.
zhongzhuan	中专, abbreviated form for 中等转学校: specialized secondary schools, generally teaching technical specialties.

FORDFOUNDATION